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How does legal status shape access to housing?  This research explores the housing journeys 
of Ghanaian migrants in the borough of the Bronx in New York City to answer that question.  
The aim of this research is to understand the processes by which poor documented and 
undocumented migrants access housing, and to uncover the hidden, informal sub-markets that 
they occupy. 
 
Data were collected over a 14-month period of fieldwork, through 2014 and 2015, using a 
mixed methods approach.  Quantitative data were drawn from secondary datasets and 
qualitative data were obtained from in-depth interviews with migrants, housing providers, and 
intermediaries. 
 
This study adapts urban informality theory by adjoining it with the concepts of migrant 
enclaves, social capital and survival strategies.  Urban informality describes informal 
settlements in the Global South that arise due to suspended sovereignty, where the state allows 
settlements to form to facilitate rapid urbanisation at minimal institutional cost.  Urban 
informality occurs in the Bronx differently than in the Global South:  migrants do not construct 
housing but rather obtain units on the formal market that they then sublet on their own informal 
market.  Complicit actors, including profit-seeking providers and indifferent public authorities, 
allow this informal market to form. 
 
The findings show that, surprisingly, legal status is not an organizing framework in the housing 
market.  Rather, the strength of one’s social ties to the Ghanaian migrant community strongly 
determines how housing is accessed.  For instance, undocumented migrants report better 
housing outcomes (lower rents and higher satisfaction) compared to their documented 
counterparts because they have more robust connections to other migrants.  The only migrant 
group that can overcome weak social network ties and still readily access affordable housing 
are unmarried female Ghanaian migrants, as they are desired as household labourers and 
potential spouses.    
 
This research further finds that documented and undocumented migrants are similar in one 
important respect, they resist support from public institutions:  housing courts, social service 
agencies, and elected representatives.  This stems from pervasive myths and misinformation 
regarding government:  migrants tend to believe that public authorities seek to deport them, or 
otherwise prohibit their families from immigrating to the U.S., and that they only truly serve 
Hispanics, who are in the majority in the Bronx.  This results in avoidable impoverishment, 
particularly among documented migrants who decline to seek public benefits to which they are 
legally qualified and entitled.   
 
This study contributes to knowledge with its empirical findings, methodology, and theoretical 
developments.  The findings deepen our understanding of poor migrant communities residing 
in the Global North, and the implications of legal status for housing access.  The methodology 
provides a novel approach for uncovering and examining allocation processes in hidden 
markets.  The adapted urban informality model gives new theoretical insights into the 
relationship between formality and informality, which has further applications in housing 
studies and urban economics. 
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Abstract 
 
How does legal status shape access to housing?  This research explores the housing journeys 
of Ghanaian migrants in the borough of the Bronx in New York City to answer that question.  
The aim of this research is to understand the processes by which poor documented and 
undocumented migrants access housing, and to uncover the hidden, informal sub-markets that 
they occupy. 
 
Data were collected over a 14-month period of fieldwork, through 2014 and 2015, using a 
mixed methods approach.  Quantitative data were drawn from secondary datasets and 
qualitative data were obtained from in-depth interviews with migrants, housing providers, 
and intermediaries. 
 
This study adapts urban informality theory by adjoining it with the concepts of migrant 
enclaves, social capital and survival strategies.  Urban informality describes informal 
settlements in the Global South that arise due to suspended sovereignty, where the state 
allows settlements to form to facilitate rapid urbanisation at minimal institutional cost.  Urban 
informality occurs in the Bronx differently than in the Global South:  migrants do not 
construct housing but rather obtain units on the formal market that they then sublet on their 
own informal market.  Complicit actors, including profit-seeking providers and indifferent 
public authorities, allow this informal market to form. 
 
The findings show that, surprisingly, legal status is not an organizing framework in the 
housing market.  Rather, the strength of one’s social ties to the Ghanaian migrant community 
strongly determines how housing is accessed.  For instance, undocumented migrants report 
better housing outcomes (lower rents and higher satisfaction) compared to their documented 
counterparts because they have more robust connections to other migrants.  The only migrant 
group that can overcome weak social network ties and still readily access affordable housing 
are unmarried female Ghanaian migrants, as they are desired as household labourers and 
potential spouses.    
 
This research further finds that documented and undocumented migrants are similar in one 
important respect, they resist support from public institutions:  housing courts, social service 
agencies, and elected representatives.  This stems from pervasive myths and misinformation 
regarding government:  migrants tend to believe that public authorities seek to deport them, 
or otherwise prohibit their families from immigrating to the U.S., and that they only truly 
serve Hispanics, who are in the majority in the Bronx.  This results in avoidable 
impoverishment, particularly among documented migrants who decline to seek public 
benefits to which they are legally qualified and entitled.   
 
This study contributes to knowledge with its empirical findings, methodology, and theoretical 
developments.  The findings deepen our understanding of poor migrant communities residing 
in the Global North, and the implications of legal status for housing access.  The 
methodology provides a novel approach for uncovering and examining allocation processes 
in hidden markets.  The adapted urban informality model gives new theoretical insights into 
the relationship between formality and informality, which has further applications in housing 
studies and urban economics. 
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List of Terms 
 
Poor Persons/Impoverished Households:  Individuals and families are categorised as poor 
in this study based on the U.S. Census’ Poverty Threshold, which is $12,486 for a single 
person and $16,072 for two persons, with increases allotted for each related child (U.S. 
Census 2016). 
 
Documented:  A person who holds legal immigration status (otherwise known as legal 
status), which confers a right to remain in the U.S. either indefinitely (permanent resident or 
citizen) or temporarily (valid visa holder). 
 
Undocumented Immigrants/Migrants:  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines 
‘undocumented’ as: ‘All foreign-born non-citizens who are not legal residents. [These 
persons] either entered the United States without inspection or were admitted temporarily and 
stayed past the date on which they were required to leave . . .’ (DHS 2010). 
 
Affordable Housing:  Affordable Housing is officially defined as housing that costs no more 
than 30 percent of a household’s pre-tax income in the U.S. (HUD 2014).  This proportion 
will be referred to throughout, as it is used in all relevant datasets.  However, following 
Hulchanski’s (1995) critique that housing ‘affordability’ is far from a definitive and objective 
measurement, this research views ‘affordability’ as contextual, to be interpreted from the 
perspective of the individual or households.   
 
Formality and Informality:  These terms will be defined jointly because, in most cases, they 
will be used relationally.  This study adapts Kanbur’s (2012) categorisation of formal and 
informal elements of the rental sector.  Formal activities include those that (1) come under 
the purview of regulation and compliance (e.g., rent controls), whereas informal activities 
include those that (2) come under the purview of regulation but do not comply (e.g., illegal 
subdividing), (3) do not come under the purview of regulation because the activities have not 
been specified in regulations (e.g., providing secure tenure), or (4) do not come under the 
purview of the regulation at all (e.g., housing choice).   
 
Borough:  One of the five areas – the Bronx, Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten 
Island –that comprise New York City. 
 
Sub-borough:  New York City divides its boroughs into smaller, contiguous geographic 
areas known as sub-borough; the U.S. Census also uses these sub-boroughs to compute area-
based statistics. 
 
Public Authority:  Any type of government agency or authority referred to in this study.   
 
Intermediary:  Any non-governmental actor referred to in this study, including non-profits, 
advocacy organisations, and religious institutions.  
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1   
Introduction 
 
1.1   Research Components  
1.1.1 Research Aim 
1.1.2  Research Questions  
1.1.3  Subjects and Context:  Ghanaians and the Bronx  
1.1.4  Hypotheses  
 
1.2  Conceptual Framework  
1.3  Chapter Outline  
1.4  Evolution of the Project 
1.5   Contributions to Knowledge 
 
1.1  Research Components 
 
This introduction is divided into five parts.  Part 1.1 describes the research aim, research 
questions, the subjects and context, and hypotheses.  Part 1.2 introduces the conceptual 
framework, and Part 1.3 presents the chapter outline.  Part 1.4 details the evolution of the 
project.  The last subsection, Part 1.5, focuses on the contributions to knowledge that this 
study seeks to make. 
 
1.1.1 Research Aim 
 
This study tests whether legal status shapes how migrants access housing by examining 
Ghanaians in the borough of the Bronx in New York City.  This migrant population is 
analysed as a case study to discern their outcomes in the housing market.  The aim of this 
research is to understand the processes by which both documented and undocumented low-
income migrants access housing and, further, to uncover the hidden, informal sub-markets 
that migrants use.  This study bridges the gap between what is known in existing data on the 
formal housing market and what is unknown about the informal market, where those living 
on the economic margins reside.   
 
 
 
2 
 
1.1.2 Research Questions 
 
This research examines how formal and informal spaces in the housing market are both 
connected and divided through a case study of Ghanaian migrants in the Bronx.  This 
research pursues four key questions which produce empirical and theoretical answers about 
the nature and structure of the housing sub-markets that both legal and illegal low-income 
migrants occupy.   
 
1. What role does legal status play in how housing is obtained in the Bronx? 
 
This study seeks to uncover how legal status shapes the processes by which migrants access 
housing.  That is, to what degree does legal status dictate the housing options available to a 
poor, undocumented migrant?   
 
2. How do Ghanaian migrants strategize to access housing? 
 
The second question concerns the specific strategies that migrants employ to find housing 
and how these correspond to any limitations they may face because of a lack of legal status.   
 
3. How do intermediaries and housing providers act as housing allocation gatekeepers? 
 
The third question focuses on other actors in the housing market, including providers 
(landlords and property managers) and various intermediaries, such as not-for-profit housing 
organizations (housing non-profits), advocacy groups, and community organisations (e.g., 
churches, mosques, ethnic groups).  The objectives are to gain a triangulated perspective on 
the segment of the housing market that serves those living on the economic margins and to 
understand the role housing actors play in allocation.  
 
4. Where does informality occur and how does it interface with formality? 
 
The fourth question explores what it means to have an informal housing marketplace exist 
alongside and within a first-world context such as New York City.  This is a highly regulated 
market with a wealth of resources, yet datasets can only approximate the existence of 
informal housing practices (e.g., overcrowding1, subdividing units).  This question addresses 
the gap in the scholarship, providing both an understanding of informal housing practices as 
well as a theoretical model of the informal market. 
                                                
1 Crowding is defined as more than one and one-half persons per room (HVS 2013).   
3 
 
1.1.3 Subjects and Context:  Ghanaians and the Bronx 
 
Ghanaians in the Bronx, as a migrant community in the borough, represent the ideal case-
study for this research.   
 
Ghanaians are a fast-growing, relatively new migrant community in New York that is part of 
a larger cohort of West African migrants.  Their migration to New York City – specifically to 
the Bronx – has grown 60 percent since 2000 and their population stands at more than 30,000 
residents (Newest New Yorkers 2013; Roberts 2014).  
 
Despite this surging growth among Ghanaians and their larger West African cohort, these 
populations in America remain largely unexamined by academic research.  What is known 
about them is that they are mostly poor, highly entrepreneurial, overwhelmingly live in the 
Bronx, and arrive through a permanent residency visa lottery or on visiting visas on which 
many overstay (MPI 2015).  These factors together describe a homogenous, geographically 
concentrated community comprised of both documented and undocumented migrants.  In 
choosing Ghanaians as the research subject from their larger milieu of West Africans, this 
study opted for the largest nationality group in New York City, for it was presumed that this 
group would have the greatest number of undocumented migrants given the relative size of 
their population.    
 
A sizable undocumented population is necessary because this study aims to understand how 
immigration status ultimately influences access to housing, if at all.  Legal status is a requisite 
condition for obtaining all manner of resources within the United States.  It gives one a right 
to employment and it provides the necessary identification documents needed to prove 
eligibility for public resources.  In short, legal status facilitates access to societal rights and 
privileges.  Hence, a lack thereof would theoretically pose significant obstacles.  In the 
formal housing market, one must prove oneself able to afford a unit using a variety of 
financial documentation, which undocumented migrants struggle to produce.  However, there 
is a dearth of academic knowledge as to how these migrants, without such paperwork, 
nevertheless access housing where allocation is highly formalised, such as in the Bronx.   
 
The Bronx is the most impoverished of New York City’s five boroughs and it has the highest 
share of renters in the city: 81.5 percent of its residents rent (HVS 2013).  Further, 80 percent 
of its housing stock is subject to some form of rent control, making it the most heavily rent-
4 
 
regulated borough (HVS 2013).  Economically, it follows that low-income migrants would 
opt to live in a low-income area, as it should be more affordable.  But the Bronx is not 
conventionally the borough of choice for most immigrant populations.  It is in fact second to 
last as an immigrant locale out of the five boroughs, ahead of Staten Island, a distant, mostly 
suburban borough.  Nevertheless, Ghanaian migrants overwhelmingly live in the Bronx, as 
more than three-quarters of their population in New York City reside in this borough.  Their 
concentration in this one borough is the highest among the West African cohort.  And it is 
important to understand why this is the case, particularly if the Bronx proves to be the long-
term home for this migrant community as opposed to merely an economically feasible short-
term reception market.   
 
Yet, the fact that the Bronx is highly impoverished suggests that it is an ideal space for a 
vibrant hidden, informal housing market.  These are grey sub-markets that exist within a 
larger urban housing market, but without the conventional rules governing access or legal 
protections, such as tenure security.  The housing offered on this informal market serves 
migrants who live on the economic margins and lack the resources and/or institutional 
familiarity needed to obtain conventional housing.  This study seeks to understand the 
informal market to learn both its functional design as well as its theoretical implications. 
 
1.1.4 Hypotheses 
 
This research began with two main hypotheses:   
 
1. Undocumented Ghanaian migrants are meaningfully disadvantaged relative to their 
documented counterparts in accessing housing because they lack legal status.   
 
The first hypothesis is based on the fact that legal status is a requisite condition for obtaining 
all manner of resources in the United States generally, and in the Bronx specifically.  One 
cannot legally obtain employment without proof of a right to work, substantiated by a 
government issued Social Security number.  Moreover, employment – which gives proof of 
income – is critical as part of a prospective landlord’s application process.  Those unable to 
supply the documentation needed to prove they are financially capable of paying for their 
housing face significant access barriers.  In addition, undocumented migrants must not only 
try to find housing without being able to provide acceptable proof of their ability to pay, but 
are also ineligible for benefits, including rental subsidies.  This means that they should, in 
theory, have fewer resources relative to other low-income persons who can legally obtain 
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housing benefits.  Per the hypothesis, undocumented migrants should be relegated to 
pursuing inferior options offered on the informal market because they cannot satisfy the 
application requirements of the formal market.  
 
2. On both formal and informal housing markets, intermediaries—non-market actors 
who can act as gatekeepers—influence allocation.   
 
This second hypothesis is derived from a review of the history of housing non-profits in the 
Bronx and academic literature describing the importance of community-based third-party 
actors in housing markets.  The Bronx has a strong history of housing advocacy that dates 
back to the 1970s, when many such non-profits were founded to rebuild the borough after 
endemic urban decay due to property abandonment and arson (Schill et al. 2002; Perine and 
Schill 2007).  The assumption is that these organisations and their derivatives that have 
followed over the years can meaningfully assist their constituencies of low-income tenants in 
finding affordable housing on the formal market.  On the informal market, the literature also 
points to the importance of social service non-profits and ethnic group social networks.  
Based on this, it follows that Ghanaian migrants would also rely on their communities for 
support if they are unsuccessful in finding housing alone.  
 
Both hypotheses were made after reviewing the literature and available data.  However, as 
the subsequent chapters will show, Ghanaian migrants have developed their own market 
processes for accessing housing that bypass the constraints of legal status, thus disproving the 
hypotheses.   
 
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
This case study uses the Ghanaian migrant experience to uncover how the informal market 
provides housing to poor migrants, who work as low-cost labourers in the urban economy, at 
minimal cost to public authorities.   
 
This project applies the theory of urban informality as its conceptual framework to situate 
this case study.  Urban informality theorises that informal settlements in the developing 
world emerge as a mode of urbanisation:  such settlements are permitted because they yield 
economic growth for the larger urban system’s economy, at minimal institutional cost (Roy 
2009). 
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This research adapts urban informality to the developed-world setting of New York City.  It 
identifies the emergence of informal housing in the Bronx as conceptually comparable to 
informal settlements in the developing world:  both occur where authorities withdraw 
sovereignty (oversight and control) in effort to facilitate economic growth in the larger urban 
system.  Adapting urban informality to the Bronx, of course, must account for the context of 
this environment, which exists in the Global North in a city where the government is strong 
and active in regulating the housing market.  However, as this research shows, regulatory 
enforcement in the Bronx has particular gaps, reflecting both administrative discretion and 
neglect – and this is where urban informality emerges.   
 
Furthermore, in adapting urban informality, the concepts of migrant enclaves, social capital, 
and survival strategies are adjoined to the original theory.  These concepts work together to 
describe how migrants navigate both formal and informal environments, individually and as a 
community: social capital influences how migrant enclaves are bonded and organised; and 
survival strategies describe the type of tactics impoverished persons living on the economic 
margins of society employ in effort to survive despite their resource limitations.  
 
1.3 Chapter Outline  
 
This dissertation is organised into eight chapters, including this Introduction, Chapter 1.    
 
Chapter 2:  Literature Review.  This chapter situates the research in the context of existing 
scholarship. It identifies the gap that the study aims to fill, namely, how legal status shapes 
informal housing allocation processes for migrants on the economic margins in cities in the 
Global North.  The literature review covers five academic areas.   
 
The first area focuses on urban informality and wider scholarship on formality and 
informality.  It delves into the categorical distinctions made between formal versus informal 
sectors.  The aim here is to show that these divisions misrepresent the symbiotic relationship 
and blurred boundaries that exist between these spaces.   
 
The second area focuses on enclaves, describing how these bonded ethnic communities 
facilitate access to resources (housing and otherwise) for its members.  Complexity in these 
enclaves results from intra-group cleavages that form based on different migration journeys, 
as well as legal status.   
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The third and fourth areas explore literature on social capital and survival strategies.  Social 
capital is a critical resource within migrant enclaves, but it can also inhibit members of a 
social network from accessing outside information.  Social capital also correlates with 
survival strategies in describing how impoverished peoples manage through hardships using 
group support. 
 
The fifth and final area, neo-institutionalism, shows an alternate conceptual pathway that this 
research strongly considered, but ultimately rejected based on findings uncovered during the 
course of fieldwork.  
 
Chapter 3:  Methodology.  This chapter describes the research’s mixed methods approach 
and single case study design.  This study is a sub-group case study that investigates a single 
population divided into two sub-groups according to legal status.  This design is grounded in 
the notion of disaggregating data on a complex immigrant community.  Quantitative data 
were obtained from a variety of public data sets to provide context on the composition of the 
local housing stock as well as the demographics of the Ghanaian population.  These data also 
allow a glimpse into the demographic composition of the informal housing market, revealing 
that it is comprised of extremely low-income households that are mostly immigrants.  
Qualitative data – derived from in-depth interviews with documented and undocumented 
migrants, housing providers, and intermediaries – are used to fill the knowledge gap where 
the quantitative data is lacking.  These data are triangulated to answer each research question.   
 
The methodology chapter also explains how the interview sample was gathered using both 
purposive and snow-ball sampling techniques, and how representativeness and validity of the 
sample size were further tested using the ethnographic method of sequential interviewing. 
 
Chapter 4:  The Bronx and its Ghanaians by the Numbers.  This chapter sets the scene 
for this research by detailing quantitative information on the case study context.  It presents 
quantitative detail on the housing stock and demographic composition of the Bronx, and 
explains the degree to which this borough is the most impoverished in New York City.  Next, 
this chapter introduces what is known about the documented Ghanaian migrant community in 
and around New York.  The aim of this chapter is to present information about where the 
subjects of this research, Ghanaian migrants, are living, as well as the broader economic and 
housing context.  
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Chapter 5:  Housing Actors.  This is the first of three findings chapters.  It addresses the 
third research question on how housing actors, providers and intermediaries act as allocation 
gate-keepers.  The findings in this chapter complicate the second hypothesis; they show that 
the main gatekeepers to housing are providers, and that intermediaries play no significant role 
in allocation in the context of the formal market.  But this outcome also depends on both the 
type of provider (private, non-profit, public) and intermediary (religious, advocacy group, 
public authority).  Depending on the provider, there are two types of allocation processes: (1) 
formal - a general application available to all prospective tenants; and (2) informal - a process 
offered only to select persons, groups, and some leaders of religious institutions.     
 
Chapter 6:  Strategies.  This chapter answers the first and second research questions.  It 
addresses what role legal status plays in how housing is obtained in the Bronx and what 
strategies documented and undocumented migrants use to access housing.  The findings in 
this chapter completely confound the first hypothesis that legal status would be a key benefit 
for migrants who possessed it.  Rather, the findings uncover several complicating variables 
that ultimately reveal a reality different from that anticipated. 
 
Firstly, regardless of legal status, Ghanaian migrants are obligated to pay a meaningful share 
of their income in remittances.  This obligation arises partly from debts that migrants have 
incurred in undertaking their migration journey, but it is mostly a duty-bound responsibility 
to one’s relatives living in Ghana that is paid monthly.  Remittances seriously strain migrant 
finances.   
 
Secondly, most documented migrants do not pursue public assistance despite being eligible.  
Both of these factors result in resource parity between documented and undocumented 
migrants.  In addition, and most significantly, the findings shown in this chapter also reveal 
that undocumented migrants are more likely to have established transnational connections to 
relatives in America because they arrive on Visiting Visas.  Therefore, this population tends 
to have strong social network support, allowing these undocumented migrants to avail 
themselves to a wide range of access-to-housing strategies.  Documented migrants, in 
contrast, tend not to have such transnational familial connections as their migration journey 
invariably begins with randomly issued visas; as such, these migrants often arrive in the US 
not knowing anyone.  As a result, documented migrants have more limited access to housing 
strategies for lack of strong familial ties to other migrants, and these connections are crucial 
in finding preferential housing.  Undocumented migrants, thus, report better outcomes 
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compared to their documented counterparts as measured by housing satisfaction and rental 
cost, particularly on the informal housing market where most of these extremely poor 
migrants obtain their housing. 
 
This chapter also explores the unique constraints and opportunities available to female 
migrants.  While the role of gender was not hypothesised as a critical factor in housing 
allocation at the onset of this research, findings reveal that this is important.  Single female 
migrants are coveted by their co-ethnics as tenants, regardless of legal status, because they 
are viewed as potential marriage partners in this community and providers of free household 
labour.  More broadly, most female migrants report that their experience in the housing 
market involves bartering their domestic skills for housing.  This has the advantage of cost 
savings for these women, but it also imposes a limitation whereby they work in the home as 
uncompensated maids and childcare providers.   
 
Chapter 7:  Urban Informality.  This chapter applies urban informality, the core of this 
study’s theoretical framework, to answer the final research question:  what is the relationship 
between the formal and informal processes in housing allocation?  The chapter examines the 
implications of the qualitative findings from the housing experiences of Ghanaian migrants.  
Namely, the relationship between formal and informal housing markets in the Bronx is 
overlapping and symbiotic, and the markets are mutually dependant.  From this 
understanding comes a model for predicting and understanding the emergence of urban 
informality as a ‘mode’ of urbanisation in the Global North’s cities.   
 
Chapter 8:  Conclusion.  This chapter describes how both the empirical and theoretical 
implications of this study constitute a significant contribution to learning.  It also explores 
further research topics that could follow from this project. 
 
1.4  Evolution of the Project 
 
From the onset of this project, the objective was to understand and discern the rules that 
apply to those who are in the U.S. illegally and live informally.  Literature on informality is 
restricted to groups living in extreme poverty and institutional isolation, but such studies 
almost always deal with informal settlements—slums, favelas, shantytowns—in the Global 
South.  Missing from this literature was a study of where and how informality may emerge in 
a formal setting—spaces with active public authorities, recognised rights, and strong 
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enforcement mechanisms.  This line of inquiry led to New York City and its Housing and 
Vacancy Survey (HVS).   
 
The HVS is a rich dataset on the city’s housing market and stock with borough-by-borough 
detail showing all that was known about the local market—including approximations of its 
informal sector.  This dataset’s indirect data on “hidden homes,” “doubling-up,” and 
“overcrowding,” provided some description of informal housing practices.   But this dataset 
stopped well short of explaining the structure of the informal sector as a distinct housing 
market, such as how informal housing was created, accessed, allocated, and by whom and 
why.       
 
This research sought to fill these gaps with an innovative focus on legal status.  The 
reasoning was that the most vulnerable, relatively new immigrants who are in the country 
illegally would be those most likely to need, pursue, and occupy informal housing.  
Comparing the housing experiences of the undocumented to that of their documented co-
ethnic compatriots made for a clear case study design, with limited confounding variables, for 
understanding both formal and informal housing markets.   
 
1.5  Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This research makes contributions to the fields of housing studies, urban economics, and 
research methodology.  Firstly, it introduces adapted urban informality as a new model for 
understanding the interdependent dynamic between the formal and informal housing sectors 
in first-world cities.  This model identifies where the general housing stock is likely to be 
repurposed in the informal sector, and how this comports with the interests of all those 
involved: low-income (migrant) occupants, providers, and governing authorities.  Secondly, 
this model provides new ways to identify different sub-housing markets and allocation 
processes in the Global North’s cities.  Thirdly, it contributes to urban economics by 
explaining the logic for how such cities also accelerate urbanisation by limited suspension of 
oversight.  This suspension can arise from administrative discretion or neglect, but it 
nevertheless functions to advance a particular form of deregulated growth that benefits the 
urban economy at minimal cost to the state.  Integrating this conceptual logic into urban 
economics better explains both geographic patterns across different segments of the low-
wage labour force as well as public resource allocation.  Finally, the methodological impact 
of this study is that it employs an innovative mix of quantitative, qualitative, and 
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ethnographic methods to study housing markets, building on previous contributions that 
apply ethnography to housing studies, such as Rex and Moore (1967).  The approach taken in 
this research provides a contemporary methodology for unmasking hidden market segments 
and learning about? inter-community dynamics among very hard-to-reach populations.   
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2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1   Formality, Informality, and Urban Informality  
2.2   Migrant Enclaves  
2.3   Social Capital and Networks 
2.4   Strategies  
2.5   Gap 
2.6   Neo-Institutionalism  
2.7   Conceptual Framework 
 
This chapter presents a body of scholarship that situates this research conceptually and 
identifies the gap that this study aims to fill: how legal status shapes housing allocation for 
migrants living on the margins in cities in the Global North.   
 
Part 2.1 introduces formality, informality, and urban informality, describing how each 
concept applies to urban spaces and housing allocation.  Urban informality is the theoretical 
core of this research, and each of the following subsections describe theories and concepts to 
which it will be adjoined.  Parts 2.2 and 2.3, Migrant Enclaves and Social Capital and 
Networks, focus on migrant communities as tangible places and intangible human networks, 
respectively.  Part 2.4, Strategies, surveys how impoverished migrants exercise agency to 
survive in marginal conditions.  Part 2.5 summarises and explains the gap that this research 
aims to fill, and Part 2.6 presents the integrated conceptual framework.  Finally, Part 2.5, 
Neo-Institutionalism, discusses scholarship that informed the conceptual development of this 
study, but was later supplanted by urban informality during fieldwork.   
 
2.1  Formality, Informality, and Urban Informality 
 
Part 2.1 introduces the concepts of formality, informality, and urban informality in regard to 
housing studies, and in order to situate the theoretical framework.  
 
Formality and informality are related concepts.  Grounded in its root word ‘form,’ which 
means ‘the rule,’ formality encompasses regulations and other institutionally enforceable 
processes (Hart 2005, p. 1).  Informality, in contrast, refers to that which functions outside of 
the bounds of formality (Sindzingre 2004; Chen 2012).  The origins of the formal and 
informal pairing are useful for understanding the theoretical basis and utility of both notions.  
Hart (1973) introduced ‘informality’ in his research on urban migrants in Accra, Ghana 
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where he observed pervasive unregulated small scale enterprising across all social classes 
(ibid).  Slum-dwelling urban migrants used ‘informal work’ as a critical survival strategy, 
while middle class people used it to hedge against the insecurity associated with their formal 
employment, which is precarious in Ghana (ibid; Hart 2005).   
 
While Hart (1973) followed Weber (1922) in theorising that bureaucratic stability (formal 
structures) offered the most reliable income for workers and employers alike, he noted that 
such stability was absent in Ghana.  There, the deficiency of formal employment and rampant 
discrimination in hiring are evidence that state laws regulating the economy were minimally 
enforced or non-existent (ibid).  Therefore, the ‘informal sector’ emerged to fill an economic 
void (ibid).  Decades later, Hart reflected that he chiefly sought to show that “Accra’s poor 
were not unemployed” as the dominant development economics discourse then held (Hart 
2006, p. 25).  To this end, he employed the term ‘informal’ to articulate vocations as 
observed and, conceptually, to capture the full scope of this developing economy (ibid).  
Significantly, Hart (1973) showed how structural conditions produced informality, and he 
strongly urged that further studies focus on exploring the relationship between formal 
structures and informality: “Accra is not unique, and a historical, cross-cultural comparison 
of urban economies in the development process must grant a place to the analysis of informal 
as well as formal structures” (p. 89).   
 
Owing to Hart’s (1973) research of the urban poor in Accra, the formal and informal 
paradigm has been adapted across disciplines.  In development economics, informality 
describes irregular income-generating activities at the individual level as well as the larger 
sector that this work creates (Chen 2012; Portes and Schauffler 1993).  Broadly, informality 
represents the foil of its respective formality.  This oppositional framing extends to 
economics, sociology, and anthropology, among other disciplines.  For instance, neo-
institutionalism delineates formal institutions – “humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interactions” manifested in enforceable laws – from their 
informal counterpart: non-codified norms and practices enforced by dense social networks 
(North 1990, p. 97; Nee and Ingram 1998).  
 
Particularly relevant to this thesis is that, in housing studies, formality distinguishes 
registered properties that follow regulatory codes from settlements that fail to abide such 
stipulations.  Larson (2002) observed this in another Global North context:  colonias in south 
Texas.  Her research documented that Mexican migrants have historically been allowed to 
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build large settlements on unincorporated land with no resistance from state authorities.  
These migrants served Texas’ economy and their informal settlements provided them with 
housing without requiring state resources.  State inaction was an exercise of discretionary 
power (ibid).  Yet, as of 2015, the state has taken an interest in incorporating the colonias 
because the unincorporated lands on which they sit have recently become economically 
valuable for the petrochemical industry (Salinas 2015).  Hence, the state can exercise its 
discretionary authority to reassert its ‘formal’ control when this aligns strategically with its 
interests.  
 
The prevailing tradition in the literature is to narrowly apply the concept of informality to the 
Global South.  This traces to Hart (1973) whose study centred on exposing theoretical voids 
in development economic theories and policies.  Studies that have followed in Hart’s (1973) 
footsteps invariably focus on contexts where formality, represented by functioning state 
institutions and laws, remains inept or absent.  The implication of this developing context 
focus is a relative dearth of understanding of how informality emerges in formal, regulated 
environments.  
 
Few studies have examined the relationship between formal structures and informal outcomes 
in ‘first-world’ contexts, but those that have demonstrate the viability and importance of such 
research.  Burger (1998a,b) showed that the conditions of the formal Dutch housing market, 
which was de-commodified, were mirrored in the informal market, where migrants rarely 
charge rents from their undocumented co-ethnics.  Larson (2002) found colonias emerged 
because poor, undocumented migrants could not afford the formal housing market, and that 
the regulatory system effectively made it impossible for their informal housing units to be 
recognised as formal property, which would have allowed it to be connected to public 
utilities.  But even though this “informality contradicts legality,” Texas authorities tacitly 
condone colonias because any practical alternative would require resources and policy 
changes – whereas inaction remained politically costless, until it became economically 
beneficial to legalise these spaces (ibid, p. 137).  Both unique studies illustrate that formality 
and informality can be effectively applied to both the Global South and Global North alike.   
In addition to over-focusing on the Global South, a separate important criticism of formality 
and informality is that both concepts lack a definitional core.  As Kanbur (2009) explains, 
informality carries the “…dubious distinction of combining maximum policy importance and 
political salience with minimal conceptual clarity and coherence in analytical literature” (p. 
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2).  Others reject the definition of formal and informal simply as opposites, finding this to be 
vapid reductionism; instead they insist that both concepts lie more aptly on a continuum than 
across a divide (Ejigu 2011; Roy 2005; Williams 2014).  Echoing these critiques, Chen 
(2007) proposes that formal and informal be understood as overlapping concepts, weighed in 
high-to-low parameters.  This is consistent with Sindzingre (2004) who argues for an 
empirically grounded application of each concept, as the definition would then be made 
explicit, which would help with understanding the theoretical meaning.  
 
Kanbur (2009, 2012) proposes a four-part definition for formality and informality to make 
the terminology more precise as it relates to economic activity:  Formal activities (a) come 
under the purview of and comply with regulation, and informal activities entail those: (b) 
under the purview of regulation that do not comply, (c) do not come under the purview of 
regulation only because they have adjusted out of the ambit of controls, and (d) would not 
come under the purview of the regulation at all.  He argues that this framing provides 
specificity (ibid; ibid).  Still, critics concede that the formal-informal framework endures 
because of its utility and versatility—it effectively assimilates analytical perspectives and 
categories of research into its conceptual paradigm (Sindzingre 2004; Guha-Khasnobis et. al 
2006; Ejigu 2011; Misztal 2005). 
 
Roy (2005) builds on the conceptual versatility of formality and informality in formulating 
the theory of ‘urban informality,’ which is especially applicable to housing studies.  Urban 
informality situates informal settlements that surround ‘megacities’ in the developing world 
as connected to the formal spaces to which they are adjacent.  Roy (2005, 2004) and Roy and 
Al Sayyad (2004) describe urban informality as a mode of urbanisation whereby the state 
deliberately suspends sovereignty, within defined parameters, in order to facilitate urban 
expansion.  It is in this suspended space that the informal settlement and its economy emerge.  
These theorists further argue that this physical realm of informality cannot be distinguished, 
in an epistemological sense, as separate from formality.  Both spaces are literally connected 
and their economies and populations are interdependent, hence formal and informal in this 
context should be viewed in composite, as mutually dependent. 
 
Urban informality therefore rejects the notion of an ‘informal sector’ as a disconnected, 
separate space.  Instead this theory holds that informality is embedded and intimately tied to 
its formal surroundings.  But how this informality manifests depends on context, including 
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the economic and social factors therein that shape its particular development (UN Habitat 
2003).   
 
Borrowing from post-colonial scholar Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) notion of the ‘state of 
exception,’ Roy (2005) describes developing world informal settlements as a calibrated 
“expression of … sovereignty” – that is, with the remit of the formal power of the state (Roy 
2005, p. 149).  Where Agamben’s (1998) state of exception describes a condition in which 
sovereign authorities purposely suspend the rule of law to facilitate extra-legal actions, Roy 
(2005) adapts this framing to explain informal settlements.  These spaces emerge because of 
a logical withdrawal of state authority; the aim of the state is to allow a mode of urbanisation 
that does not strain state resources yet yields economic growth.  This observation 
corroborates Larson (2002)’s findings in South Texas, among others’ (p. 148; Boyd 2000; 
Hart 1973, 2005; De Soto 2000; Hall and Pfeiffer 2000).  Informality is therefore not the 
“‘chaos that precedes order, but rather the situation that results from its suspension’” (Roy 
2005, p. 149).  Those who build informal settlements live and work in unsanctioned space, 
but their economic activities, despite being insecure and unrecognised, generate growth 
(ibid).  
 
Figure 2.1 is an original depiction of the conventional understanding of developing world 
cities. 
 
Figure 2.1    Formal-Informal Sector Divide 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
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Figure 2.1 separates ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ into distinct sectors with a clear divide between 
them.  Urban informality theorists argue that this delineation is misleading, because what 
occurs in the informal ‘sector’—such as self-made housing—does not occur in a vacuum 
(Roy 2004, 2005, 2009; Roy and Al Sayyad 2004; Robinson 2002).  These settlements arise 
because there is a demand for urbanisation.  This demand itself can be driven by a variety of 
factors, including both low and high growth situations (UN Habitat 2003).  In the former 
circumstance, dismal economic growth or endemic poverty may facilitate slums as a low-cost 
solution (ibid).  But this logic may also apply to the latter situation, where the aim of 
accelerating development motivates the state to allow unregulated, legally unrecognised 
outgrowths that do not conform to legal standards or building codes (ibid).   
 
In either case, urban outgrowth is not unexplained or uncontrolled, but rather a consequence 
of a strategic exercise of state sovereignty:  withdrawal (Roy 2004, 2005; Roy and Al Sayyad 
2004).  Critically, urban informality proponents find that this ‘mode’ of urbanisation is 
logical, for it achieves the state’s objective with minimal institutional investment or liability.   
In addition, these theorists reject the conflation of the informal sector exclusively with 
poverty (Williams 2007, 2010, 2014; Williams and Nadin 2010).  What makes a place, an 
activity, or an individual informal is not poverty, but the lack of institutional (legal) 
recognition.  So, while there is temptation to associate dilapidated built-environment 
aesthetics with informality, this is not a universal standard.  A slum in India or Favela in 
Brazil is as legally informal as an unregistered privately constructed gated community in 
South Africa (de Soto 2000; Skidmore 2010; Atkinson and Blandy 2005).  The importance of 
disentangling poverty from informality proves key for appreciating urban informality in 
developed world cities as well.  For in the Bronx, poverty is endemic and the quality of 
housing can vary widely, yet this is not what makes a unit informal; informality results from 
an illegal subdivision, crowded subletting or through legally unrecognised apartment 
transfers.   
 
Figure 2.2 below is an original illustration of urban informality as its authors describe it.  
Here, both formal and informal spaces are viewed as part of the same urban system.   
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Figure 2.2   Urban Informality Illustration of Formal-Informal 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Depiction 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the urban informality conception of the megacity as an urban system. 
The dotted horizontal arrows show that the informal space is not fixed, but can fluctuate.  The 
state may reassert its sovereignty over an informal settlement when it is deemed necessary.  
The barriers and limits are not fixed or permanent, but fluctuate in accordance with demand 
and the state’s actions (or inactions) in meeting it.  But whatever the relative size or 
prominence of the formal and informal space, they do not exist apart from one another; they 
are mutually dependent.  Thus, in this diagram, the dotted vertical line shows a permeable, 
overlapping barrier between formal and informal spaces.  Those living in an informal 
settlement may work in the formal economy, and vice versa.  So, there is a continuous 
transactional dynamic between both spaces.  This exercise of authority can take place in the 
form of legalisation of the unrecognised space or its destruction.  A famous example of the 
latter includes the mass removal of illegal favelas in Rio de Janiero in anticipation of the 
2016 Olympics (Douglas 2015).  Other examples include the Baan Mankong Programme in 
Thailand that worked to legalise informal settlements and bring the properties therein up to 
(formal) housing standards using state-guaranteed loans (Boonyabancha 2009).  
Alternatively, the size of the informal sector may grow with economic demand for housing 
and labour.  Examples of this abound, such as shantytown expansions in Mumbai, Nairobi, 
and numerous other developing world cities (Björkman 2013; Mundia 2017). 
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However, the explanatory logic of urban informality does not necessarily extend to the 
individuals who occupy and construct informal settlements.  This is a clear gap in the theory.  
This study aims to bridge this gap by adjoining urban informality to additional concepts. 
 
The following sections in this Literature Review explore selected scholarship on the concepts 
of migrant enclaves, survival strategies, and social capital as part of this study’s inquiry into 
how legal status influences allocation in the poorest segment of the rental market.  These 
concepts are introduced independently and then brought into conversation under an adapted 
urban informality theoretical framework.  This study adapts urban informality to informal 
housing allocation processes in the developed world using housing patterns of Ghanaian 
migrants living in the Bronx.  Per the hypotheses, legal status separates Ghanaian migrants 
across the permeable border between formal and informal spaces where the documented have 
full access to all housing options whereas the undocumented are relegated to an informal 
market.   
 
2.2   Migrant Enclaves   
 
Based on the empirical evidence that ethnic and immigrant groups congregate together and 
segregate from mainstream populations, this section surveys the literature to understand why 
this is so and what is known of the social dynamics in these communities. Section 2.2 
introduces three major theories regarding immigrant (migrant) and ethnic clustering: (1) 
spatial assimilation, (2) place stratification, and (3) the ethnic enclave, and then proceeds to a 
selection of studies that have applied each theory.  Thereafter, additional studies on ethnic 
enclave migrant communities are explored to illustrate the scope and limitations of this 
theory, as well as to further the notion of the enclave in relation to urban informality. 
 
Spatial assimilation, first articulated by Massey (1985) and subsequently expounded by a 
number of other theorists, established that clustering occurs because of economic necessity 
(Alba and Nee 1997; Alba et al. 1999).  Residing in a community of co-ethnics is useful for 
immigrants and ethnic minorities because they can more easily negotiate this market, and 
thereby more readily access affordable accommodation relative to the general market 
(Massey 1985).  This is but the initial stage of the journey under this theory:  the processes of 
climbing the socio-economic ladder, acculturation, and assimilation eventually impel them to 
exit this homogeneity and follow the mainstream group (whites) into suburbia.  Under this 
theory, residential mobility acts as the mechanism for assimilation and the clustered 
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ethnic/migrant community is an impermanent space, born of necessity, and dissolved when 
its utility is exhausted (Massey 1985; Alba and Nee 1997; Alba et al. 1999).   
 
The theory of place stratification builds on spatial assimilation, but differs crucially in one 
respect: this theory identifies structural limitations, such as housing discrimination, as forces 
that prevent certain groups from achieving residential mobility.  Place stratification 
ultimately draws from the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis, which holds that limitations on 
residential choice, particularly for African Americans, “combined with the steady dispersal of 
jobs from central cities, are responsible for the low rates of employment and low earnings” of 
minorities (Kain 1994, p. 371; Kain 1968).  Thus, these groups are unable to pursue the path 
toward mainstream assimilation and, as such, their members continue to reside in segregated 
areas that are frequently underserved and economically deprived (Rosenbaum and Friedman 
2007; Kain 1994).  
 
The ethnic enclave theory differs from the previous two theories in contending that the self-
contained ethnic/migrant community becomes an end in itself (Portes and Wilson 1980; 
Portes 1987; 1995; 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Zhou 1992; 1996).  These 
spaces create economic and social opportunities that would otherwise be unavailable to 
migrants.  Members are not simply resigned to their clustered communities as spatial 
assimilation and place stratification suggest, but actually prefer them.  This is because 
enclaves build “bounded solidarity” – communal trust based on shared experience and 
identity, which deepens their attachment to their co-ethnic community (Portes 1987, 1995).  
This high-level of group solidarity further facilitates enterprise through trust-based lending 
and access to reliable labour, creating a positive feedback loop of economic and social 
opportunities, ensuring the enclave’s sustainability (Portes and Zhou 1996; Portes 1995, 
1998).   
 
A number of studies have sought to test the three aforementioned theories.  For example, 
Schaake et al. (2010) investigated the role of neighbourhood ethnic composition in explaining 
moving out rates in Holland, and found that “ethnic minorities are more likely than native 
Dutch to move within neighbourhoods, and less likely to move away from them” even as the 
share of minorities in those neighbourhoods increases (p. 593).  The results “question the 
validity of the spatial assimilation theory,” but support the ethnic enclave model (p. 606).  
These authors are also careful to note that place stratification could also explain their findings 
(p. 606).  In another study, Logan, Alba, and Zhang (2002) studied immigrant groups in New 
21 
 
York City and Los Angeles, testing whether ethnic neighbourhoods in these central cities 
served as via points or as permanent destinations for their occupants.  Their findings were 
mixed: some ethnic neighbourhoods were “chosen by those for whom it serves their practical 
needs for an inexpensive and congenial setting,” and for others – Filipinos, Afro-Caribbeans, 
and Indians – the neighbourhood served as their “destination” rather than a “springboard” (p. 
320-321).  Importantly, this study found persistent evidence of housing discrimination against 
Afro-Caribbeans in New York, also supporting place stratification’s hypothesis (ibid). 
 
The three theories are not mutually exclusive, for each depends on context and the group in 
question.  For example, Rosenbaum and Friedman’s (2007) detailed study of how generations 
of immigrants fare in New York’s housing market supports both spatial assimilation and 
place stratification.  These authors find that for groups with phenotypically fair skin from 
Europe and Asia, the residential journey operates in accordance with spatial assimilation – 
first generation clustering, followed by social assimilation and residential integration into 
more mainstream areas (ibid).  In contrast, for:  
 
[H]ouseholds of African heritage and dark-skinned Latinos, whether native-born or 
belonging to any of the immigrant generations …[the] results demonstrate 
unequivocally that black race continues to determine where households live above 
and beyond the influence of socioeconomic status, and thus remains a salient 
predictor of households’ access to a range of resources that have been shown to be 
important in influencing social and economic mobility within and across generations 
(p. 8).   
 
Ethnic enclave theory shares aspects of spatial assimilation and place stratification.  
According to the theory, an enclave is a clustered homogenous community that forms and 
endures because it provides resources that are difficult for minorities to individually obtain in 
mainstream society (Portes and Shafer 2006).  Some theorists argue that the notion of 
bounded solidarity, critical for the enclave’s flourishing, “does not arise out of the 
introjection of established values or from individual reciprocity exchanges, but out of the 
situational reaction of a class of people faced with common adversities” (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993, p. 1325).  Thus, the enclave emerges from discriminatory conditions—
which place stratification theory also describes—but endures and thrives because it facilitates 
economic and social opportunities for members (Williams 2007, 2010, 2014; Williams and 
Nadin 2010).  
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As migrants are the focus of this study, the relevant questions are:  what is known about 
enclaves regarding (a) the dynamics within and (b) their relationship with mainstream 
society?   
 
There are a number of case studies that explore such issues, the most notable of which is of 
Cuban migrants in Miami, Florida, who are studied by the sociologist Alexander Portes – 
architect and co-author of the enclave theory and bounded solidarity concept.  Portes focuses 
on two cohorts of Cuban migrants: the first arrived before 1980 and the second between 1980 
and 2000.   
 
In his analysis, the first cohort was afforded an array of institutional and social advantages, 
including “warm” federal resettlement assistance programs and a perception in the general 
public that Cuban migrants were a “deserving group, loyal U.S. allies in the global struggle 
against communism” (Portes and Shafer 2006, p. 17).  In Miami, this cohort formed a strong 
enclave which acted as a catalyst for entrepreneurialism financed through an inter-group 
system of “character” based loans (p. 14).  By 1987, these migrants had self-employment 
rates higher and aggregate wealth greater than any other Hispanic group in the country, as 
well as relative to the native population as a whole (ibid).   
 
The 1980-2000 cohort of Cuban migrants, in contrast, arrived under entirely different 
circumstances and experienced a dissimilar trajectory relative to their earlier counterparts 
(ibid).  Cubans of this period were defined by a historic event, the Mariel exodus of 1980. 
This is when the Cuban government opened the port of Mariel to all relatives of exiles—
resulting in an outpouring of 125,000 refugees into South Florida in less than six months 
(ibid).  Among Americans the influx was widely unpopular and it shifted policy from 
welcoming to militarily enforced deterrence (ibid).   
 
Significantly, the second cohort also received a cold reception from their predecessors in 
Miami.  The newcomers “were not part of old Cuba, having been raised during the 
revolutionary period, and lacked strong kinship and friendship ties with the established 
Miami Cuban community” (p.17).  Furthermore, the first cohort held the post-Mariel entrants 
“…responsible for the rapid decline of Cubans’ public image in the United States and having 
few social links with them…came to regard the newcomers as a group different from 
themselves” (p.17).  Portes and Shafer (2006) argue that as a consequence the later cohort, 
unable to avail itself all the enclave’s resources—including financial capital—performed 
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dismally as entrepreneurs ranking “the lowest of all ethnic categories” (p. 21).  However, this 
is not to suggest that the enclave was of no benefit – over a third of new migrants found non-
menial work through co-ethnic enterprises despite lacking English language skills (ibid).   
 
The Cuban enclave of Miami is theoretically illuminating.  One lesson that it teaches is that 
external factors can interject in ways that alter a particular enclave’s historic course, for better 
or worse.  While Portes and company warn against universalising from a single enclave, as 
they hold that one must weigh each group’s political-historical particularities, this research 
asserts two general propositions.  First, the enclave provides a resource base-station for its 
members, provided sufficient population size and density (within a spatially contiguous 
region) are present.  Second, solidarity functions as a critical social resource within an 
enclave (Portes and Wilson 1980; Portes 1987; 1993; 1998; Portes and Zhou 1992; Portes 
and Shafer 2006).   
 
One argument to be made against enclave theory is that it subsumes inter-group complexity.  
In the Miami case study this complexity arises from social cleavage between the two 
generations of Cubans, which suggests an enclave comprised of two distinct cohorts, divided 
by respective migration histories.  Yet this enclave is treated as a singular whole in the study.  
Conceptualising an enclave in unified form does not allow sufficient space for examining 
community segmentation. 
 
Galvez (2007) provides insight on enclave segmentation.  Her study is on Mexican migrants 
in the Bronx and the division between the documented and undocumented members of this 
community.  For early Mexican migrants and their progeny, obtaining U.S. legal status was 
not nearly as vexing a challenge as it is for newcomers.  As such, these early migrants do not 
readily identify with those who followed, of which the majority are undocumented (ibid).  
Furthermore, because of their legal status, documented Mexicans view themselves, and are 
perceived by newer members differently: “those who enjoy such status are elevated to the 
position of ‘experts,’ from whom the rest are expected to learn” (p. 108).  Hence, these 
findings suggest segmentation: this enclave milieu is comprised of at least two sub-
communities emerging from different migration experiences, which shape shared identity and 
notions of solidarity, respectively.  
 
Additional research has also challenged and complicated conceptual presentations of socially 
homogenised enclaves because insufficient attention is given to their internal hierarchies. 
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Mahler (1995) rebukes the ethnic enclave as totalising, particularly for undocumented 
migrants.  Her research on Hispanic nationalities in Long Island, New York focused on 
“…relationships within the immigrant population” in order to capture how migrants “felt” 
and “behaved” toward one another in practice (p. 14).  Her findings show that undocumented 
migrants are a sub-class of documented co-ethnics.  One way the documented community 
exploits the undocumented is through operating an informal housing market of high-cost, 
low-quality bedrooms (ibid).  Her research ultimately contests the presence of ethnic 
solidarity, as a notion with a seldom “questioned presumption of…existence” (p.14).   
 
Still, there are counter ethnographic studies that support the enclave hypothesis’ main 
propositions.  Stoller (2001), for example, examines West African migrants in Harlem and 
their enterprising “street hawking” of imported goods (ibid).  Like Mahler (1995) and Galvez 
(2007), Stoller’s study also identifies undocumented status as a significant distinguishing 
characteristic.  But Stoller’s (2001) conclusions on inter-community relationships differ from 
other theorists’ findings; West African migrants actively serve and protect their own, 
particularly undocumented members from exploitation because of intense group bonds (ibid).  
His findings also show that these migrants are extremely enterprising and rely on one another 
for social support and financial capital, consistent with enclave theory (ibid).  This also 
coheres with other studies of marginalised ethnic group behaviour, such as Boyd (2000) 
study of black women in the urban North who engage in ‘survivalist entrepreneurship’ 
(Williams 2007, 2010, 2014; Williams and Nadin 2010).  Interestingly, communal solidarity 
among the migrants in Stoller (2001) extends beyond nationality and what emerges is a 
shared identity, which the author terms as “Africanicity.”  Ostensibly this complicates the 
single nationality premise of an ethnic enclave, but in West Africa, tribal affiliations pre-date 
borders, so citizenship is not always the main basis for grouping (ibid; Harrison 2003).   
 
These complicated, conflicting studies on ethnic enclaves relate to urban informality, 
illustrating that the enclave emerges to provide resources that are unavailable to its members. 
The state, through its absence and withdrawal in terms of institutional support and 
enforcement, allows migrants to construct their own particular environment.  In this void, the 
enclave performs important functions—employment and housing—that are not readily 
accessible to most within the migrant community.  Enclave theory, by explaining the 
isolation that migrants feel from mainstream society as well as introducing the notion of 
‘bounded solidarity,’ shows the practical push and pull forces that engender urban 
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informality.  Hence, enclave theory is useful for illustrating some of the logistical elements of 
urban informality in Global North contexts, but critically, further conceptual tools are needed 
to discern what takes place within the enclave among its respective sub-populations.   
 
2.3  Social Capital and Networks 
 
Part 2.3 explores social capital and networks, situating these concepts in the context of 
migrant communities.  First, there is a brief presentation of definitions and typologies.  This 
is followed by an applied discussion of the concepts of ‘bonding’ versus ‘bridging’ social 
capital and ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ social capital.  Finally, the relationship between these 
concepts and urban informality is considered.  
 
Social capital has numerous authors and conceptual iterations, but its functional meaning is 
remarkably consistent.  Bourdieu (1984), who brought the term into contemporary use, first 
described it as “a capital of social connections, honourability and respectability” (p. 122).  He 
later expanded and refined his definition of social capital to:  
 
The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each 
of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which 
entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (Bourdieu 1984, p. 248).   
 
Portes (1998) offers a more succinct take, defining social capital as: “the ability to secure 
benefits through membership in networks and other social structures” (p. 8).  Finally, 
Coleman (1990) describes its terms through its purpose, “[l]ike other forms of capital, social 
capital is productive, making possible the achievements of certain ends that would not be 
attainable in its absence” (302).   
 
Bourdieu (1984) and Portes (1998), as well as Coleman (1990) argue that social capital 
functions as a form of currency within a particular network.  Networks are communities 
wherein members can theoretically obtain information, access, or benefits from others within 
their group, and this process of exchange is how social capital is used.  Hence, social capital 
obtains its value from its social network.  
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Of the numerous expositions on social capital, arguably the most useful for this research is 
the typology of ‘bonding’ versus ‘bridging,’ and how these correspond to different network 
arrangements.  Bonding social capital draws people closer together who are already familiar 
with one another or are otherwise socially grouped (Granovetter 1973, 1985; Putnam 1993; 
Woolcock 2001).  The concept of bounded/ethnic solidarity in enclaves (see part 1) builds on 
this type of social capital:  
 
The more distinct a group is in terms of phenotypical or cultural characteristics from 
the rest of the population, the greater the level of prejudice associated with these 
traits, and the lower the probability of exit from this situation, then the stronger the 
sentiments of in-group solidarity among its members and the higher the appropriable 
social capital based on this solidarity (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, p. 1329).   
 
Bridging social capital, in contrast, facilitates connection between individuals across different 
groups. This type of social capital increases the size of one’s network and, by extension, 
enhances the scope of potential resources available to an individual (Christakis and Fowler 
2010; Granovetter 1973; Phillipson et al. 2004; Putnam 1993). 
 
In his study of housing mobility and race in suburbia, Briggs (1998) builds on the bonding 
and bridging typology by formulating a more applied binary of social capital: leveraged 
social capital and social support.  The former refers to “getting ahead” using others for 
assistance and/or access to resources in effort to advance toward a goal, thus leveraging one’s 
network (1998).  Finding housing through one’s network would be an example of exercising 
leveraged social capital.  This social capital also echoes Beider and Goodson’s (2005) 
argument that social networks can act as pathways to overcome biased institutional 
constraints.  Social support, the second component of the typology, refers to finding help for 
an immediate basic need—assistance with “getting by” (Briggs 1998).  Examples of social 
support capital include receiving emergency financial or emotional help from family or close 
friends.  Building on Granovetter’s (1973) research on social networks, Briggs explains that 
wider networks made of weaker ties (bridges) to unrelated individuals are more advantageous 
than tighter (bonded) kinship networks (ibid). 
 
Stoller’s (2001) case study of West Africans in New York gives a strong illustration of 
bonding social capital and social support in practice.  He describes West Africans as a 
relatively new community struggling to identify culturally and linguistically with their 
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surroundings and frequently mistreated in their dealings with natives (ibid).  They “invariably 
complained of loneliness, sociocultural isolation, and alienation from mainstream American 
social customs” (Stoller and Mcconatha 2001, p. 327).  Such circumstances caused West 
Africans to turn inward and bond in what the author terms, “Africanicity,” which is a bond 
based on shared tribal heritage, religion (Islam), and common experience as street traders 
(ibid).  In practice, these migrants frequently provided support to one another, such as taking 
care of a fellow trader’s merchandise to prevent theft, and providing emotional and financial 
support during difficult periods (ibid).  
 
Social capital can also be deleterious.  Following Waldinger (1995), Portes (2014) explains 
that “…particularistic benefits accruing to some by virtue of membership in ethnic or 
religious communities is experienced by others as exclusion from the same social and 
economic benefits” (p. 18407).  Exclusion of non-group members from certain benefits, such 
as favourable employment, requires government intervention to disband unfair arrangements 
(Waldinger 1995).  Negative effects within networks include placing excessive claims or 
obligations on some members: “cozy intergroup relationships of the sort frequently found in 
solitary communities can give rise to a gigantic free-riding problem” (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993, p. 1342).  This follows Granovetter’s (1995) argument that impersonal 
markets emerged partly to resolve situations wherein social ties encumbered enterprise. 
Consequently, social capital can cut both ways, particularly in tight ethnic communities.  
Burgers’ (1998a,b) housing study of migrants in Rotterdam, Holland is an instructive case 
study in this regard.   
 
Burgers’ (1998a,b) findings showed that undocumented migrants belonging to communities 
with high levels of solidarity easily found low-cost, quality housing living with their co-
ethnics who were documented (ibid).  In contrast, migrants whose communities lacked 
solidarity, such as Eastern Europeans, fared worse.  These migrants frequently resided in 
expensive low-quality housing and/or relied on charities for support (ibid).  However, 
Burgers is careful to note that some migrants paid a price in terms of social integration and 
mobility when co-ethnics provided their accommodations: “after all the pains associated with 
going illegally to a rich, Western country, they do not succeed in shedding their ethnic and 
national background and are trapped in basically the same kind of community from which 
they tried to escape” (p. 1866).  Being socially confined to one’s ethnic community also 
allows exploitation, as Burgers (1998a,b) found some documented migrants demanded 
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unpaid services from their undocumented co-ethnics, who would oblige out of fear of 
eviction and deference to normative customs.  
 
Social capital depends on the conditions and context that facilitate its production.  Whether 
social capital functions as a positive or negative resource is predicated on environmental 
pressures and a given community’s reaction to its influence (Giddens 1984; Bacharach and 
Baratz 1962).  Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) write, “social capital arising out of 
situational confrontations is strongest when the resulting bounded solidarity is not limited to 
the actual events but brings about the construction of an alternative definition of the situation 
based on re-enactment of past practices and a common cultural memory” (p. 1332).  The 
West Africans in Stoller (2001) provide a good example in this regard: these migrants formed 
their solidarity based on shared lineage as traveling tradesmen and situated personal 
difficulties of life in New York City within the larger historic journey of their people (ibid).  
Although these migrants lacked ‘bridges’ to external networks, their high levels of bonded 
social capital—solidarity—did not impede members from forming some external ties (ibid).  
In contrast, Burgers’ (1998b) findings in Rotterdam show that although the:  
 
[G]enerous welfare state offers room for ethnic solidarity, this ‘bounded solidarity’ is 
at the same time a strongly ‘binding solidarity.’  In the Dutch context, undocumented 
immigrants remain dependent on the ethnic community of which they are a part for a 
long time.  When housing is concerned, there is nothing left for them outside this 
community but charity or the black market (p. 1866).   
 
In Rotterdam, the context fosters bonding not by way of confrontational experiences, but 
through social benefits that attenuate housing market pressures for qualifying migrants (ibid).  
These conditions produce both positive and negative social capital: undocumented migrants 
can easily access free or inexpensive housing sub-leases from their network of co-ethnics; but 
residing in these conditions can engender dependency, isolation, and result in indentured 
servitude (ibid).  Hence, institutional rules and conditions of a given space shape how social 
capital can function, impacting individual and group choice for the inhabitants of that 
environment (Giddens 1984; Bacharach and Baratz 1962). 
 
In the context of urban informality, the notion of social capital and the network on which this 
currency is traded is key for appreciating inter-community systems in migrant enclaves.  
Where urban informality is a theory for the situational circumstances in which the state 
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withdraws its authority and enclave theory describes how migrant communities form, social 
capital focuses on the means by which migrants engage with one another.  Knowledge that an 
informal settlement exists does not answer the question of whether and how legal status 
influences one’s position in one’s social networks.  Finding answers to these questions 
requires social capital based theory in effort to understand intra-community dynamics. 
 
2.4 Strategies  
 
Part 2.4 discusses the concept of ‘survival strategies.’  This Part explores how this concept 
applies to behaviour among individuals residing in difficult conditions.  It further links 
literature on strategies to literature on housing studies, as well as to the concept of urban 
informality.    
 
Survival strategies are actions that individuals and social groups take in order to manage in 
marginal conditions and with limited resources (Wallace 2002).  In these environments, such 
persons must improvise to find subsistence for themselves and their families.  The literature 
on survival strategies focuses on these types of actions (ibid).   
 
Among the most notable works classifying survival strategies is Rakodi (1995).  Her work 
catalogues strategies—also described as ‘coping’ behaviours—into three types: actions that 
(1) increase resources; (2) mitigate consumption; and/or (3) alter household composition 
(ibid).  The first includes a range of efforts from working multiple jobs to engaging in 
enterprising self-employment.  The literature indicates that both men and women use this 
strategy, though many contend that because women are often resigned to lower-paid, less 
secure work, their use frequently follows a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the negative 
social stigma (of working as a woman) against potential income yield (De Jong 2000; Boyd 
2000 Creese and Wiebe 2009; Datta et al. 2007).  The second and third classifications of 
mitigating consumption and altering household composition include actions that reduce costs 
through rationing and maximising available resources (Rakodi 1995; Portes and Jensen 
1988).  These strategies – which include eating more cheaply and/or less frequently, as well 
as postponing children – are found to disproportionately be used by women (Rakodi 1995, 
1999).  This classification system describes housing insofar as it is a necessary expense that 
can, at best, be mitigated.   
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Housing choice behaviour falls under “mitigating consumption.”  Whereas housing choice 
theory holds that a variety of factors such as location, size, quality, and budget influence 
choice, cost would be the main consideration per Rakodi’s survival strategy (Zinas and Jusan 
2012; Kulberg 2002; Timmermans and Noortwijk 1995).  Numerous studies show that 
migrants elect the most inexpensive accommodations available and further try to cut costs by 
sharing space with co-ethnics (Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999; Datta et al. 2007; Stoller 2001; 
Mahler 1995).  This ‘sharing’ often entails overcrowding and sparse use of utilities such as 
heating and electricity (Stoller 2001; Mahler 1995).  These conditions resemble those in 
informal settlements in that housing is occupied in a manner that is analogous to the practices 
employed across in shantytown type settings in the developing world.    
 
Drawing a connection between housing choice and Rakodi’s (1995) classifications is largely 
a novel application of ‘survival strategies.’  Conventionally, strategic behaviour is observed 
in case studies of informal economies in Africa and Latin America where the focus is on 
understanding how specific segments of the poor manage to subsist in their environment.  In 
these contexts, the state’s capacity to uniformly enforce the rule of law and provide welfare 
support for the poor is limited.  Hart (1972), Castells and Portes (1989), and Roberts (1991), 
Boyd (2000), among others, have immersed themselves in these informal economies to 
broadly understand the economic and social behaviour of the poor.  Insofar as their findings 
concern housing, they have identified ‘self-building’ as a strategy whereby the poor construct 
homes piecemeal—as they collect resources and materials—in informal settlements (Wallace 
2002; Mushumbusi 2011).  While this research is insightful, there remains a dearth of 
scholarship focused specifically on housing strategies, particularly where the context is a 
formal economy.  
 
One rare exception that provides a measure of insight into how the survival strategy concept 
applies in a first-world setting is Datta et al.’s (2007) study of migrants in London’s low-paid 
economy.  This research shows that despite London’s wealth and stability, migrants endure 
low-wages, high living costs, limited access to institutional assistance, and social exclusion 
(ibid).  These conditions approximate the difficulties of their home country (ibid).  And 
because London presents “challenges that are similar to those experienced by the poor in the 
developing world,” transnational migrants carry their developing world “strategic repertoire 
with them” (p. 407-8).  Context is critical in shaping how Datta et al. (2007) conceptualize 
survivalist behaviours.  They deliberately label the actions they observe as ‘tactics’ rather 
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than strategies because, “although migrants often move to London as part of a conscious 
strategy to better their lives, the barriers they face on arrival… reduce[s] their ability to 
‘strategize’” (p. 405).  Building on Williams’ (2006) description of tactics as ‘the art of the 
weak,’ Datta et al. (2007) adapt this terminology to “highlight how powerlessness affects the 
strategies that…migrants might try to develop in an often-hostile labour market and society” 
(p. 418).   
 
This study further corroborates Portes’ and Zhou’s (1992; 1996) findings that communities 
turn inward when mainstream society marginalises them: “migrants’ tactics to counter social 
exclusion revolved around creating friendship groups that were used as psychological support 
mechanisms as well as for functional reasons such as finding work, housing and so on” (p. 
423).  
 
The London study reflects a salient theme found in the previously discussed case studies of 
migrants in Rotterdam, Cubans in Miami, South Americans in Long Island, Mexicans in the 
Bronx, and West Africans in Harlem: strategic reliance on inter-ethnic group networks as a 
strategy (Burgers 1998a,b; Portes and Wilson 1980; Mahler 1995; Galvez 2007; Stoller 2001; 
Williams 2007, 2010, 2014; Williams and Nadin 2010).  Indeed, the act of migration itself 
reflects a strategic step that is supported by social networks:  
 
[T]he decision to migrate is influenced by the existence and participation in social 
networks, which connect people across space.  [N]etworks provide resources in the 
form of information and assistance…[and] explain the persistence of migration long 
after changes in the original migration-inducing structural conditions (Boyd 1989, p. 
645). 
 
Hence, migration to the developed world as a survival strategy is a measure of one’s co-
ethnic social network’s strength (Hagan 1998; Poros 2001; Massey et al. 1987; Yucel 1987).   
The previously cited studies suggest that co-ethnics frequently engage their social networks 
to obtain a variety of resources, including migration support and, when they arrive, housing.    
 
In integrating survival strategies into urban informality, this research seeks to take advantage 
of an opportunity for further study.  Strategies, as shown in this literature review, ‘fits’ into 
urban informality because this concept captures how impoverished persons act alone and in a 
community to find housing in the developed world.  In short, examining strategies reveals the 
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rationale behind migrant decision-making and how a lack of legal status might shape their 
choices (Bacharach and Baratz 1962). 
 
2.5   Summary and Gap 
 
This chapter explores scholarship that has not previously been brought into conversation to 
show how these literatures can work together and help uncover how legal status shapes 
informal housing allocation processes for migrants living on the economic margins in cities 
in the Global North.     
 
To summarise:        
 
● Ethnic enclave theory situated migrants as a coherent community.  This theory 
explained how shared ethnicity, nationality, and heritage bonded migrants who lived 
in close proximity to one another in a foreign context.  In short, the notion of an 
ethnic enclave gave a sociological context for situating the Ghanaian migrant 
community.  This research then further sought to unearth the dynamics within the 
enclave as part of its examination of how legal status might divide co-ethnic migrants 
into sub-communities within the larger enclave.  
 
● Social capital provides a conceptual language for understanding how migrants help 
one another.  Bonding and bridging social capital, for instance, distinguishes the type 
of help that migrants can give to members of their social network (community) and 
the limitations and costs associated with this form of help (Woolcock 2001; Portes 
2014).  Many migrants have abundant bonded ties, but their reliance on this type of 
social capital stymies opportunities to bridge to resources outside of their immediate 
ethnic community.  Social capital and networks illuminate facets of the forces that 
shape enclaves, yet there remains room for discerning nuance: who within a 
community may avail themselves of their social network’s resources and why? 
 
● ‘Survival strategies’ identifies the means by which individuals living on the margins 
navigate their environment in effort to survive (Wallace 2002; Datta 2007; Frayne 
2004; Creese and Wiebe 2009).  This proves useful not only for listing the different 
tactics that marginal individuals employ, but also for understanding how these actions 
are strategic in confronting environmental constraints (Giddens (1984).  In this sense, 
one’s location matters.  An impoverished individual navigates the environment 
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differently in the context of a weak state where the rule of law and governing 
institutions are inept versus a setting in which the state is strong but the agent remains 
poor and marginal.  Hence, strategies as applied in this research provide a means for 
understanding how poor migrants survive.  This concept contextualises the measures 
that migrants take to find housing despite their limited resources and, for some, lack 
of legal status (Giddens 1984; Bacharach and Baratz 1962). 
 
In centring on a migrant community living in a Global North rental market, the first objective 
is to better understand the ramifications of legal status as the factor that most distinguishes 
migrants from one another in a single community; next is to define allocation processes in the 
informal housing market that these migrants occupy.  Each objective illustrates what is 
missing in the existing scholarship.  To bridge this gap, this study applies enclave theory, 
social capital and networks concepts, and strategies under an Adapted Urban Informality 
conceptual framework to uncover an unknown within a migrant community.   
 
Part 2.6 presents the integrated conceptual framework, Adapted Urban Informality.  This Part 
presents, diagrammatically, how the concepts detailed in the literature review are applied in 
the adapted framework answering this study’s research questions.  
 
2.6   Conceptual Framework 
   
This research adapts urban informality, shifting its application to a first-world setting and 
focusing on housing allocation.  Conventionally, urban informality theorises that informal 
settlements in the developing world are a result of suspended sovereignty; the state withdraws 
its control to spur urbanisation at minimal cost (Roy 2005; Roy and Al Sayyad 2004; 
Robinson 2002).  
 
Adapted urban informality re-conceptualises ‘informality’ to describe not only unregulated 
housing developments, but also alternative mechanisms for accessing regular units.  The 
value of this approach is that it provides a new model for learning the variety of informal 
pathways that migrants use to find housing.  The theoretical goal of this approach is to 
broaden our understanding of informal housing beyond the physical condition of the dwelling 
to include the full spectrum of allocation processes in cities in the Global North.   
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As adapted in this study, urban informality is also adjoined with the concepts of survival 
strategy, social networks, and elements of ethnic enclave theory, including bounded 
solidarity.   
 
Figure 2.3 provides a model depiction of the conceptual framework, Adapted Urban 
Informality. 
 
Figure 2.3    Adapted Urban Informality 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
 
Figure 2.3 integrates the key concepts described in this chapter into the urban informality 
model. The enclave, shown as a greyed oval in the centre of the diagram, aggregates migrants 
into a single community. The presence of social capital and networks shows that migrants are 
tied to each other despite their legal status.  Strategies define the measures that migrants take, 
using their networks or otherwise, to overcome their resource limitations and the obstacles 
they may encounter to survive.   
 
Furthermore, Figure 2.3 shows migrants as a singular enclave community, bifurcated by legal 
status.  Despite the separation between documented and undocumented migrants, communal 
ties are envisioned to hold the migrant community together in this model.  The red arrows 
indicate the strategic actions that migrants employ in effort to navigate the constraints they 
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face to find housing and facilitate its affordability in the urban system according to where and 
how they are situated across the permeable line.  
 
In sum, this framework shifts urban informality to a developed world setting and combines it 
with additional concepts to address how documented and undocumented Ghanaian migrants 
living on the economic margins access housing.  This approach aims to address how the 
formal market tolerates and facilitates the informal submarket that lies within it; to reveal 
social forces that shape informal allocation; and to demonstrate if, where, and how legal 
status influences such processes.  
 
2.7  Neo-Institutionalism  
 
Part 2.7 focuses on neo-institutionalism, the initial conceptual framework for this research.  
The purpose in introducing neo-institutionalism is to illustrate the conceptual development of 
this project, and list key concepts that were carried forward from neo-institutionalism into 
this study. 
 
Neo-institutionalism is a broad label that is used here to condense two subfields: New 
Institutionalism in Economics (NIE) and New Institutionalism in Sociology (NIS).  Both NIE 
and NIS influenced the conceptual evolution of this project.  The following discussion briefly 
summarises each subfield and explains why this literature could not be operationalised for 
this research. 
 
NIE emerged from the innovative work of Ronald Coase (1937, 1960, 1984), Oliver 
Williamson (1975, 1981, 1985, 1994, 2000), and Douglas North (1990).  Following Coase’s 
(1937, 1960) thesis that property rights and transaction costs critically shape the structure of 
firms, North (1970) and Williamson (1975) further postulated that institutions – embodied in 
formal rules and informal norms that govern arrangements – are established to mediate 
economic activity and minimise exogenous costs.  NIE provided a theoretical language and 
tools for framing economic outcomes as products of institutional context – arguing that 
formal rules and informal customs comprise the institutions that govern behaviour and shape 
the economy.  NIE popularised transaction cost economics and the notion of bounded 
rationality, which holds that individuals act rationally under the limited scope of their 
cognitive ability and access to information, a humble interpretation of the perfect rationality 
enshrined in the neo-classical homo economicus archetype (North 1990; Williamson 2000).     
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Whereas NIE pushed conventional thought in economics, NIS advanced a bold academic 
agenda more broadly.  Its early architects, Victor Nee (2001, 2003, 2005) and Paul Ingram 
(1998), adapted NIE alongside concepts drawn from economic sociology to explain the 
process by which institutional arrangements emerged and shaped all manner of choice.  
Namely, NIS integrated transaction costs, bounded rationality, and the “choice-within-limits” 
framework characteristic of neo-institutionalism (Ingram and Clay 2000; Nee 2003; Nee 
2005).  But NIS was distinguished from NIE through its integration of Granovetter’s (1985) 
notion of social “embeddedness,” which argued that non-market social networks played a 
crucial role in producing economic outcomes (p. 482; Nee and Ingram 1998; Nee 2003; Nee 
2005).  While Granovetter (1985) introduced embeddedness in response to Williamson’s 
(1975) argument that transaction costs shape institutions and economic activities, Nee and 
Ingram (1998) integrated both concepts in NIS.  Per NIS, institutions impose constraints and 
provide credibility, overcoming the reliability issues associated with social networks, which 
reduces the transaction costs stemming from uncertainty (Nee and Ingram 1998).  Finally, 
unlike NIE, NIS established a bi-directional relationship between social groups, intermediate 
organisations, and the state to explain status quo institutional arrangements governing choice 
as a product of an iterative dynamic among all three levels.  
 
This research embraced neo-institutionalism as a framework for understanding allocation 
processes at the bottom of the rental market.  This application of neo-institutionalism to 
migrants was conceptually novel; it sought to capture the relationship between migrants who 
operate on the margins and the formal institutions that set the constraints that shaped their 
choices.  The thinking was that ‘choice within constraints’ provided a useful synthesis in 
considering how migrants navigated this market.   
 
However, the process of gathering data for this study revealed that NIE and NIS did not apply 
to the rental market that was being studied.  For example, actors such as intermediate 
organisations – represented by housing advocacy groups, non-profits, and religious 
institutions – mostly played a minor role in the experience of migrants.  It seemed that 
North’s (1990) assertion that institutions establish the ‘rules of the game’ rang hollow, as 
formal processes were invariably subverted, ignored, or otherwise non-existent.  Based on 
NIS, this study’s plan to conceptualise a bi-directional relationship between the migrants and 
the governing bodies that set and enforced housing policy proved inapt, for migrants scarcely 
interacted with these bodies or shaped their agendas.  Thus, neo-institutionalism did not live 
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up to its theoretical promise for this project because of realities uncovered during fieldwork. 
 
Neo-institutionalism, however, did direct this research to focus on examining formal rules 
and informal norms.  Pursuing this line of thought led to literature on urban informality, 
which focused on housing settlements and bridging the logical separation between formal and 
informal sectors.   
 
Where neo-institutionalism fell short in explaining the disconnection and indifference toward 
institutions among Ghanaian (and West African) migrants, urban informality accounted for 
this directly: institutions, per that theory, represented the formal apparatus that had 
withdrawn from governing the space that migrants occupied.  Migrants created their own 
settlements and rules where the state (formal institutions) opted not to exert its authority.  
Moreover, urban informality resonated with the migrant journey itself: the theory emerged 
from the developing world, where it described how informality functioned within formality.  
It made sense to apply a framework that captured how past practices were mirrored in their 
new environment.  The bi-directional relationships and constraints that neo-institutionalism 
articulated, as such, were inapt for (illegal) migrant communities, for these concepts actually 
applied to governed spaces and the citizens that lived therein.   
 
Urban informality, in short, proved most apt for studying documented and undocumented 
Ghanaian migrants living in extreme poverty in the Bronx.  This theory provides a solid 
foundation for situating the topic at hand – legal status and informal housing allocation – and 
could be readily adjoined with additional concepts to suit the contextual focus of this 
research.       
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3.1   Overview 
 
3.2       Case-Study  
3.2.1 Site 
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3.4.2 Documentary Data 
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3.5   Chapter Conclusion 
3.5.1 Summary  
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This chapter presents the research methodology.  There are five parts in this section.  Part 3.1 
is an overview and explanation of the research’s mixed methods methodology.  Part 3.2 
describes the nature of the case-study, including the site, migrant population, case study 
design, and sampling methods. Parts 3.4 and 3.5 detail the quantitative and qualitative data 
that have been gathered for this dissertation, respectively.  Part 3.5 discusses the evolution of 
the methodology used in this study and summarises the preceding parts.   
 
3.1  Overview  
 
This project is a single-case study focused on a hard-to-reach migrant population, so it 
required a mixed-methods research methodology comprised of quantitative and qualitative 
data.  The strategy of the mixed methods approach is to contextualise the research population 
and case-study site using quantitative data and to uncover the unknown segment of the 
housing market that migrants occupy through qualitative data.  This qualitative data is crucial 
for understanding how migrants access housing in practice and what their actions illustrate 
about the layered segments of the housing market in the Bronx.  In short, qualitative data is 
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the heart of primary source data collection in this study and provides the basis for analysis 
and findings.  
 
Quantitative data were gathered from datasets such as the US Census and New York City’s 
Housing and Vacancy Survey (HVS).  The numerical data situate the research: They provide 
facts about the state of the housing market in the Bronx and important demographic 
information on the populations that inhabit this borough, including what is known of 
Ghanaians. 
 
Qualitative data were gathered primarily through in-depth interviews with three groups of 
subjects: migrants, housing providers, and intermediary actors that interact with either or both 
of the other groups.  Further qualitative data was obtained from documentary evidence.  
These data form the core of this project in that they provide the basis for the new knowledge 
presented in this study.  All qualitative data is triangulated by source; data collected from 
each source is examined individually and alongside other sources to discern inconsistencies 
as well as to corroborate and validate all findings (Denzin 1978; Patton 1999). 
 
3.2  Case Study  
 
3.2.1 Site 
 
The Bronx stood out among the five boroughs that constitute New York City in reviewing the 
existing data on migration and population distributions across the city:  it is the destination of 
choice for one of the fastest growing groups of migrants, West Africans, and has the highest 
percentage of renters (as opposed to owners) in New York City.  Moreover, this research 
arose from an interest in examining informal housing dynamics, and the Bronx – as the 
poorest borough with the lowest average rental costs and an overrepresented share of “hidden 
homes2” – proved to be the ideal case-study site.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 A hidden home is a household that is not captured under regular census surveying. They are the most likely 
spaces for undocumented individuals.  These include persons residing in subdivided units wherein the number 
of occupants exceeds the legally allowed limit, and those who are sharing space within the home of a friend or 
family member (HVS 2013).  Hidden homes are very likely to be occupied by poor “illegal” migrants—the key 
demographic for this study.  
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3.2.2 Population 
 
Selecting Ghanaian migrants as research subjects from the larger population of West Africans 
required physical outreach in addition to preliminary data-mining.  The early months of 
fieldwork were dedicated to this task.  Neighbourhoods throughout the western Bronx, where 
the majority of African immigrants reside, were canvassed.  The aim of this process was to 
learn about the geographic and ethnic composition of the West African community first hand.  
This context informed the decision to focus on one nationality, Ghanaians. 
Ghanaian migrants were selected for three key reasons:  population size, visa variety, and 
English language fluency.   
 
First, Ghanaians constitute the second largest West African nationality group in New York 
City and the largest group in the Bronx.  Their population size increased the probability that 
the research could access a sufficient number of documented and undocumented subjects. 
Second, Ghanaians are among the highest number of Diversity Visa (DV) recipients.  DV 
visas are issued by US embassies by lottery and provide a direct path to citizenship.  That a 
large proportion of Ghanaians enter the US on this visa seemed a key point of comparison to 
examine housing outcomes by different entry pathways (e.g., visiting student, sponsorship 
visas, etc.).  Third, as a former British colony, migrants from Ghana speak at least basic 
English and this eased the process of accessing interview subjects in this community, 
especially among the undocumented migrants.   
 
The case study area was comprised of three sub-boroughs in the Bronx: (1) Morrisania/East 
Tremont, (2) High Bridge, and (3) University Heights (see Figure 3.1 and Tables 3.1 and 
3.2).  These sub-boroughs make up most of the western Bronx, which is where the majority 
of the borough’s West African nationalities, and Ghanaians specifically, are concentrated.  A 
map of the Bronx, broken out by sub-borough, is shown in Figure 3.1 below.     
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Table 3.1  Distribution of Ghanaians and Non-Ghanaians by Bronx Sub-boroughs  
Sub-boroughs Non-Ghanaian Ghanaian 
Total 
Population 
Riverdale/Kingsbridge Population  
% Share 105,466 (7.7%) 1,787 (8.1%) 107,253 (7.7%) 
Willamsbridge/Baychester 
  
142,181 (10.4%) 1,948 (8.4%) 144,129 (10.4%) 
Throgs Neck/Coop City 
  
115,416 (8.4%) 1,051 (4.8%) 116,467 (8.4%) 
Pelham Parkway 
  
126,549 (9.3%) 664 (3%) 127,213 (9.2%) 
Morrisania/East Tremont 
  
155,228 (11.4%) 2,364 (10.7%) 157,592 (11.3%) 
Kingsbridge/Mosholu 
  
123,025 (9%) 1,894 (8.6%) 124,919 (9%) 
University 
Heights/Fordham   
129,472 (9.5%) 4,367 (19.8%) 133,839 (9.6%) 
Highbridge/South 
Concourse   
136,532 (10%) 4,074 (18.4%) 140,606 (10.1%) 
Soundview/Parkchester 
  
180,417 (13.2%) 2,498 (11.3%) 182,915 (13.2%) 
Mott Haven/Hunts Point 
  
152,891 (11.2%) 1,458 (6.6%) 154,349 (11.1%) 
Total 
1,367,177 (100%) 22,105 (100%) 
1,389,282 
(100%) 
        Source:  U.S. Census, American Community Survey (2014)  
 
To appreciate how these areas are situated spatially, Figure 3.1 provides a map of sub-
boroughs in the Bronx.  Observe the proximity of the areas highlighted in Table 3.1  
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Figure 3.1    Sub-Boroughs of the Bronx 
 
Source: New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (2013) 
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The three sub-boroughs in the case study site are contiguous, as the map above shows, and 
although they account for only 20 percent of the borough’s physical space, 50 percent of the 
known Ghanaian population in the borough resides in this area (US Census 2013).  
 
Table 3.2 below lists information on the housing stock and demographic composition of these 
three sub-boroughs.  
Table 3.2 Morrisania East Tremont 
Highbridge 
South Concourse 
University Heights 
Fordham  
Number of Households 53K 49K 42K 
Blacks 50K 46K 39K 
Black Percentage 38% 39% 39% 
Non-USA Birth 53% 63% 66% 
Percent on Public Assistance  37% 34% 36% 
Subfamilies (Doubling Up) 7K 8K 6K 
Median Income for Renters $20,000  $25K  $20,000  
Percent Below Poverty Line 40% 32% 37% 
Rent Regulated-Stabilised 47% 82% 76% 
Households w/R-I Ratio <30% 69% 66% 70% 
Percent of Crowding  13% 20% 18% 
Owner Households 7K 4K ** 
Number of Individuals 150K 143K 126K 
Hispanics 92K 90K 85K 
Hispanic Percentage 55% 57% 57% 
Percent of Pop. Immigrated 33% 48% 49% 
Renter Households 46K 45K 40K 
Other Rent Reg. 40% 11.50% 14% 
Gross Rent/Income (R-I) Ratio 43% 42% 52% 
Gross Rent $970  $1,026  $1,045  
Unregulated Housing 13% ** 11% 
Households w/R-I Ratio <50% 43% 44% 51% 
Physically Poor-Quality Housing 19% 24% 23% 
Ownership % 13% 8.50% ** 
**Sample Size Too Small to Report NYC Housing and Vacancy Survey (2013) 
 
These three sub-boroughs are similar to the Bronx as a whole in terms of income, poverty, 
composition of regulated and unregulated housing stock, share of African Americans and 
Hispanics (the two groups that make up a significant majority of the Bronx’ residents), and 
other key demographic metrics listed in the tables above.  
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3.2.3 Case Study Design and Justification   
 
This research follows Onwuegbuzie and Leech’s (2007) notion of “disaggregating” 
knowledge of a single community using a focused lens.  This project does this through its 
focus on housing outcomes among Ghanaians in the Bronx.  The single case design applies 
the controlled analysis supported by the literature on case studies: “The single case can be 
used to determine whether a theory's propositions are correct or whether some alternative set 
of explanations might be more relevant. [T]he single case can represent a significant 
contribution to knowledge and theory building. Such a study can even help to refocus future 
investigations in an entire field” (Yin 2009, p. 47).    
 
This case study is designed using Yin’s (2009) instruction.  The single case study focus of 
this research presents the most optimal course for disaggregating data on how documented 
and undocumented Ghanaian migrants in the Bronx access housing.  Here, nationality and 
geography act as controls whereas legal status is the independent variable, and the basis for 
comparison.  Hence, observing one differentiating factor in a population within a relatively 
small geographic space allows for a simplified yet nuanced investigation that yields findings 
that otherwise could not be easily uncovered.  
 
3.2.4 Sampling Methods and Validity  
 
This research relied on two sampling methods: purposive and snowball sampling.  The 
validity of the sample was further ensured by using the ethnographic method of sequential 
interviewing.  
 
Purposive sampling relies on the researcher’s judgement to identify appropriate research 
subjects (Becerra and Zambrana 1985).  To apply this method effectively, the researcher 
invested the early months of fieldwork into gaining an understanding of West African and 
Ghanaian migrant communities in the Bronx.  This process entailed attending community 
events and political meetings (e.g., the Bronx African Advisory Council), and holding 
meetings with third-party intermediaries.  This included community leaders and non-profits, 
public officials who could give information on the demographics of the Ghanaian migrant 
community that was not discernible from census data.   
 
This preliminary exploration revealed that the Ghanaian migrant population broadly skewed 
toward young males, and this was particularly pronounced among the undocumented sub-
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population, which would not be captured in census surveying.  This information guided the 
purposive sampling as it helped ensure that a sizable proportion of young men were included.  
 
The snowball sampling technique was applied to meet as many Ghanaian migrants as 
possible.  This, in turn, led to more prospective research subjects who were also screened 
using the purposive sampling technique.  The snowball sampling found Ghanaians through 
churches, mosques, and workplaces of people who lived within the case study area. 
 
To ensure the validity of the sample population, this research further applied the ethnographic 
technique of sequential interviewing.  This technique is used in research situations where the 
target population is hard-to-reach and conventional statistical techniques used to obtain 
representativeness are not viable (Small 2009).  Accordingly, the researcher must continue to 
increase the sample n until a point of qualitative ‘saturation,’ which occurs when the data 
gained from each additional interviewee coheres with the data gained from the preceding 
interviewees within that subgroup (Small 2009).  Hence, if the research is still uncovering 
new trends or reasons to modify the questions asked in interviews as the researcher 
approaches the target n size, then the researcher must continue to recruit additional subjects 
until a point of saturation is reached. 
 
The sampling methods used in this study – snowball sampling, purposive sampling, and 
sequential interviewing – work to ensure validity and representativeness as best as possible.  
But it is important to recognise the limitations inherent in investigating any hard-to-reach 
population (Atkinson and Flint 2001; Benoît and Martine 2009; Stoecklin-Marois et al. 
2011).  Migrants, particularly those who are undocumented, are deeply wary of revealing 
sensitive personal information of the kind broached in this study (Benoît and Martine 2009).  
They may fear deportation or financial exploitation (ibid).   This research grapples with this 
challenge by applying methodological techniques grounded in the literature, but it ultimately 
recognises and respects that uncovering hidden populations is an uncertain endeavour.   
 
3.3  Quantitative Component 
 
3.3.1 Secondary Sources  
 
The secondary quantitative sources are made of three datasets that cover different periods 
individually, but collectively span 1980-2014.  The analysis is based on published tables from 
these datasets.  These data are divided between (a) surveys that detail the housing market and 
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residential makeup of neighbourhoods throughout New York and (b) surveys that provide 
information on immigration, settlement patterns, and related demographic facts.  Although 
there is some overlap between these datasets, the combination gives the best possible 
understanding of how Ghanaians typically migrate to the United States, where they tend to 
reside within the Bronx, the housing options available to them in those areas, and how their 
community has developed and changed overtime.  
 
1. New York City’s Housing and Vacancy Survey (HVS)3  
 
The HVS is a comprehensive report on New York City’s housing stock and the populations 
that occupy these units.  This research draws the following information from published tables 
from the most recent HVS survey, which was compiled in 2013, focusing on the three sub-
boroughs of the case study site in the Bronx: 
 
● Spatial variation, household size, and income of immigrant households. 
● Housing and neighbourhood conditions for immigrant and non-immigrant renters. 
● Crowding, doubling up, and sub-families among immigrants and non-immigrants.  
● Housing supply: size and composition of stock, rental units under regulation, and the 
share of regulated units that are occupied by immigrant vs. non-immigrant 
households. 
● Rents, including variations based on unit type/size, and the availability of subsidies.   
● Hidden household and crowding data by race, ethnicity, regulation, and type.  
 
2. US Census’ Five-Year American Community Survey (ACS)   
 
The US Census’ Five-Year American Community Survey (ACS 2014) provided demographic 
details on the makeup of the Ghanaian population in the Bronx and the surrounding region.  
Specifically, the following information on Ghanaians was gathered from this dataset’s 
published tables, which includes data from 2009-2014:  
 
● Geographic distribution and population size in New York and the tristate area. 
● Household characteristics of the sub-boroughs that comprise the Bronx. 
● Comparative demographic detail on all residents of the Bronx. 
 
                                                
3 This research uses the most recent publically available HVS data, which was published in 2013. The HVS is 
conducted every three-years and the official report is published some years thereafter.  The next HVS’s full 
report is expected to be released in 2018.    
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3. Newest New Yorkers publications 
 
The Newest New Yorkers is a public report that analyses the recent cohorts of immigrants 
using census data and other population survey data available to the local government in New 
York City.  This publication focuses on the top 20 immigrant populations, but it also contains 
data in its appendix on other immigrant groups outside of the top 20.  This dataset includes 
immigrant population statistics and settlement patterns in New York.   
 
In its most recent edition (2013), Ghanaians are ranked 18th in population size among new 
immigrants, but in previous editions, Ghanaians were not among the top 20.  Data from the 
Newest New Yorker publication were used to examine the migration patterns and population 
size of Ghanaians in New York City since 1980, when this publication was first released.  
Specifically, the information obtained from this publication was used to identify additional 
demographic detail on the Ghanaian population as part of their larger West African cohort.   
 
3.4   Qualitative Component 
 
This subsection explains the primary sources that were used to gather qualitative data for this 
research, as well as how this information was obtained.  
 
3.4.1 In-Depth Interviews 
 
Three different groups were interviewed for this study: (1) migrants (documented and 
undocumented), (2) housing providers, and (3) intermediaries, for a total of 92 in-depth 
interviews.  The information gathered from these sources is triangulated with the quantitative 
data to answer the research questions.   
The composition of the sampled individuals by relevant categories is detailed below.   
 
1. Migrant tenants  
 
Guided by the Ghanaian population distribution data reported in the US Census’ American 
Communities Survey, the following distribution of documented Ghanaian migrants was 
interviewed: 
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Table 3.3    Documented Migrants Sample 
 Male Female 
 15 15 
Age range   
25-34  4 4 
35-44 4 5 
45-54 4 5 
55-64 3 1 
Household Type   
Married 7 6 
Married, no spouse present 4 6 
Single 4 3 
 
Since the undocumented population are unlikely to respond to census surveys, the sample 
from this group was selected using purposive techniques based on discussions with various 
intermediaries and community leaders on the gender and age range composition of the 
undocumented migrant population.    
 
Table 3.4    Undocumented Migrants Sample 
 Male Female 
 17 8 
Age range   
25-34  8 3 
35-44 5 3 
45-54 3 2 
55-64 1 0 
Household Type   
Married 4 3 
Married, no spouse present 6 3 
Single 7 2 
 
Interview questions:  The in-depth interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format 
and included questions aimed at learning the housing and immigration journey of each 
migrant, as well as understanding their opinions using their community and future economic 
and housing aspirations.  (See appendix for list of questions).  
 
In addition, a number of survey-type questions were asked of migrants to obtain numerical 
primary data.  These include information on (a) rental cost, (b) unit size, (c) length of time at 
the location, (d) income, (e) public assistance income, if any, and (f) family size. 
 
The methods employed to access migrants are discussed in the sampling subsection, 3.2.4. 
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2. Housing providers 
 
The vast majority of rental housing in the Bronx exists in 10-40 unit building complexes. 
Private providers hold the bulk of the stock, although most of these properties are governed 
by rent regulations. As such, owners and managers of such properties make up the largest 
share of the providers interviewed.   
 
In addition, there are also non-profit providers who operate newer buildings that are strictly 
regulated.  Many of these properties, however, serve a particular population of tenants (e.g., 
HIV/AIDS positive residents, the elderly, etc.); the researcher focused on the providers in this 
category who serve all qualifying low-income tenants.   
 
The smaller property category is comprised of owner occupied housing.  These properties 
have no more than four units and make up a small share of the housing stock.   
 
 A total of 14 providers were interviewed, as show in Table 3.6 below. 
 
Table 3.5   Housing Provider Sample 
 
 
 
 
Sampling:  The researcher employed a variety of methods to reach providers, including: (a) 
cold-calling and emailing, (b) neighbourhood canvassing/speaking with building 
superintendents for further introductions, (c) connecting through attorneys who frequently 
represent landlords in eviction proceedings, (d) informal introductions through tenants (who 
were not included in the sample), and on a few occasions, (e) introductions through 
intermediaries. 
 
The sequential interviewing technique was also applied for housing providers.  
 
Questions:  Semi-structured interviews with providers focused on understanding their 
process for selecting tenants.  The researcher sought to understand the formal and informal 
criteria used to judge prospective applicants as well as provider awareness of, and policy 
toward, unauthorised subletting and roommate arrangements.   
 
In addition, documentary materials such as rental applications (if such forms existed) were 
collected from providers where possible.   
Private:  Building Complex 8 
Private:  2-4 Family Property 2 
Non-profit housing:  Building complex 4 
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3. Intermediaries 
 
Intermediaries comprised the most heterogeneous group of interviewees.  They included: (a) 
representatives of religious institutions, (b) non-profit organisations involved in housing 
advocacy, tenant organising and other related services, (c) personnel from public agencies 
charged with providing housing benefits, and constituent service staff from elected officials’ 
offices, and (d) amorphous groups that provided services and community for African 
immigrants.   
 
A total of 23 organisations were interviewed, as show in Table 3.7 below.      
 
Table 3.6    Intermediaries Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sampling:  Accessing most intermediaries was simple, especially relative to migrants and 
housing providers.  Many non-profit and public organisations were found through internet 
searches and then contacted by email or phone.  The remainder were found through referrals 
from other intermediaries.   
 
Accessing religious and “other” organisations required more direct outreach, including 
visiting their site-locations on numerous occasions.  But once contact was established, 
scheduling interviews was not difficult, as officials from all intermediaries proved willing 
and eager to be interviewed.  
Questions:  Questions for intermediaries depended on the purpose of their organisation.  
Broadly, the questions focused on the following topics: (a) gathering their perspective on the 
housing issues of the West African community broadly, and any specific detail on the 
Ghanaian population in particular, (b) discerning the intermediary’s specific role and services 
in effort to establish their place in the allocation process, including any relationship with 
housing providers, (c) documenting their outreach processes and criteria (as institutions) for 
providing housing-related services, and (d) testing the validity of other data gathered through 
informal and formal conversations with housing providers and migrants.   
 
 
 
Religious  5 
Non-profit  10 
Public 5 
Other 3 
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3.4.2 Documentary Data 
 
1. Benefits/Subsidies  
 
Documentary information on all available housing benefit programs was gathered and 
examined to discern:  the specific benefits offered by each program, the target eligible 
population, and the application process.  The list of relevant programs is shown below. 
 
(1) Living in Communities (LINC)  
(2) Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) Housing Subsidy Program  
(3) Family Eviction Prevention Supplement (FEPS)  
(4) Coalition for the Homeless Rental Assistance Program (RAP)  
(5) New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) Section 8 
(6) NYC Department of Housing and Preservation Development (HPD) vouchers  
(7) NYS Homes and Community Renewal (HCR) 
 
The aim of examining these resources was to learn which programs are available to migrants, 
and then to ask migrants specifically if they receive any of these benefits.    
 
2. Other Documentary Evidence  
 
Housing application forms:  Application forms were gathered from numerous housing 
providers to understand and analyse the formal requirements for leasing an apartment.  This 
information provided the basis for outlining the formal housing application process, which 
was then compared to the informal process that was discerned from in-depth interviews with 
migrants, providers, and intermediaries.    
Participant Observations and Field Notes:  These ethnographic data provided the basis for 
the purposive sampling of interviewees and making numerous other methodological choices 
during the course of fieldwork.  Moreover, these ethnographic materials also informed the 
data analysis process, as they provided a strong background and context for capturing 
important nuances regarding how migrants and institutional actors make their housing 
choices.     
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3.4.3 Data Analysis 
 
Coding:  Coding refers to labelling (naming) data according to categorical segments that can 
be analysed within the frame of the research hypothesis and questions (Saldaña 2016).  Three 
different coding techniques were applied to analyse interview transcripts and documentary 
evidence in effort to answer the research questions: 
 
1. Open-coding:  This process entailed examining individual transcripts for specific 
concepts that categorise a respondent’s statements.  
 
2. Axial coding:  After open-coding, axial coding was applied to identify connections 
between categories in order to reveal patterns or consequences of actions.  For 
example, axial coding was used to identify group strategies that individuals employ to 
access housing and to see if and how these strategies differ based on legal status. 
 
3. Narrative analysis: This process entailed examining uninterrupted interview responses 
and then presenting this qualitative data as an intact vignette of a respondent’s views, 
which are further analysed in context with additional quantitative and qualitative data.  
 
It is important to note that data analysis was an iterative process grounded in a theoretical 
approach whereby emerging findings influenced respondent questions and the examination of 
data.  This harkens back to the sequential interview techniques discussed previously 
 
Triangulation: All qualitative data is triangulated by source; that is, brought into 
conversation with each other in order to rigorously examine the validity of each singular 
segment (Denzin 1978; Patton 1999). 
 
3.5  Chapter Conclusion 
 
3.5.1 Summary  
 
This research centres on understanding the housing choices and outcomes of migrants who 
mostly operate in hidden and informal segments of the housing market.  In applying a mixed 
methods approach, this research has sought to employ a variety of appropriate tools to 
uncover answers about a hard-to-reach population. 
 
Established quantitative data are used to understand and situate the context of this study, but 
also to identify and describe what is unknown – and thereby articulate the basis for this 
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research.  It is here that qualitative data is sought and applied.  These data are gathered from 
variety of sources, but are critically examined both separately and alongside each other to 
deduce coherent empirical and theoretical findings.  These findings are presented in the 
chapters that follow.   
 
3.5.2 Discussion 
 
The methodological lesson learned in this project is that flexibility and iterative learning are 
critical for exploring and understanding unknown spaces.  Gathering data in the field required 
adapting to situations on the ground as much as maintaining a clear focus on the larger 
research objectives.  In practice, the researcher needed to first build trust with the Ghanaian 
community, particularly among undocumented individuals who had a strong incentive to 
avoid attention, as well as establish meaningful contacts among providers and intermediaries 
alike before interviews could be pursued.  As such, data-collection did not occur in a linear, 
predictable sequence.  Finding the right people to talk to and the appropriate time to ask the 
difficult questions proved to be a function of persistence and patience.  But slowly built 
relationships facilitated greater honesty in interviews and allowed for more serendipitous 
encounters, creating a positive feedback loop of quality data that could be verified through 
triangulation.   
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4  
The Bronx and its Ghanaians  
by the Numbers 
 
4.1   The Bronx 
4.1.1 Housing Stock 
4.1.2 Housing ‘Affordability’ and Poverty in the Bronx 
4.1.3 Summary 
 
4.2    Ghanaians in the Bronx   
4.2.1 Spatial Distribution  
4.2.2 Demographics, Housing, and Employment 
4.2.3 Summary 
 
4.3    Chapter Conclusion 
4.3.1 Summary and Discussion 
 
This chapter provides contextual information on the Bronx and its Ghanaian population using 
quantitative data.  The purpose of this chapter is to detail the state of the housing market in 
the Bronx and to illustrate the degree of poverty in this borough relative to the other areas 
that comprise New York City.  This background information is critical for understanding 
where the subjects of this research, Ghanaian migrants, are living, as well as the broader state 
of their economic and housing context.  In short, this chapter sets the scene for this research.   
 
The further aim of this chapter is to explain what existing data can teach.  These quantitative 
data describe the high levels of poverty in the Bronx, the state of its rental market in terms of 
stock and costs, and the composition and location of its immigrant populations—specifically, 
Ghanaians.  But such data go no further in describing the housing market occupied by the 
most impoverished beyond finding that such persons live in “crowded” conditions.  Their 
households are categorised as “hidden homes,” a label that merely describes (mostly 
immigrant) households residing in non-conventional arrangements on the economic margins 
without further understanding as to how their housing fits into the larger housing market.  
Hence, this chapter describes what is known about the rental sector in the Bronx and its 
poorest occupants in effort to deduce what is unknown, and situate this research.  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter is divided into three Parts.  Part 4.1 focuses on the 
Bronx, specifically, its housing market and the demographics of its residents, particularly 
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immigrants.  Part 4.2 centres on Ghanaian migrants in the Bronx.  It describes their 
demographics and spatial patterns.  Part 4.3 presents the chapter summary and discussion.   
 
4.1  The Bronx 
 
Part 4.1 has a two-fold purpose: first, to present and describe the housing market in New 
York City generally and the Bronx specifically and second, to explain the high degree of 
poverty in the Bronx, with special focus paid to data on immigrants in this borough. 
 
The information presented in Part 4.1 is drawn from New York City’s most recent Housing 
and Vacancy Survey (HVS) and, to a lesser degree, private publications.  Some of the tables 
shown in this chapter are compiled from different segments of the dataset in composite form.  
 
4.1.1  The Housing Stock 
 
New York City is comprised of five boroughs.  Of these boroughs, the Bronx has more than 
1.3 million residents (approximately 500,000 households) or nearly 17 percent of the city’s 
population per the most recent decennial US Census.  It also has nearly 18 percent of the 
city’s 2.17 million rental units.   Despite its size as the second smallest borough in population, 
the Bronx is arguably the most urbanised of the five boroughs by housing tenure:  nearly 80 
percent of the residents in this borough are renters as compared to 68 percent citywide.  
Compared to other boroughs individually, the Bronx retains the highest share of renter 
residents, with Manhattan coming in second place with 76 percent.     
 
Table 4.1   Number of Households by Housing Tenure and Borough 
 
Borough All Owners Renters 
All 3,088,881 984,066 2,104,816 
Bronx 473,656 98,166 375,491 
Brooklyn 929,296 256,130 673,166 
Manhattan 752,459 181,606 570,853 
Queens 769,860 337,775 432,085 
Staten Island 163,610 110,389 53,221 
          Source: New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (2013) 
 
It is important to understand the high concentration of renter households in the Bronx to 
appreciate the relevance of rent regulation to housing prices.  As Table 4.2 shows, four-fifths 
of the Bronx’ housing stock is comprised of rent-regulated properties.  Rent regulations 
describe a variety of policies and laws that are used to limit rents (Collins 1997).   
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Table 4.2  Distribution of Renter Households by Regulatory Status within Boroughs 
 
Regulatory Status All Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Staten Island 
Number 2,104,816 375,491 673,166 570,853 432,085 53,221 
All 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Controlled 1.80% ** 1.60% 3.50% 1.30% ** 
Stabilized 45.70% 59.30% 42.90% 45.60% 42.20% 13.80% 
Pre-1947 34.40% 48.30% 34.00% 37.50% 22.70% ** 
Post-1947 11.20% 11.00% 8.90% 8.10% 19.50% 8.40% 
Mitchell-Lama Rental 2.20% 2.70% 2.80% 2.20% 1.10% ** 
In Rem 0.10% 0.10% ** 0.40% ** ** 
Public Housing 8.80% 12.80% 9.20% 9.20% 4.00% 9.00% 
HUD & Other Regulated 2.80% 4.10% 2.30% 3.50% 1.40% ** 
Unregulated 38.60% 20.40% 41.20% 35.60% 50.10% 72.00% 
 In Rental Buildings 35.00% 18.50% 38.90% 30.40% 45.40% 66.60% 
 In Co-ops/Condos 3.60% 1.90% 2.30% 5.30% 4.70% ** 
          Source: New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (2013) 
        * Since the number of units is small, interpret with caution.     ** Too few units to report. 
 
Historically, New York City has had a highly regulated housing market dating to laws passed 
early in the 20th Century (Perine and Schill 2007).  But over time the share of regulated 
properties has declined citywide, with the Bronx being the exception (Community Service 
Society 2007, 2013).  This is because rent regulations that cover private properties are 
voluntary; private owners accept the terms of regulations in exchange for property tax 
abatements (Collins 1997; Perine and Schill 2007).  These agreements run for 20-year 
contracts, at which point the property owner can renew with the city (ibid).  But the booming 
demand for housing in New York City has increased market rents to heights wherein it is 
more profitable to operate an unregulated, free-market rate property that is liable for property 
taxes than accept abatements and rent controls (Collins 1997).  From 1981 to 2013, the share 
of rent-regulated housing citywide has declined from 63 percent to 47 percent, a net-loss of 
231,000 units (Furman Center 2013).  
 
The decline of rent-regulated housing has not impacted all boroughs equally.  In particular, 
the Bronx retains its rent-regulated stock, which comprises nearly 80 percent of all units in 
this borough.  The market forces acting on rental properties in other boroughs have not yet 
reached the Bronx, for it does not command the same market rates as Manhattan, Brooklyn, 
or Queens (HVS 2013).  This is because the Bronx is the poorest area in New York City, with 
median incomes – which are explored in greater detail later in this chapter – of approximately 
$25,000, 35 percent lower than the citywide median (HVS 2013).  
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The most common type of rent-regulation in New York City is ‘stabilisation.’  As shown in 
the data presented in Table 4.2, almost 60 percent of all rental properties in the Bronx fall 
into this category.  The second most common is public housing, which amounts to 11 percent 
of rental units in the Bronx.  The remaining regulation programs cover the balance of rental 
housing.  Only 20 percent of units in the Bronx are unregulated, without rent restrictions.  
 
In the Bronx, there are 222,586 rent-stabilised units divided into two classes:  constructed 
before and after 1947.  The difference between these two classes lies in the level of tax 
benefits available to the landlord (Collins 1997).  Both rent-controlled and stabilised 
properties limit the cost of the unit irrespective of the occupant’s income.   
 
Public housing accounts for most of the remaining share of regulated units, 48,074.  These 
units, unlike stabilised properties, are directly owned and managed by the New York City 
Housing Authority (NYCHA) (McLaughlin et al. 2013).  The rents may be no greater than 30 
percent of the tenant’s annual income (Community Service Society 2013).  Public housing is 
exclusively available to low-income households, as defined by the Federal Poverty 
Guidelines (ibid).  The remaining categories— ‘HUD & Other Regulated,’ ‘Mitchell Lama,’ 
and ‘In Rem’—collectively account for less than 26,000 units, approximately 9 percent of 
regulated units.  These three types are like public housing in that rent for these units can be 
no greater than a third of the tenant’s income and they are only available to low-income 
households.  But the key difference is ownership:  some are public, owned by a municipal 
government or the federal government, while others are private (Collins 1997; Community 
Service Society 2013, 2007).   
 
4.1.2 Housing ‘Affordability’ and Poverty in the Bronx 
 
While the scale of its rent regulation distinguishes the Bronx from other boroughs, rental 
housing demand in the Bronx resembles the City as a whole.  This is captured in Table 4.3 
below, which details the supply-constrained conditions of the housing market citywide and in 
the Bronx specifically.  
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Table 4.3     Rental Vacancy by Borough 
Borough Rental Vacancy Rate Number of Vacant Rental Units 
All 3.12% 67,818 
Bronx   3.23% 12,531 
Brooklyn 2.61% 18,011 
Manhattan 2.80% 16,460 
Queens 3.79% 17,023 
Staten Island 6.65%* ** 
Source: New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (2013) 
 
The strong demand for housing in New York is also present in the Bronx where the vacancy 
rate is only 3 percent.  Accordingly, rent regulation laws are in effect when the vacancy rate 
is below 5 percent, what is legally categorised as a “housing emergency” per New York State 
laws that set these regulations (HVS 2013).    
 
Table 4.4  Median Contract and Gross Rent and Median Renter Income by Borough 
Borough 
Median Contract 
Rent per Month 
Median Gross 
Rent per Month 
Median Asking 
Rent per Month Median Household Income 
All $1,100 $1,204 $1,300 $38,500 
Bronx $942 $1,050 $1,200 $25,200 
Brooklyn $1,020 $1,143 $1,200 $35,000 
Manhattan $1,500 $1,580 $2,240 $57,780 
Queens $1,200 $1,265 $1,200 $42,450 
Staten Island $1,000 $1,130 $1,000* $35,000 
Source: New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (2013) 
 
The effect of this strong demand for housing is also reflected in rental prices in the Bronx.  
Notice in Table 4.4 above that although the Bronx has the lowest monthly rents, it also has 
the lowest median income.  Median monthly contract rents are 15 percent cheaper in the 
Bronx relative to the city as a whole, but median incomes are 45 percent lower among Bronx 
residents than citywide.  Hence, based on their income, these residents face the highest rent-
to-income burden, 45 percent, in the city despite housing in this borough being cheaper 
relative to other areas.  Thus, although rents in the Bronx may be cheaper relative to other 
boroughs, it does not follow that they are affordable.  
 
Further illustration of absolute and relative poverty in the Bronx is shown below in Figure 
4.1. 
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Figure 4.1    Median Household Incomes by Borough  
 
Source: New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (2013) 
 
The Bronx stands out as the poorest borough by far.  More than 35 percent of its households 
have a median income of $20,000 or less, the largest share of low-income households of any 
borough.  One clear implication of such a significant low-income population is that a 
disproportionate share of tenant income is paid toward rent.  Bronx residents typically face 
monthly rent burdens significantly greater than the 30-percent of gross income deemed 
‘affordable’ per Federal Housing and Urban Development guidelines (Community Service 
Society 2007).  
 
Consequently, a substantial share of residents in the Bronx qualify for housing benefits 
(subsidies) through a variety of programs administered by local, state, and federal authorities.  
Tenants receiving benefits are granted a substantial discount on their monthly rents, yielding 
affordable out-of-pocket rents.  These programs are catalogued in Table 4.5 below.  
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Table 4.5   Median Contract and Out-of-Pocket Rent*, and Subsidy by Type  
 
Rent Subsidy 
Median Contract 
Rent per Month 
Median Out-of-Pocket 
Rent per Month 
Subsidy Amount 
per Month 
All Renter Households 
Receiving Subsidy $1,076 $275 $801 
Section 8 $1,176 $250 $926 
SCRIE $800 $537 $263 
Advantage $1,070 $82 $988 
Housing Stability Plus $909 $425 $484 
Employment Incentive Housing 
Program ** ** -- 
Jiggetts $866 $250 $616 
Family Eviction Prevention 
Supplement $950 $215 $735 
Other New York State or City 
Subsidy $1,000 $300 $700 
Other Federal Housing subsidy $1,056 $224 $832 
Source: New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (2013) 
*Paid out of pocket means the amount of rent not paid by a gov’t. housing subsidy program 
 
The housing benefits function as follows:  
 
1. Rent Freeze Program for Seniors (SCRIE).  This program caps rent at one-third of the 
household’s total monthly income, and is available for tenants 62 or older with an 
annual income of less than $50,000.   
2. Section 8.  This is a portable federal voucher that pays the difference between market 
rent and one-third of the household’s monthly income.  While any household with an 
income below the federal poverty line qualifies for this program, only 99,000 
vouchers are available in New York City (HVS 2013).  As such, there is a multi-year 
waiting list.   
3. ‘Other’ City and Federal subsidies include a range of specialty funding for designated 
groups, such as the homeless, persons diagnosed with HIV/AIDS, and victims of 
domestic violence.   
4. Family Eviction Prevention Supplement (FEPS) is the main program available to the 
average low-income household.  However, to obtain this subsidy – which provides up 
to five years of support with annual renewal – one must be in the process of eviction 
and be a current recipient of public assistance.  
 
While the total percentage of tenants in the Bronx receiving benefits is not available – due to 
the fact that these benefits are administered by multiple agencies across different levels of 
government – an indirect proxy is the percentage of tenants receiving non-housing public 
assistance: 27 percent of all residents in the Bronx (HVS 2013).  
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There is also a large population of households that do not receive any benefits despite being 
extremely poor.  These are “hidden households” (HVS 2013).  These hidden households, who 
reside in crowded conditions (most often immigrants), are unreported in the census because 
they do not respond to public surveys.  There are an estimated 40,000 such households in the 
Bronx.   Their estimated median income is $14,000, 45 percent less than the Bronx median, 
$25,200.  In context, this means a hidden household would expend more than 80 percent of 
their income on rent if they leased a unit at the median contract rate in the Bronx, $942 per 
month.  
 
Many unanswered questions remain about the housing market for those who are hidden, 
including: do they have their own market for accessing housing, with different pricing and 
allocation processes?  
 
4.1.3  Summary 
 
These quantitative data illustrate that the Bronx is very poor and has a rental sector that is 
heavily regulated.  These regulations, however, do not reduce the cost of housing to the point 
that it is affordable for most tenants: the majority have monthly rents in excess of 30 percent 
of their gross income.  Hence, the Bronx may be cheaper relative to other boroughs in New 
York City, but it is not affordable for its residents.   In addition, while nearly a third of these 
residents do receive some form of public assistance and/or housing benefits, there remains a 
sizable share of renters living in poverty who do not receive financial assistance.  Immigrants 
are the tenants most likely have limited access to public support because they often do not 
legally qualify for such assistance.  Among the poorest of the poor are hidden households.  
This population is made up mostly of immigrants who live in crowded conditions.  Little else 
is known about those who comprise this categorical group in the data.  This research aims to 
uncover the hidden housing market in the Bronx, with a focus on Ghanaian migrants.   
 
4.2  Ghanaians in the Bronx 
 
Part 4.2 explains what is known about Ghanaian migrants in the Bronx, the subjects of this 
study. This Part describes the Ghanaian community and the larger West African population 
of which they are a part, including their demographics, spatial location, housing patterns, and 
labour force participation. 
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The data presented in this segment are drawn from the US Census, The Newest New Yorkers 
publication, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Housing and Vacancy Survey. 
 
4.2.1 Ghanaian Spatial Distribution  
 
Ghanaians are among the fastest growing migrant populations in New York City.  Their 
community has doubled since the year 2000 to almost 30,000 households (Census 2014; 
Newest New Yorkers 2013).  This growth is highly concentrated: nearly three-quarters of 
these migrants reside in the Bronx, where more than half live in an eight-square mile area 
(HVS 2013).  They are part of a larger West African migrant cohort living in the Bronx: 
based on conservative estimates, there are 77,000 West Africans in the city, the majority of 
which live in this borough (Census 2014; Robins 2015).   It is important to note that this 
population figure does not include undocumented individuals, as persons from this sub-group 
invariably do not complete census forms or respond to government surveyors for fear of 
deportation (Font and Mendez 2013).  
 
Table 4.6  Distribution of Ghanaians in New York City’s Five Boroughs 
 
New York City Boroughs Non-Ghanaian Ghanaian Total Population 
Bronx Population 
% Share 
1,367,177 (16.7%) 22,105 (73.8%) 1,389,282 (16.9%) 
Brooklyn   2,510,129 (30.7%) 3,999 (13.3%) 2,514,128 (30.7%) 
Manhattan   1,592,764 (19.5%) 1,043 (3.5%) 1,593,807 (19.4%) 
Queens   2,231,035 (27.3%) 2,448 (8.2%) 2,233,483 (27.2%) 
Staten Island   467,322 (5.7%) 371 (1.2%) 467,693 (5.7%) 
Total 8,168,427 (100%) 
 
8,198,393 (100%) 29,966 (100%) 
         Source:  U.S. Census, American Community Survey (2014)  
 
The data show 74 percent of known members of the Ghanaian community live in the Bronx.  
And yet it is important to recognize that these data are themselves imperfect: migrants are 
known to resist surveying for fear of deportation and are generally wary of reporting 
themselves to government institutions because they are uncertain as to what will be done with 
that information (Font and Mendez 2013).  Hence, their representation in public datasets is 
likely significantly underestimated; in particular, migrants with insecure legal status are often 
underreported in official data estimates (ibid). 
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Nearly half (49 percent) of all Ghanaians live within three contiguous sub-boroughs: 3, 4, and 
5.  Other West African nationalities are also strongly represented in these areas.  This spatial 
concentration is one of the features of an ethnic enclave, as described by Portes and Wilson 
(1980).  Namely, one key feature of an enclave is that it is a geographic space wherein a large 
community of migrants, who share the same nationality, heritage, and culture, reside.  Other 
characteristics of the enclave concern how members of this community interact and bond 
with one another to overcome structural barriers and create (economic) opportunities that 
ethnic migrants would struggle to access through mainstream society (ibid).  It is beyond the 
scope of these quantitative data to discern whether the sociological elements of the enclave 
are present, but it is nevertheless clear that the Ghanaian, and West African community more 
broadly, meets the spatial concentration criteria set forth by enclave theorists (Kenneth and 
Portes 1980; Portes 1987; 1995; 1998).  
 
4.2.2  Demographics, Housing, and Employment 
 
This subsection details characteristics of Ghanaian migrants.  The objective of this subsection 
is to show that this community of Ghanaians are relatively recent arrivals who have moved to 
the US for employment.  Hence, this population is comprised of working age adults, of which 
the majority is male.   
 
The tables presented in this subsection organise the known Ghanaian population by 
households.  
 
Ghanaians are overwhelmingly a first-generation immigrant community: 98.5 percent of 
these households include persons born abroad.  This high rate of foreign-born residents 
suggests that the overwhelming majority of Ghanaians in the Bronx do not automatically 
have legal status.  This conclusion is supported by the additional data presented in Table 4.7 
below, which shows that almost half of all Ghanaians in the Bronx are not citizens.   
 
Table 4.7   Ghanaian Households by Citizenship Status and Sex 
    Male Female Total  
US Citizen 
  65 (1.6%) 38 (1.3%) 103 (1.5%) 
Naturalized citizen 2205 (53.7%) 1527 (51.6%) 3732 (52.8%) 
 
Not a citizen 1833 (44.7%) 1397 (47.2%) 3230 (45.7%) 
Total   4103 (100%) 2962 (100%) 7065 (100%) 
Source:  U.S. Census, American Community Survey (2014) 
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Non-citizen status does not mean that all these households are undocumented.  This category 
can include a variety of visa statuses: student, work, visiting.  Those who overstay the time 
allotted on their visas or otherwise violate a condition of their temporary residency become 
undocumented.  However, because the undocumented do not report their legal status, 
estimates such as those shown in Table 4.7 cannot sub-categorise ‘not a citizen’ by legal 
status type.   
 
Uncovering this undocumented population is critical for this research, as the aim is to 
compare migrants with and without legal status in the housing market.  The purpose of this 
focus is to understand housing experiences and outcomes among those most likely to inhabit 
hidden spaces – the undocumented – and compare them to their documented counterparts, 
who, while still poor, can benefit from the advantages of legal status.  That nearly 45 percent 
of the known Ghanaian population fall into a category with uncertain legal status strongly 
suggests that a subpopulation of undocumented Ghanaians exists.   
 
The best proxy for the hidden Ghanaian population is their unhidden counterparts.  After all, 
becoming undocumented does not alter a migrant’s demographic profile.  To this end, Table 
4.8 provides age distributions of Ghanaian migrants and reveals that this community skews 
toward working-age males.  
 
Table 4.8     Ghanaian Households by Age 
  Male Female Total 
18 to 24 yrs. 25 (.6%) 67 (2.3%) 92 (1.3%) 
25 to 34 yrs. 570 (13.9%) 343 (11.6%) 913 (12.9%) 
35 to 44 yrs. 1082 (26.4%) 1070 (36.1%) 2152 (30.5%) 
45 to 54 yrs. 1323 (32.2%) 1094 (36.9%) 2417 (34.2%) 
55 to 64 yrs. 960 (23.4%) 302 (10.2%) 1262 (17.9%) 
65 yrs. or more 143 (3.5%) 86 (2.9%) 229 (3.2%) 
Total 4103 (100%) 2962 (100%) 7065 (100%) 
Source:  U.S. Census, American Community Survey (2014) 
 
The substantial majority of the population is between the ages of 25-54 (78 percent).  
Concentration in this age band is even more pronounced among female migrants, of which 85 
percent are between 25 and 54 as compared to 73 percent of males.  Moreover, that the share 
of households aged 65 or older (3 percent) is small further reflects the relative youth of this 
community.  Such demographic attributes differ meaningfully from the general population of 
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the Bronx, where 77 percent residents are between 18 and 64 years of age as compared to 90 
percent of Ghanaians.  That the population skews in this direction is ostensibly unsurprising, 
for this is consistent with economic migration (De Jong 2000).   Those with the greatest 
earning potential are those most likely to migrate and are supported by their families in this 
endeavour because they will send back remittance income (ibid). 
 
In terms of how Ghanaians occupy housing, most rent.  Specifically, 91 percent are renters.  
This figure is 10 points higher than the Bronx-wide figure and nearly 30 points higher than 
citywide.  Renting is the logical housing choice for Ghanaians because this community is 
primarily low-income adults who have migrated for economic reasons.  It is also important to 
note that the available data on renting does not break out renters by degrees of tenure 
security: whether they have a lease for their unit or are simply sharing space without a formal 
contract.  This limits what can be learned from existing data; it shows the extent to which the 
hidden homes that these migrants occupy can be understood.   
 
Estimates on how migrants live show that Ghanaian households also mostly cohabitate:  less 
than 10 percent of males live alone compared to 18 percent of females.  
 
Table 4.9   Ghanaian Households by Size 
 
  Male Female Total  
1 One person 374 (9.1%) 523 (17.7%) 897 (12.7%) 
2 1149 (28%) 760 (25.7%) 1909 (27%) 
3 1046 (25.5%) 637 (21.5%) 1683 (23.8%) 
4 705 (17.2%) 514 (17.4%) 1219 (17.3%) 
5 411 (10%) 317 (10.7%) 728 (10.3%) 
6 or more persons 418 (10.2%) 211 (7.1%) 629 (8.9%) 
Total 4103 (100%) 2962 (100%) 7065 (100%) 
Source:  U.S. Census, American Community Survey (2014) 
 
What these data suggest is that male and female Ghanaians alike tend not to live alone, but 
that males are more likely to reside in crowded conditions with roommates.  This coheres 
with Table 4.10 below, which shows the low proportion of children in Ghanaian households.  
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Table 4.10    Number of Children in Ghanaian Households 
 
  Male Female Total  
0 1967 (47.9%) 1124 (37.9%) 3091 (43.8%) 
1 793 (19.3%) 619 (20.9%) 1412 (20%) 
2 609 (14.8%) 655 (22.1%) 1264 (17.9%) 
3 347 (8.5%) 393 (13.3%) 740 (10.5%) 
4 OR MORE 387 (9.4%) 171 (5.8%) 558 (7.9%) 
Total 4103 (100%) 2962 (100%) 7065 (100%) 
Source:  U.S. Census, American Community Survey (2014) 
 
Taken together, these data further suggest that persons in these households either cohabitate 
with a spouse or housemates, given that most migrants do not live alone.   
 
A key inference made from the preceding data is that migrants are focused on employment.  
This is shown in the labour force participation rates listed in Table 4.11 below.   
 
Table 4.11    Employment Status of Ghanaians Households by Sex 
 
  Male Female Total 
Employed 3618 (88.2%) 2518 (85%) 6136 (86.9%) 
Unemployed 333 (8.1%) 127 (4.3%) 460 (6.5%) 
Not in labour force 152 (3.7%) 317 (10.7%) 469 (6.6%) 
Total 4103 (100%) 2962 (100%) 7065 (100%) 
Source:  U.S. Census, American Community Survey (2014) 
 
Without context Table 4.11 may appear unremarkable, but compared to the general 
population of the Bronx, Ghanaians stand out.  Namely, 87 percent of Ghanaians are 
employed and only 7 percent of this group are not members of the labour force as compared 
to 71 percent and 20 percent of residents in the Bronx (HVS 2013).  The relatively small 
share of non-active labour force participants among Ghanaians reflects that there are far 
fewer very young or old Ghanaians as compared to the general population of New Yorkers.  
These labour participation data, again, comport with a community of economic migrants who 
aim to minimise expenses and earn an income.   
 
4.2.3  Summary 
 
Part 4.2 presented what is known of the Ghanaian community in the Bronx using data drawn 
from its documented population.  These data show that Ghanaian migrants comprise a 
relatively small but growing community that is part of a larger cohort of West Africans on a 
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similar growth trajectory.  Ghanaian migrants live throughout the Bronx, but concentrate in 
three sub-boroughs.  Demographically, they are comprised of working aged adults, mostly 
male, who cohabitate with others and have very high labour force participation rates.  In 
summary, they are community of economic migrants.   
 
Based on the data presented in this subsection, Ghanaian migrants in the Bronx form the 
contours of an ethnic enclave: a sizeable community of migrants who live with each other in 
a defined geographic space.  However, the data reveal nothing of the internal dynamics that 
shape this apparent enclave, nor how migrants make their cohabited housing arrangements or 
why these dynamics persist.  Moreover, there is a fundamental flaw in drawing inferences 
from the documented migrants that supplied this survey data – what of those who did not 
respond because they resist such conventional surveying?   
 
4.4 Chapter Conclusion 
 
4.3.1  Summary and Discussion 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate what is known about the housing market in the 
Bronx and its Ghanaian migrant population to situate the research context.   
 
The data reveal that the Bronx is a poor borough by all measures: median incomes, monthly 
rental prices, and proportion of residents on public assistance.  However, this poverty does 
not translate into affordable housing prices for all its residents.  Even though the Bronx has 
the most rent-regulated properties of any borough, it remains unaffordable for most of its 
residents.  This is because incomes are disproportionately lower than the cheaper monthly 
rents.  Hence, Bronx residents, particularly those not receiving housing benefits, face a high 
rent burden.  
 
Immigrant residents, who are least likely to qualify for benefits because they lack legal status, 
expend a higher proportion of their income on monthly rent.  These economic pressures 
influence crowding rates, which remain high in the Bronx.  But public datasets that detail 
crowding rates are limited in the insight they can provide about migrant populations, 
especially on undocumented sub-populations.  These data catalogue these unknown 
populations as “hidden homes.”  Such households have very low incomes and are most likely 
comprised of migrants.   
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Based on the available data on Ghanaian migrants, it is clear that their community meets the 
minimum thresholds for an ethnic enclave.  They live in a contiguous area in the Bronx.  
Their housing composition shows high levels of non-spouse cohabitation.  In addition, nearly 
half of this community does not have legal status, suggesting that their ethnic community 
plays an important role in helping those without legal status overcome access barriers.  The 
demographics show this community has a substantial share of working age adults and high 
labour force participation rates.  Here, again, the data have reached their limit.  How these 
migrants come to live with one another and otherwise access housing, especially the 
undocumented, given their low incomes is unexplained by these data.  Hence, much of the 
internal dynamics of this migrant community remain hidden.   
 
The clear implication of these data is that there is a hidden migrant housing market in the 
Bronx.  This is what this research aims to uncover and understand through studying Ghanaian 
migrants.  The quantitative data reveal the contours of an ethnic enclave living on the 
economic margins, but why these migrants chose the Bronx as their locale is unknown.  This 
is perhaps because it is the cheapest borough, with robust and reliable public transportation to 
the city’s entire labour market.  But it also might be that because a critical mass of West 
African migrants has arrived in the Bronx, more migrants follow because of the gravitational 
pull that comes from the amenities offered by living with one’s co-ethnics.  Still, interpreting 
only the raw data leads to mostly speculative answers.  The qualitative data and analysis that 
follow aim to bridge this void by giving clearer answers as to what draws Ghanaians to the 
Bronx and keeps them there.      
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5 
Housing Actors 
 
5.1  Housing Providers 
5.1.1 Overview of Housing Providers and Rent Regulations  
5.1.2 Formal Process 
5.1.3 Informal Process 
5.1.4 Provider Preferences 
 
5.2   Intermediaries 
5.2.1 Housing Advocacy Non-Profits 
5.2.2 Public Authorities  
5.2.3 Religious Institutions 
 
5.3  Chapter Conclusion 
5.3.1 Summary 
5.3.2 Discussion 
 
This is the first of the three findings chapters.  It centres on housing providers and 
intermediaries in the Bronx’ housing market in an effort to answer the research question:  
how do such actors function in housing allocation?  Do they act as gatekeepers and, if so, 
how?   
 
The purpose of exploring the role of housing providers and intermediaries is three-fold.  The 
first goal is to discern how different actors shape housing access in the rental sector.  The 
second goal is to determine the relative importance and relevance of each type of actor in the 
allocation process.  The third goal is to build a basis for triangulation using these qualitative 
interview data.  
 
Methodologically, this chapter uses qualitative data drawn from semi-structured interviews 
with housing providers and leaders of various intermediary organisations that perform 
functions related to housing access in the Bronx.  Further qualitative data was gathered from 
documentary evidence, such as the rental applications used to screen prospective tenants.  
Quantitative data on the number of housing units in a landlord’s portfolio and the range of 
monthly rental costs was gathered from interviews with housing providers. 
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5.1 Housing Providers 
 
5.1.1 Overview of Housing Providers and Rent Regulations 
 
The term ‘housing providers’ describes various types of landlords that supply housing on the 
rental market.  The term ‘provider’ is used in lieu of ‘landlord’ here because the individual or 
organisation who supplies the housing is not always the property owner.  In the Bronx, these 
providers are divided into four main categories: non-profit, public, private, and property 
management firms.  Table 1 explains the differences between each of these types of 
providers. 
 
Table 5.1   Type of Providers and Key Attributes 
Provider Type Key Attributes 
Non-Profit ● Charitable ownership structure. 
● Receives financing from local, state, and federal 
government. 
● Receives property tax abatements.  
Public ● Owned by New York City Dept. of Housing. 
● Financed by local, state, and federal governments. 
● No property tax obligations. 
Private ● Owned by private individual or corporation. 
● Privately financed. 
● May receive property tax abatements in exchange for 
entering the rent stabilisation program.  
Property Management  ● Paid management services, including: collecting monthly 
rents, making repairs, filling vacancies, pursuing 
evictions where necessary, and completing state 
reporting. 
● Often does not own any property. 
● May receive property tax abatements in exchange for 
entering the rent stabilisation program.    
Source:  Perine and Schill (2007); Collins (1997) 
 
The housing providers surveyed in this research offer only apartment units.  The size of units 
ranged from studio (efficiency) to three-bedrooms.  Each interviewee has properties in the 
three sub-boroughs in the case study area, though many have additional buildings throughout 
the Bronx.  Furthermore, all affirm that they have West African tenants, including Ghanaians. 
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Table 5.2  Interviewed Providers by Type, Portfolio Size and Regulatory Status 
Provider Type n Portfolio Size Regulatory Status 
Non-Profit 4 5,000 units Stabilized  
Public 1 48,000 units Stabilized  
Private 7 20,000 units Stabilized and No Regulation  
Property Management  3 20,000 units Stabilized  
Source:  Provider Interviews 
 
Nearly all of those interviewed for this study have units that fall under ‘rent stabilisation,’ as 
noted in Table 5.2 above.  In the Bronx, this regulatory status applies to 80 percent of the 
housing stock in the rental market.  Under stabilisation, there is a legal limit on the monthly 
rent, and the occupying tenant has a statutory right to a lease renewal.  The actual rent cost 
depends on the unit size, the amount paid by the last tenant, and whether the unit had any 
major capital improvements (MCI).  For example, if a one-bedroom apartment was last 
rented to tenant A for $700 a month, the landlord may raise the monthly rent a maximum of 
20 percent, to $840, for the new occupant, tenant B.  However, as per the Rent Act of 2015, if 
tenant A was paying a preferential rent (an amount less than the allowable legal rent), the rent 
for tenant B can increase 5 percent if the unit’s last vacancy commenced less than two years 
ago, 10 percent if less than three years ago, 15 percent if less than four years ago, and 20 
percent if four or more years ago.   
 
Further allowable monthly rent increases come from capital improvements and annual 
increases.  If the property or unit had any major capital improvements (MCI), an additional 6 
percent per-year increase on the legal rent dating to when the work was completed is 
permissible.  In addition, all rent regulated units are subject to an annual increase as 
determined by the Rent Guidelines Board of New York City.  Historically, these increases 
range from 2 to 5 percent.  In 2015, for the first time in two decades, the Board voted against 
any increase for one-year leases and decided on only a 1 percent increase on two-year leases, 
its smallest ever.   
 
A significant fact to note is that once the legal rent threshold reaches a monthly rent of 
$2,700 (as of 2016), the stabilisation rules no longer apply to the unit.  This is known as 
‘high-rent vacancy deregulation.’  Demand for units more expensive than the rent 
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stabilisation threshold is low in the Bronx, as monthly rent at or above $2,700 is not yet 
economically viable in this low-income market.  However, in Manhattan and other wealthier 
areas of New York City, demand supports rents higher than the stabilisation threshold, 
creating significant economic incentives for providers in these markets to reach the 
deregulation threshold.    
 
Rent regulations overlap across all types of housing providers in the Bronx’ housing stock.  
Properties can be both rent-stabilised and earmarked for low-income groups.  Public housing 
is made of rent-regulated properties, but its units are only available to low-income tenants for 
whom the rent does not exceed one-third of their income.  Non-profit provider owned 
properties are also simultaneously rent stabilised and can only be leased to low-to-moderate-
income tenants.  Unlike public housing, non-profit housing is not discounted to the rate of 
one-third gross income threshold.  Private landlords and property management firms’ 
portfolios are almost exclusively comprised of rent regulated properties, with the exceptions 
of small-scale providers of multi-family properties.  These private providers are not bound by 
income-based restrictions as to whom they can rent to.   
 
Finally, there remains an undescribed fifth category of providers:  tenants who sub-divide and 
sub-let their apartments.  These ‘providers’ are not formally subject to any rent regulations, 
although the units that they have leased through conventional providers typically are.  Rent 
regulations nevertheless set the informal market price, as the formal market monthly rent is 
divided by the number of occupants—with some possible manipulation by the leaseholder—
to determine the individual cost.  Hence, the reach of rent regulations stretches into the 
informal market, even though there is no mechanism to enforce such rules in this submarket.   
 
Rent regulation, ultimately, is the principal means by which the local law facilitates housing 
affordability in New York City.  Because stabilisation applies to apartment units irrespective 
of the tenant occupant’s income or legal status, it assures a broad policy of affordability 
without straining public budgets through means-tested entitlements—i.e., housing benefits.  
Instead, the cost of these rent regulations comes mostly from property tax abatements and 
low-interest financing for new builds.   
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5.1.2 Formal Process 
 
How do rent regulations shape the tenant selection processes of different providers?  The 
most useful way to answer this question is to examine the formal housing application.  The 
first step in accessing housing on the rental market in the Bronx is to contact a housing 
provider to inquire about vacancies.  Contact is usually made directly, but a housing broker 
may also be used.  In either case, the process begins with an application form.  This form asks 
for detailed personal information on the prospective tenant and their co-occupants, and 
requires financial and personal identifying documentation.  The application, therefore, sets 
out the process and establishes the procedures that one must follow.   
 
For providers who receive taxpayer supported financing—namely, public and non-profit 
providers and private landlords who use the 421-tax credit program in exchange for accepting 
only low-to-moderate income tenants—the foremost objective of the application is to screen 
out ineligible applicants.  Only households with low-to-moderate incomes are eligible.  
Furthermore, the applicant—the would-be lessee—must be a legal US resident.  Most private 
landlords and property management firms, however, are not bound by such tenant-selection 
constraints, though like all providers they cannot discriminate based on race, sex, ethnicity, 
religion, or payment method.  Despite the relative autonomy of private providers in choosing 
tenants, there remains remarkable convergence across all providers in the documentation they 
require from prospective tenants, as shown in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3  Materials Required in Housing Applications by Provider 
Application Form  Public Non-Profit Private 
Property 
Management  
Biographic Data         
Previous housing history   X X X 
Reasons for leaving previous address   X     
Household size and member composition X       
Income and Employment         
List part and full-time employment of all 
households X X X X 
List all other sources income (e.g. welfare, social 
security, disability, unemployment, pension, etc.) X X X X 
References         
Three non-relatives   X X X 
Bank Information         
Checking account X X X X 
Savings account X X X X 
Other assets X X X X 
Documentation         
Last six pay stubs for all working family 
members X X X X 
Last two years’ tax returns and W-2 statements X X X X 
Last six rent receipts from current landlords   X     
Last two telephone bills   X     
Last two Con-Edison (utility) bills   X X X 
Photo I.D. for all family members over 18 years 
of ago X X X X 
Passport, Birth Certificate, or U.S. Naturalization 
Letter X X     
Social Security Card X X X   X 
Copies of children’s birth certificates  X X     
Copy of Section 8 Certificate and package (if 
applicable) X X X X 
Current Public Assistance budget letter (if 
applicable) X X X X 
SSA award letter for SSA or SSI benefits (if 
applicable) X X X X 
School verification for all students X  X X X 
Copy of most recent bank statements X  X X X 
Signed release form for credit and criminal 
history check X X X X 
Application fee ($25-$50)   X X X 
Current apartment lease or notarized letter from 
the person you reside with   X X X 
Vehicle history    X     
        Source:  Housing Application Forms (see Appendix) 
 
This application uniformity across providers illustrates that all landlords seek data to discern 
the credit-worthiness of an applicant.  Names of all adult occupants and prior tenancy 
histories are cross-referenced with the housing court for eviction history.  Tax returns and 
employment records establish one’s past to present income history.  An applicant’s social 
security and identification cards are used to obtain a credit report and score.  Even small-
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scale providers of multi-family properties report asking for similar information and 
documents, despite not having a standardised application form.  However, the reasons for this 
application convergence across all providers vary.  
 
Public providers are less concerned with default risk, as residents of public housing are 
subsidised to ensure that no more than thirty-percent of their income is spent on monthly rent, 
and they often receive other public assistance resources for other expenses.  This makes it 
highly unlikely that these tenants will default.  Moreover, the public provider is a government 
entity and therefore has no obligation to be profitable.  It receives funding from government 
appropriations to cover its operating costs. Hence, the primary purpose of this provider’s 
application process is screening for eligibility:   
 
“The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) application portal gets us all the 
information needed to see if the applicant even qualifies.  Meaning that they are low-
income, a resident of New York City, and a US citizen.  The application doesn’t mean 
they’re getting an apartment; the wait period is very, very long.  But it is the first step 
to determine eligibility before they can even get in line.” (P5) 
 
This application process screens prospective tenants based not on their ability to afford the 
cost of a particular unit, but instead on their status as a low-income household.  Non-profit 
providers are somewhat similar in that they too are responsible for renting to income eligible 
households.  However, non-profit providers do not operate taxpayer guaranteed properties, so 
they must charge fiscally sustainable rents to ensure the durability of their enterprises.  
Therefore, for these providers, the application process serves a hybrid function:  
 
“The application allows us to see if you qualify for the apartment based on your 
income and whether you would be able to afford its rent.  We need documents like 
your social security number to complete a credit and criminal background check.  We 
also need a 4506 [Internal Revenue Service tax return request form] and IDs for the 
City.  They need that to make sure that we are renting only to low income US 
citizens.” (P14)   
 
Non-profits receive taxpayer support in the form of tax abatements and low-cost financing in 
exchange for legally agreeing to rent only to low to moderate-income households.  However, 
these providers also must ensure that their tenants have sufficient income—which may 
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include portable housing benefits—to cover the cost of their units.  Thus, non-profits must 
balance income eligibility and default risk equally.  
 
On the other end of the continuum are private providers and their property management 
firms.  For these landlords, unless they have accepted low-interest taxpayer financing for a 
new development, the fundamental purpose of the application is to screen for default risk; 
prospective applicants would not be excluded based on their incomes being too high.  As 
exclusively for-profit firms, their objective is to price their units at the maximum allowable 
amount within stabilisation parameters (in most cases) and to rent to tenants able to 
sustainably afford this rate.  The responses below, the first from a private provider and 
second from a property management owner, illustrate how they understand the purpose of 
their housing applications: 
 
“The application gives me the facts.  I look at credit, taxes, employment, bank 
accounts, housing court record if any, etc. to decide whether they’re going to be able 
to pay your rent.” (P1) 
 
“With the application, we can see where you fit.  First, we determine if you have the 
income necessary; we usually use the 30 percent rule, but not always.  Second, if you 
do, we can then figure out what size unit you need based on family size and what’s 
available.  Some of our properties receive 421-tax credits, so we have to be very 
careful with those; make sure they are rented to low-income families with all their 
papers [legal status].  But basically, we use the application to see if you’re going to be 
a risk or not because no one wants to go to Court.” (P7) 
 
The private providers are blunter in their assessments, but the substance of their response 
echoes that of the management firm: the application functions to discern ability to pay and, 
thereby, default risk.  Eviction in New York City is expensive and time-consuming, costing 
thousands in court costs, legal fees and lost rent, and taking months to complete (Gunn 1995; 
Navarro 2016).  Because of this, private providers are motivated to gather all the 
documentary materials needed to conduct a thorough and diligent examination of a 
prospective tenant’s income and payment history in order to make an informed decision.   
 
While different provider types weigh different considerations when selecting tenants, their 
respective application processes converge because this process yields the information 
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necessary to decide.  It is also clear, however, that different providers vary in the degree of 
flexibility they have in selecting tenants.  Public and non-profit providers are limited to 
renting to low-income households with legal status.  This is a legal obligation that cannot be 
abrogated.  Private providers are not restrained like their counterparts – they may rent to 
whomever, irrespective of income or legal status.  Indeed, it is for this reason that these 
providers’ ascertainment of the ability to pay—which ensures profitability—is the chief 
objective of their housing application.   
 
Despite the flexibility that private providers may exercise in selecting their tenants, in relying 
on an application process that requires the same types of documentation as their public and 
non-profit counterparts, they indirectly exclude certain migrant applicants.  This is because 
these private providers request, as shown in Table 4.3, U.S. issued identification cards, social 
security information, tax records and other materials that are difficult for migrant tenants—
particularly the undocumented—to procure.  As such, the formal application process, which 
for private providers is not intended to screen based on legal status, precludes prospective 
tenants who simply cannot supply the materials needed by this formal process.  So why do 
private providers allow this unintentional constraint on their potential applicant pool?  The 
answer lies in the fact that the formal application is not the only pathway by which migrant 
tenants may access housing with private providers.  
 
In sum, the formal housing allocation process functions as is illustrated in the synthesised 
depiction shown Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1    Formal Housing Process 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
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As Figure 5.1 shows, public and non-profit providers have one pathway for selecting tenants: 
the housing application forms, which are also used by private providers.  However, private 
providers are not restricted to using these applications; they may select tenants in any way so 
long as it does not violate discrimination laws.  As such, providers have an alternate, informal 
process that, for many, is their preferred tenant selection pathway.  How this process 
functions and pertains to migrants is detailed in the next subsection. 
 
5.1.3 Informal Process 
 
Migrants who fail to pass the application process still obtain housing.  This indicates that the 
formalised process is either not universally enforced or is not the only pathway to access 
housing.  Many providers use alternative informal procedures to find tenants, which are 
different from the formal housing application process.  This informal process operates 
parallel to the formal process, but entrance through this pathway requires a social network 
connection.  To obtain access to a conventional apartment unit via an informal channel 
invariably means that a prospective tenant has been referred by an existing tenant when a 
vacancy arises.   
 
Referrals are of special import to landlords when the property in question appears to have an 
ethnically homogenous tenant composition.  As one provider explains:   
 
“[I receive applications] from the same immigrant community, or even tenants who 
are in the apartment.  For example, I have a tenant that’s paying me every month.  I 
would rather that person bring me somebody, a family member, a friend, a relative, 
than getting someone off craigslist that I don’t even know.  So, referrals go a long 
way.  Nothing is 100%.  I’d be lying if I tell you yes, but so far, I’m happy with the 
result.  The chance of the person that you refer to be bad maybe is 10% the chance of 
getting someone off of craigslist that you don’t know is 50/50.  They may be good 
they maybe not be good so you have to go with the probability.” (P3) 
 
Landlords not bound by regulatory constraints speak candidly about their reliance on referrals 
for selecting new tenants.  This method offers an informal guarantee, as the existing tenant—
the referrer—stakes her or his credibility on behalf of the prospective tenant.  As such, the 
referrals mirror the formal application process by serving the same function: minimising 
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financial risk.  Moreover, as one provider explains, failure to use referrals may compromise 
their relationship with an existing tenant.  
 
“If somebody comes to me and they’re eligible and they qualify…  I have no problem 
giving them an apartment…  But let’s say I have an African American and the 
building is predominantly Spanish…and I have one of the Spanish people saying my 
sister really wants this apartment.  Because of the referral I give them that as opposed 
to the other person.  I don’t discriminate, let’s say this whole building is Spanish, I’m 
not gonna put a black person in there.  You can’t do that.” (P3)   
 
The view expressed above is that a housing complex is a social community that the provider 
does not aim to disturb, particularly if this community is profitable as it stands.  Providers are 
more than comfortable with allowing existing tenants to shape the ethnic composition of their 
residential community, as doing so preserves tranquillity without compromising profitability.  
Moreover, this notion of self-congregating ethnic communities appears to cohere with their 
worldview and gives them a measure of fiscal assurance: 
 
“Immigrants historically they like to stay in their own community…most of them they 
bring each other.  If they know someone from Africa they come and stay with them.  
We have an empty apartment… they take over the apartment and…get somebody to 
move in with them.” (P2) 
 
The informal tenant-selection process typically unfolds in the following manner.  A migrant 
lives in a building owned or managed by a provider landlord and learns of a vacancy.  This 
information is shared with a friend, family member, or simply a person from their ethnic 
community.  The existing tenant speaks to the landlord on behalf of their acquaintance who is 
a prospective applicant.  In this case, the landlord often does not expect the tenant to submit a 
full housing application beyond the perfunctory information required to complete a lease.  
This prospective tenant is still expected to cover the upfront costs:  the first month’s rent and 
a security deposit (usually equivalent to one month’s rent).  In relying on this referral, the 
private provider is betting that the credibility of the existing tenant is sufficient to assure that 
the new tenant will not default.  Providers have confidence in this because, as illustrated with 
P2’s response, they know that the migrant household will be comprised of numerous rent-
payers who are all sharing the cost together.  This arrangement proves affordable for the 
tenants and, from the provider’s perspective, is a logical solution to the affordability 
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challenge that they might otherwise face.  Finally, further advantages of the referral system 
are that it minimises the period that the unit is left vacant and eliminates the administrative 
cost and delays associated with the due diligence process that accompanies conventional 
housing applications (e.g., checks on credit, criminal, housing court history, prior tenancies, 
etc.).   
 
Whereas the formal process creates unintended barriers for those who lack documents such as 
a social security number and tax records, this informal process does not present those 
obstacles.  This follows from private providers’ statements wherein they express indifference 
to a tenant’s legal status.  Instead, they primarily value profitability: what matters is 
discerning a prospective tenant’s ability to pay.  Without documentation, these providers 
make decisions based on a combination of experience with the referring tenant and their own 
subjective reasoning.  As one provider explains:  
 
“You can know whether it will work out [with an applicant] by body language, 
posture, general look.  You can’t explain it.  If you’ve been in the business, it’s just an 
instinctual intuition.  I can’t tell you this is how I do it.  There’s no science to it.  [I]t’s 
not quantitative.  It’s a gut feeling.  When you go against your gut and rent to 
someone you instinctually say this isn’t going to work out, it doesn’t work out. You 
say why didn’t I stay with my intuition.  And you have 5 years of aggravation.  You 
can tell by looking at somebody…” (P8) 
 
In sum, providers operate an informal process alongside their formal application process.  
This informal process is deemed no less legitimate than the formal process.  Rather, it is 
simply a separate pathway that private providers make available to prospective tenants who 
are referred through reliable sources.  Figure 5.2 adds to the previous synthesised depiction to 
show both formal and informal processes as parallel processes. 
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Figure 5.2    Formal and Informal Housing Processes 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
 
As the diagram illustrates, private providers – unlike their public and non-profit counterparts 
– can rely on both housing applications and informal referrals, and indeed prefer the informal 
tenant selection pathway.  The nature of these preferences is described in greater detail in the 
following subsection.  
 
5.1.4 Provider Preferences 
 
The tenant selection process reveals that among non-profit and private providers, as well as 
property management firms, there is a strong desire for consistently paying, low-maintenance 
tenants.  However, different providers are constrained in the degree to which they can act on 
this preference.  Private providers, as explained, have greater freedom in selecting tenants—
they are not bound to accept only low-income households with legal status.  Nevertheless, all 
providers must adhere to non-discrimination laws: ethnic and racial background cannot be 
used as the basis for tenant-selection.  Nor can payment method, which is to say that portal 
housing benefits such as vouchers, may not disadvantage an applicant per law.  In practice, 
however, private providers vary in their adherence to such rules.  Private providers reveal a 
strong preference for West African migrants because they ‘work’ and do not rely on benefits, 
and this informs their tenant-selection. 
 
“In my building, everyone works; that’s what we like in our tenants.  Like the 
Africans, they always work and go about their business.  You go to school and you do 
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your best so you do better in life financially and mentally.  And you can encourage 
your siblings, your kids and someone comes in with a program they don’t go to 
school or work.  [Tenants that rely on benefits] just stay at home all day.  What do 
they do at home all day?  They watch TV.  Not empower themselves or their kids to 
do better.” (P6)  
 
The response above ties into a strong stigma against, and aversion to, tenants that use housing 
benefits, particularly those with multiple children.  Providers articulate a frustration with the 
‘type’ of individuals who rely on them.  The theme of this disapproval has two layers.  The 
first is a normative disapproval of individuals who feel entitled to public support and are not 
working, though they are able-bodied adults.  During interviews, these providers would hold 
West African tenants up as exemplars because, in their view, they are gainfully employed and 
therefore do not rely on government assistance.   
 
To understand the cultural context of the biases expressed by these providers, it is worth 
noting their own gender and ethnic background: all of the providers interviewed in this study 
are male and the vast majority are Caucasian.  In the United States, members of this 
demographic group, particularly those with higher incomes, hold the most conservative views 
toward welfare program and believe such programs have nominal to adverse effects on their 
recipients (Lauter 2016).  As such, biases against those who receive welfare support are 
arguably shaped by the worldview that many providers hold, reflecting their own culture, 
which shows an affinity toward working tenants (‘hard workers’) and disliking of those who 
legally receive public entitlements.   
 
The second layer of disapproval toward tenants that receive housing benefits arises from a 
concern that such tenants are high-maintenance, costlier customers.   
  
“Most landlords do not like programs…If I’m not doing anything and I’m able and 
my kids see that I’m not doing anything, they’re gonna do the same thing and it’s a 
trend.  If you have a family and they’re doing shit… [t]hey do nothing but complain.  
All day long.  If someone stays at home all day and there’s no hot water one day what 
will that tenant do.  They’ll call management and say there’s no hot water.  If you go 
to work you don’t have time to complain, pay attention to all those details. You see 
the perspective.  I don’t want that in my building.  If you come in they don’t care 
about that person they don’t care about the colour of the person’s skin, just that that 
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person works and goes to school…  When someone says to you I cannot work which 
is bullshit.  They usually do that to collect a social security check.  That’s how most 
landlords think.” (P4) 
 
Private landlords are reluctant to accept applicants who receive housing benefits, for they 
view these tenants as more likely to damage their units and make maintenance demands.  
Instead, these landlords prefer full paying tenants.  Despite this being an illegal preference, 
landlords consider it a wise practice.  This ultimately strengthens the case for informal 
methods of tenant-selection.  In this sense, migrants are advantaged; providers are acting on 
their positive views of their ethnic community—in contrast to their negatively held views of 
the native citizens.   
 
An important deduction to make from providers’ revealed preferences is that the different 
selection processes, formal versus informal, are themselves critical in shaping these views.  
Private providers operate this formal process alongside their informal process.  The formal 
application process gives substantial detail about an applicant’s income, employment history, 
whether they receive public assistance of any kind, and other details.  As such, the formal 
process can screen for more than just default risk.  Providers learn who relies on housing 
benefits from their formal application process and can discriminate accordingly.  On the other 
hand, the informal process also gives important detail about the prospective tenant.  Firstly, 
they are members of the same ethnic community of which the providers have a favourable 
view and established relationship.  Secondly, landlords know that persons from this 
community pay their rent and are not financially burdensome in terms of maintenance.  
Hence, the normative view that “Africans… always work and go about their business” 
becomes shorthand for higher profitability, especially relative to native citizens who receive 
housing benefits.   
 
Many providers dislike housing benefits because of the programs’ unreliability.  Another 
private provider explains his frustration with a now defunct assistance program:   
 
“They had this cockamamie thing where a tenant came in under Work Advantage [a 
housing benefit program] 5, 6, years ago and the design was to increase their share of 
the rent 20% every year. So let’s say the rent was 1000 the tenant came in paying 200. 
So by year 5 the city’s objective was to get that tenant to pay the full thousand. 
Laudable objective in theory. Where a lot of these folks are on minimum wage there’s 
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no way they’re gonna get to 1000 or 400 or 600. If somebody does that’s great. 
They’re self-sufficient. But it was a dogma and…it’s very unrealistic.  The Work 
Advantage went caput.  There was no new program for 2,3 years.  How do you do 
that to people?  It’s befuddling how you do that.” (P8) 
 
In addition to Work Advantage, other government subsidy programs also require biannual or 
annual income and employment status updates from the tenant recipients.  If recipients fail to 
provide this information, the payments will be discontinued.  Providers accept high risk 
tenants whose income is insufficient because of these public subsidy programs.  When these 
programs are withdrawn, the provider is left with a tenant who cannot pay their rent and their 
only recourse is to pursue an eviction, which is an expensive, lengthy legal process (Gunn 
1995; Navarro 2016).  During the course of the eviction process, the provider is unlikely to 
receive any rent.     
 
Thus, provider preferences are shaped by hard and soft economic realities.  These include the 
need to minimise risk by selecting tenants who have demonstrated an ability to pay, and 
relatedly, minimising the number of tenants who are reliant upon fickle methods of payment.  
In addition to reflecting economic realities, these preferences also show how the gender, 
cultural affiliation, and ethnic background of the providers themselves – who are 
predominately male Caucasians – influence their normative views on the tenant populations 
they desire over others.  Inevitably, these preferences are not revealed in formalised housing 
applications, which are necessarily designed to be impartial in the types of information they 
glean from prospective applicants.  What providers show through their narrative accounts is 
that while housing benefit programs might reduce the risk of default, these programs and the 
tenants who rely on them are deemed inherently high risk, so providers avoid them where 
possible.  
 
It is for these reasons that certain providers (namely those that are not bound by statutory 
obligation to serve low-income persons) tend to prefer migrant tenants who typically would 
fail under formal due diligence, particularly West Africans.  The language used by providers 
to express this preference is that migrant tenants have a strong work ethic and do not demand 
repairs, which makes them more profitable. 
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5.2 Intermediaries 
 
Intermediaries are both public and private organisations that, in theory, play a critical 
function in accessing housing.  The literature situated such organisations as ‘gatekeepers’ 
which, through their intimate knowledge of the local housing market, including many 
providers and government resources, facilitated access to housing.  This research sought to 
uncover the role that such intermediaries play in the Bronx for the local West African 
population.  The objective in interviewing individuals from this diverse array of organisations 
was to understand the housing market from the perspective of non-transacting parities that 
may influence housing allocation.  The data gathered from these groups also serves the 
methodological purpose of triangulation, corroborating or complicating other data gathered 
from housing providers and migrant groups. 
 
However, contrary to the hypothesis that intermediaries play a direct and significant role in 
the housing market as gate-keepers, this research found minimal evidence supporting this 
claim.  Mostly, intermediaries do not shape allocation in the formal market or in the informal 
market, only religious institutions are as important as hypothesised.  Still, interviews with 
these groups provided unexpected and deep insight into the governing structures of the 
informal housing market, and how the Western African community relates to and navigates 
formal institutions and processes.   
 
The findings on intermediaries are organised into three subsections: first, housing advocacy 
non-profits (social service organisations); second, public authorities (government offices such 
as the housing court); and third, religious institutions (churches and mosques).   
 
5.2.1 Housing Advocacy Non-Profits 
 
Non-profit advocacy on behalf of the poor has a long history in the Bronx.  The period of the 
‘Bronx is Burning’ – which refers to a period from the late 1970’s to 1980’s when landlords 
purposely set fire to their properties to collect insurance pay-outs rather than operate in 
decaying areas – led to the creation of a legion of multi-purpose, urban renewal non-profits 
(Perine and Schill 2007; Schill et al. 2002).  Some of these non-profits have become 
providers themselves, receiving abandoned properties from the state along with rehabilitation 
grants (ibid).  Other non-profits formed to advocate for low-income tenants’ rights where 
landlords neglect repairs or otherwise engage in exploitative practices.   
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In offering these services, non-profits position themselves as important grassroots 
organisations that serve low-income communities in the Bronx.  The strength of these 
housing non-profits, therefore, comes from their deep ties to the community, enabling them 
to organise individual households towards collective tenant advocacy.  Housing advocacy 
organisers work where community members have reported landlords that have been negligent 
with repair work or otherwise violated tenant’s rights.  After their initial canvassing, these 
organisers then hold community fora where the aim is to galvanise tenants and help them to 
elect their own representatives.  As one non-profit leader explains:  
 
“[T]enants will lead workshops on how to get repairs, how to form a tenant’s 
association, how to navigate housing court…  Our model is really based on leadership 
development… We teach them how to do it and work with them on strategy and 
understanding their rights and key actors.  We bring in folks like lawyers when 
tenants decide to sue their landlord.  They talk about the pros and cons and what to 
expect in order for them to make an informed decision.” (HN5) 
 
The objective of this dynamic is two-fold.  The first objective is to build a tenant-led 
leadership infrastructure capable of collecting actionable facts that can be used to obtain 
neglected repairs.  Any issues of financial exploitation can be addressed through legal 
advocacy.  The second objective is to establish a durable tenant association that can self-
lobby over the long-run to ensure that the provider does not renege on their responsibilities. 
 
While housing advocacy non-profits have found success organising Hispanic and African 
American groups, they uniformly report that West African migrants are apprehensive toward 
seeking out their support.  What organisers uncover from the limited number of times that 
these migrants have sought their advice is that they remain exceedingly insular, relying on 
one another for help.   
 
“[W]e’ve seen many cases of people who come in, trying to figure out how the 
system works, and we tell them how complicated it is, and they simply say no, no, I 
think my cousin is going to help me or my uncle is going to help me.” (HN4)   
 
The process of bringing an actionable complaint against a housing provider is complex, one 
that most native citizens are also unlikely to undertake.  According to advocacy groups, West 
African migrants are even less likely to bring a complaint because they have a greater 
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tolerance of exploitative providers and illegal, suboptimal housing conditions.  
 
“They will rent a place like a basement that is not normally fit for a residence and 
they’ll rent that space and put them there… An African that just came to the country 
he needs a space and he’ll accept it. … So in general landlords are more comfortable 
with African tenants but they also use that to take advantage of some of them: not 
proper housing code, no heat, hot water, no repairs, they’re not as diligent or up to 
date with repairs and maintenance. They know if it’s an African tenant that person is 
more concerned with going to work.  She is not willing to take a day off to go to 
housing court and spend 24 hours to get the judge to hear his case so…[landlords] 
take advantage of that.” (HN8) 
 
This unwillingness on the part of West African migrants to engage with formal processes can 
be attributed to the fear of reprisal that many hold because of their uncertain legal status. 
While non-profit advocacy groups report that they try to consistently inform all their clients 
that they have legal protections and should not fear reprisal because of their immigration 
status, it is not clear that this information penetrates the West African community. This 
creates a cyclical dynamic: migrants are fearful and unwilling to seek help or accept 
information on their rights, and advocacy groups, for their part, are unable to disseminate 
information and organise these communities because of their apprehensiveness.  In an effort 
to organise and politically engage the borough’s growing West African community, the head 
of the African Advisory Council (AAC), a public authority founded with assistance from the 
Bronx Borough President’s Office, explained the dilemma as such:  
 
“The thing about the African community [is that] we seem to be very comfortable 
with our rights being infringed on.  But if that issue is not affecting us to the point 
where it is not making our life unbearable we deal with it.  But if a [non-African] 
lived in a house and there’s no heat, no hot water that person would on, a legal 
ground, refuse to pay and then go to court…  [Their] community is willing to go 
through that fight to make sure our rights are preserved.  But the African man will say 
it just happened in the month for a week or two or maybe it’s just been happening 
randomly so they’ll contend with that and move on… Landlords are more 
comfortable having African tenants because they are not problematic.  [That’s why] 
they don’t have a problem getting housing, it’s just affordability…” (PA3)  
 
88 
 
The responses above corroborate what many providers have stated in describing West 
African migrants as ‘non-complainers.’  Based on the data, these migrants are not interested 
in forcefully advocating for their rights and demonstrate a high tolerance for suboptimal 
housing conditions.  Of course, this fact may well illustrate a power dynamic wherein these 
migrants are acutely aware of their tenuous place in society and therefore have neither the 
will nor the inclination to jeopardise their situation.  Hence, it follows that they would be 
disinterested in the work of advocacy groups; participating in this type of organisation draws 
attention and takes time away from gainful employment.   
 
Housing advocacy non-profits serve certain tenant demographics, but not Ghanaian migrants.  
While their functions are important to ensure a measure of housing fairness where the local 
government has failed to proactively address systemic issues, these non-profits do not fill the 
role of gate-keeper.  Their function within the market is that of makeshift regulation enforcers 
that work through tenant organising.  However, this research does not find that these groups 
have any power to shape how housing is ultimately obtained.  They are unable to negotiate 
with landlords as to whom or how they should select tenants beyond ensuring that providers 
do not discriminate in violation of the law.  And providers would have minimal inclination to 
retain an amiable relationship with advocacy groups, for they are viewed as antithetical to the 
profit-maximisation goals of providers, and their tenant referrals might be seen as 
problematic, potential ‘complainers.’   
 
Beyond building tenant associations, these non-profits also act as information repositories on 
housing assistance by using knowledge that they have built from their close and continuous 
working relationship with social service agencies and public authorities.  This information, 
however, is only accessible to the those that frequent housing non-profits, which tends not to 
be West Africans.  Hence, the relevance of housing advocacy organisations in the housing 
process is tenuous and adversarial, as shown in Figure 5.3 below. 
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Figure 5.3   Placement of Advocacy Organisations in the Housing Process 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
 
As the diagram shows, these advocacy organisations have no role to play in the tenant 
selection process.  Their main dynamic with providers is an adversarial relationship.  Hence, 
they act within the formal market but do not function as housing gatekeepers.  
 
5.2.2 Public Authorities 
 
Public authorities include the local housing court and government funded social service 
agencies.  These organisations play no direct role in housing allocation.  The court functions 
as an arbiter when disputes arise between landlords and tenants, such as non-payment, repair 
neglect, noise complaints, and other such issues.  The social service agencies provide direct 
assistance to tenants.  This assistance usually takes the form of cash payments for arrears, 
when a tenant is late with their rent and at risk for eviction and homelessness.   
 
In the housing market, the court and social service agencies work in tandem: tenants at 
immediate risk of eviction receive assistance from social service agencies at the direction of 
the court.  This dynamic commences when a tenant answers their eviction notice in court.  
These notices are most often sent because of non-payment.  Agencies then intercede on 
behalf of indigent tenants. When the agencies determine that there is a possible path forward 
to ensure that the tenant can return to solvency, but lacks the resources needed to pay arrears, 
they apply for emergency funding.  This is known as “the one-shot deal.”  This program pays 
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the landlord back rent on condition that they withdraw the case and sign a stipulated payment 
agreement with the tenant. 
 
Housing court and social service agencies begin to work with low-income tenants after they 
have received formal notice of an impending eviction, termination of utilities, etc., but West 
Africans rarely reach the stage where their case is brought before the Housing Court.  As a 
local judge explains: 
 
“In my years on the court, I have had very few cases involving West Africans, at least 
going off of the names I read in the legal documents.  On occasions when there is 
such a case, they did not show up.  I am usually later informed by the landlord’s 
council that the tenant has voluntarily vacated.  I believe my colleagues have had 
similar experiences.” (PA4)      
 
The court and social service agencies tend not to serve West African migrants.  Many of 
these migrants live in shared accommodation where there is minimal opportunity for 
institutional involvement unless a case is made by one of the cohabitants.  However, raising 
such a case would be disadvantageous for the tenant, as eviction for some or all of the 
occupants is the only resolution to an illegal subdivision or overcrowding. 
 
Moreover, the landlords are responsible for permitting these illegal housing arrangements, so 
it is unlikely they would involve an outside authority to interrupt their business model.  If the 
provider did seek the assistance of the court, they would do so by filing a petition to have the 
migrants not listed on the lease evicted.  The power remains in the hands of the provider. 
Hence, there is no appropriate avenue for informal tenants to seek support when they have a 
dispute with their provider.  Even among migrant tenants who have found housing via the 
formal process and have a lease, there clearly remains a disinclination to proceed through the 
court and social service agencies if a housing dispute arises, as evidenced by the judge’s 
response.    
 
Thus, despite their important role in regulating and resolving landlord-tenant housing 
disputes, public authorities remain disconnected from West Africans.  This is corroborated by 
statements from intermediaries who explain how migrants rarely reach out for assistance.  
 
“A lot of it goes back to immigration status… they’re afraid of being deported…  It’s 
our jobs to do outreach to those communities so they’re aware of the free legal 
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services that they’re entitled to and the services that the government provides to 
them.” (PA9) 
 
Here, a city official explains that immigration status is an animating concern in the West 
African community and that, to his mind, explains why many are unwilling to contact public 
authorities to access the range of resources that are available to them.  During fieldwork, this 
problem became especially relevant because of the Ebola epidemic that hit West Africa in 
2014-2015. Local public health officials made appeals to New York’s West African 
community to ensure that those who had recently returned from the region sought out 
healthcare services if they felt ill.  Still, officials feared that the undocumented subset of the 
community would not seek out help because of their lack of legal status, despite assurances 
that there would be no immigration consequences.  Fundamentally, as government officials 
acknowledged, their inability to reach all quarters of this community pointed to an 
institutional weakness on their part as well as a lack of trust among West African migrants.   
  
Yet, in most cases, government agencies do not have an incentive to advertise their finite 
resources.  Instead, the responsibility tends to be on community leaders to learn what is 
available and to share that information within their community.  However, as a local public 
authority staffer explained:  
 
 “I would say Africans are just unfamiliar with things.  They don’t know how to get 
benefits. They know it’s out there but they don’t know the process and if they’re 
undocumented, that barrier, fear of their immigration status won’t allow them to go to 
the offices to receive those benefits.  There’s no incentive for government offices to 
promote that these services are here.  [And] there isn’t a set process or outreach 
mechanism for these agencies.” (P4)   
 
Still, elected officials that have large numbers of West Africans in their district have sought 
to strengthen their ties through surveying and outreach.  Another staffer responsible for such 
a project explained: 
 
“[O]utreach is what we’re doing…  It’s a continuous process.  The thing is with 
numbers there are undocumented people that are not interested in participating in any 
type of survey because of their immigration status.  [But] we’re expanding our 
relationship with [the West African] community and identifying what services they 
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need, building our referral network so we know where to send this population once 
we do the outreach.” (PA5) 
 
These efforts, however, remain new projects—elected officials’ staff acknowledge that they 
lack granular detail about their West African community as compared with other groups, 
such as the majority Hispanic and African American populations.  The challenge, also echoed 
by housing advocacy non-profits, is that West African migrants generally lack the collective 
will and leadership often needed to make their communities aware of resources available to 
them.  Indeed, even the African Advisory Council (AAC) has fallen short of its mandate.   
 
What this researcher observed in attending AAC meetings, and speaking with its leaders and 
migrants, is that the group has had little to no success in making inroads into West African 
communities.  Not only are AAC meetings relatively sparsely attended, its leaders concede 
that they do not pursue much community organising or outreach efforts.  This might explain 
why a clear majority of the migrants surveyed in this research have never heard of the AAC 
or attended one of its meetings.  Thus, because they are disconnected from intermediaries, 
West African migrants mostly look inward for social support.   
 
Figure 5.4 adds to the previously depicted model by including the role of public authorities in 
the context of the market.  These intermediaries have an information-sharing relationship 
with advocacy groups, whereby these advocacy groups help tenants to obtain benefits from 
public authorities and report bad providers.  Public authorities also arbitrate formal market 
landlord-tenant disputes through the housing court, functioning as regulators. 
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Figure 5.4   Public Authorities in the Housing Market 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
 
Like housing advocacy groups, public authorities have a limited connection to migrants.  The 
key finding from intermediaries is that they appear to play no critical function in terms of 
housing gate-keeping.  Rather, their role is reactive, and they only react to persons who seek 
out their services, who do not include West Africans.  What intermediaries do reveal about 
migrants is that they look inward for social support.  
 
5.2.3 Religious Institutions 
 
Places of worship serve a role as information clearing-houses for the West African 
community.  Churches and mosques provide a space and platform for trust-based connections 
between migrants, enabling West African nationalities to meet, bond, and share knowledge 
with each other on employment opportunities and housing offerings.  The utility of places of 
worship, however, is limited due to the insular nature of these spaces, which restricts the 
scope and quality of the information that is shared therein.  One pastor’s remarks illustrate 
this phenomenon:    
 
 “We have a family church.  When someone moves and has a house, some people 
come to me and tell me to announce it to the congregation.  Everyone knows one 
another in our community and so we can trust each other—we don’t need outsiders as 
much because we are family.” (RI3)   
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This response captures a disregard for outside help and implies that migrants are limited in 
their capacity to engage with others outside of the bounds of their community.  Hence, there 
is a dearth of new information on housing resources entering this tight network wherein 
migrants are already unfamiliar with formal institutions. 
 
Worse still, religious institutions also tend to disseminate misinformation.  A common 
example of this includes the myth that receiving public assistance prohibits one from later 
applying for Family Reunification, which is the right of a legal resident under US 
immigration law.  While this is inaccurate, it resonates deeply in the migrant community on 
an intuitive level.  The thinking goes: why would the government allow me to bring my 
family if I, myself, need public assistance to survive?  Religious institutions frequently repeat 
this false understanding of the law but there is no such provision in the relevant statute.  
Nevertheless, because places of worship have deep credibility and facilitate trust between 
their members, such myths become accepted as fact.  Consequently, migrants are not only 
deprived of facts about how particular laws and regulations work, they are also unlikely to 
encounter accurate information because their community functions as isolated echo-chamber.  
It is for this reason that one local government official explained the importance of religious 
leaders as such:  
 
“There is a lot of misinformation [in the West African community].  One of the 
reasons why it is important to have a relationship with community leaders is because 
in this immigrant community there is this notion that government shouldn’t be trusted 
because of the stuff that goes on in their own countries.  So the community leader, the 
imam or pastor, is key for fighting that bias and sharing credible information.” (PA2)  
 
Yet, these very leaders often do little to correct the myths that are circulating in their 
community.  This may partly reflect the power-dynamic that the leaders are incentivised to 
maintain: they serve the role of general arbiter in the community’s internal hierarchy and  
reliance on outside institutions may reduce or compromise their authority.  Hence, these 
religious institutions are structured to retain control over information.  Evidence of their 
power is reflected in the important role they play on the informal housing market. 
 
It is in these places of worship that many migrants learn of room-mating, spare beds and 
other such informal housing opportunities.  This informal housing comprises the stock 
provided on the informal market.  This market, including both its inferior and superior 
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segments, will be described in greater detail in the following chapter. For their part, the 
clergy act as facilitators and arbitrators.  As facilitators, they are aware of the importance of 
members helping each other.  
 
“When someone is a member and we find they have a need, we sit down [with them] 
and assess it, and see how we are able to help. The need can be of different kinds. 
Some may be thinking about rent, some about what to eat. Some may be thinking 
about a job. With housing, for example, if someone has a 2-bedroom apartment and 
wants someone to share it with, we can help make that connection.” (RI3)   
 
The clergy facilitate informal housing transactions by making connections using their deep 
knowledge of the circumstances, needs, and resources of members of their congregation.  
Migrants, for their part, are more inclined to trust potential roommates they meet at their 
church or mosque, especially when this introduction is made by the clergy.  Moreover, 
because there are social consequences for disreputable dealings in the context of a shared 
community, transacting parties can trust that arrangements made through religious 
institutions will be honoured.   
 
In terms of their latter role as arbitrators, the clergy appreciate their responsibilities of helping 
their congregation resolve disputes.  A Ghanaian imam explained his role in intra-community 
disputes as such:   
 
“You don’t exploit [your] people.  This happens maybe 1 out of 10 or 1 out of 20 
[times].  But when it does, you bring me, the Imam in.  This is especially if you have 
rented a room from another brother and you think they are overcharging you or 
something.  Maybe my solution will be to help you find another place.  Or maybe I 
will help you get a refund of some kind.  But the main goal for me is to bring peace to 
the situation.” (RI4) 
 
The role that clergy play in resolving intra-community conflicts in the Bronx is similar to 
their function in Ghana.  As has been explained to this researcher, in many parts of Ghana an 
elder who is respected by all parties can step in, hear all concerned, and render a verdict that 
is respected by all parties.  It is important to note that while such reliance is illustrative of the 
deep trust-based bonds within this community, it is also revealing of the weaknesses or 
limitations of formal institutions such as the Housing Court, to intercede or arbitrate in 
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informal housing situations.  These are circumstances where there is no lease or situations 
where the activity in question is illegal (e.g. overcrowding).  Hence, informal transactions 
call for informal jurisprudence.  
 
Religious institutions are very important to the migrant community.  The institutions and the 
clergy that lead them not only give physical space, but they also help build intangible trust 
within the community.  They provide space for migrants to connect and share information.  
These interactions are valuable, for they allow migrants to learn of informal and formal 
housing opportunities, as well as find resources to help overcome barriers associated with 
lack of legal status.  While these institutions are weak in terms of their connections to formal 
market housing providers or social service agencies, they are critical on the informal market.  
They help facilitate access to informal housing opportunities and arbitrate disputes, replacing 
the role of the Housing Court.  In sum, religious institutions are key, not only for the 
flourishing of the informal market but also for bolstering the enclave by deepening bonds of 
trust among migrants.     
 
Figure 5.5 presents a new unified depiction of both the formal and informal housing markets, 
including the role of all intermediaries.   
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Figure 5.5  Formal and Informal Housing Markets including all Intermediaries 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
 
The diagram above shows that religious institutions operate in both formal and informal 
housing markets.  On the formal market, these institutions communicate with private 
providers as well as facilitate connections between migrants, for example, by giving referrals 
to private providers in order to bypass the housing application process.  On the informal 
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market, the clergy mediates disputes in the superior segment of this market; tenants who 
obtain housing here invariably live with other migrants who share their faith and worship at 
the same religious institution; indeed, it is through this religious connection that many find 
their housing in the first place.  Hence, by facilitating connections and providing information 
that is useful to finding housing, religious institutions function in a gatekeeper-type capacity 
in both formal and informal housing markets.  
 
More broadly, Figure 5.5 illustrates how the informal market is comprised of formal market 
units that have been repurposed.  How this process unfolds is described in the next chapter, 
Strategies, and the implications of this linkage between the two markets is explored in 
Chapter 7, Urban Informality.   
 
5.3 Chapter Conclusion 
 
5.3.1 Summary  
 
This chapter explains how the housing market functions from the perspective of providers 
and key intermediaries.  Firstly, the main gatekeepers are providers.  Secondly, contrary to 
what was hypothesised at the start of this project, this research uncovered that intermediaries 
are not significant players in the context of formal market housing allocation.  However, 
within the scope of these two broad deductions, there are further nuances as to formal versus 
informal tenant selection processes.  Namely, the relationship between West African migrants 
and institutions that govern the housing market, and the hierarchy within, and shape of, the 
informal market that these migrants inhabit.   
 
Housing allocation is clearly the domain of providers.  Providers who receive taxpayer 
resources are restrained in their discretion as gatekeepers.  They must choose tenants based 
on income and often rely on lotteries to make the final selection among qualified 
applicants.  Most prospective tenants in the Bronx find housing using the formal application 
process, as this is the procedure used to screen financial risk.  The fact that most providers 
use applications presents an obstacle for those without legal status.  The emergence of an 
informal processing system, however, also reveals that private providers do not apply their 
formal process universally:  they have made a pathway for economically viable would-be 
tenants who cannot use normal procedures. 
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Private providers and their property management companies have far greater discretion.  
These providers set their own rules and abrogate those procedures for the tenants that they 
want: namely, West Africans.  Providers state that their experience with this ethnic group 
gives them sufficient basis to accept referrals from existing tenants when there is a vacancy.  
The qualitative data shows that this referral system benefits both the provider and the 
migrant.  Using this channel, the provider finds a financially reliable tenant – with minimal 
administrative expense – whom they prefer over their native-born counterparts who would 
apply using the formal application process.  This is partly because native-born tenants are 
more likely to use benefits, a sign that they are high maintenance tenants with a greater 
probability of default.  The other component is the cultural bias on the part of providers 
themselves; their own normative worldviews tend to disfavour those receiving public 
benefits, as benefit recipients are viewed as lacking good work ethic.  In turn, they exult those 
who do not receive such benefits, such as West African migrants, for self-reliance is seen as a 
virtue.  The effect of this bias is that some providers express a cultural affinity toward West 
Africans as these migrants’ behaviour coheres with their own normative values.  
 
Consequently, the formal application process may be viewed as an obstacle to accessing 
housing with private providers for many.  This is because the data gleaned from this process 
may show that rent will paid by benefits, and this information can have the opposite effect of 
impeding access as the provider may not desire tenants who are on benefits.  Thus, the 
qualitative data demonstrates that the formal housing process does not reflect how housing 
allocation unfolds in its totality.  
 
Intermediaries, especially housing advocacy non-profits and public authorities, do not act as 
housing gatekeepers.  Non-profits and public authorities offer a complex range of resources 
available to tenants in the housing market, but West Africans are not among those who take 
advantage of them.  This partly reflects the fact that intermediaries fail to penetrate this 
migrant community.  Also, however, the community itself is seriously circumspect toward 
seeking institutional support because of their precarious immigration status and their 
unfamiliarity with the function of these bureaucracies.  Instead, migrants turn inward for help 
and support.  This is an important finding that the interviews with non-profits and public 
authorities corroborate.    
 
Religious institutions, on the other hand, offer an important window into how intra-
community resources operate.  These institutions give migrants the space for trust-based 
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connections where they can share information on employment and housing opportunities, as 
well as obtain informal dispute resolution.  Hence, the advantage of these institutions and 
their clergy is that they engender mutually beneficial transactions within the community.  The 
disadvantage is that reliance on this tight circle may inhibit knowledge of outside resources, 
such as those offered by government agencies and non-profits.  This problem is made 
apparent by the misinformation that is rampant in the West African community regarding use 
of public benefits and its supposed adverse impact on one’s immigration rights.  The clergy at 
these religious institutions perpetuate many of these inaccuracies, suggesting a combination 
of ignorance among their ranks as well as a desire to retain control over those members of 
their congregation who turn to them for help.  
 
5.3.2  Discussion 
 
The findings discussed in this chapter reveal how the West African enclave is established and 
maintained.  Spatial concentration allows migrants to easily interact and come to rely on one 
another.  This intra-community reliance deepens ties to the enclave as membership yields 
important benefits, such as access to housing.  Indeed, what is observed in the Bronx is not 
dissimilar to what other theorists, such as Portes (1987; 1995; 1998;) or Stoller (2001), have 
found in their research on spatially bound ethnic communities.  Members of these ethnic 
groups benefit from one another and thus have more than cultural reasons to retain and 
deepen those bonds of kinship. 
 
Through this chapter’s focus on housing actors, this research finds that the housing market 
has morphed to meet the needs of the West African enclave community, and vice versa.  For 
instance, providers have developed an alternative tenant selection process for West African 
migrants who cannot successfully complete the conventional formal application process.   In 
this sense, the supply side of the market has evolved beyond its regulatory constraints to fill 
profitable demand.  More significantly, this demonstrates urban informality—the suspension 
of formal rules— in practice.  Providers opt not to apply the same procedures to referred 
migrant tenants and, further, turn a blind eye to the cohabitating tendency of these tenants 
because doing so ensures steady profitability.  Moreover, for their part, migrants have taken 
advantage of these conditions to devise their own housing market structures and institutions.  
This includes the processes by which they share information internally about housing 
opportunities, and a reliance on their religious institutions to adjudicate when disputes arise.  
The findings from interviews with intermediary organisations reveal that while migrants 
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ignore formal institutions, such as the housing court or social service agencies, they 
reproduce these services internally.  As such, their informal submarket is not ungoverned or 
chaotic; it is simply unrecognised but still highly functional. 
 
Nevertheless, this enclave is not without critical limitations.  These weaknesses are similar to 
those cited by the scholarship discussed in the Literature Review: that negative social capital 
exists alongside the positive kind that enables this enclave to emerge and function.  For 
example, migrants integrated into the informal market struggle to access new information 
because the town hall spaces in this community – churches and mosques – are not places 
where objective information is revealed.  This finding corresponds with Burger’s (1998a,b) 
observation that tight ethnic enclaves also form ‘binding’ communities that impede escape.   
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6  
Strategies  
 
6.1   Similarities  
6.1.1 Remittances 
6.1.2 Benefits 
 
6.2  Dissimilarities  
6.2.1 Documented Migrants 
6.2.2 Social Network Endowment 
6.2.3 Documented Migrant Strategies 
6.2.4 Undocumented Migrant Strategies 
 
6.3  Gender 
6.3.1 Categories of Female Migrants 
6.3.2 Perceptions 
6.3.3 Marriage Pressure 
6.3.4 Results 
 
6.4  Chapter Conclusion 
6.4.1 Summary 
6.4.2 Discussion 
  
This chapter is the second findings chapter and it focuses on documented and undocumented 
Ghanaian migrants.  It answers the research question: What strategies do both migrant groups 
use to access housing?  This question addresses whether and how legal status shapes 
migrants’ pathways to housing.  
 
The term ‘strategies’ is adapted from the concept of survival strategies, which means ‘tactical 
efforts that individuals use to subsist in impoverished conditions’ (Wallace 2002; Datta et al. 
2007).  The aim of this chapter is to enumerate the ways in which Ghanaians use strategies to 
find and afford housing.  The data presented in this chapter uncover the different markets in 
which documented and undocumented migrants seek housing.  These data are used to test the 
hypothesis that legal status gives an advantage in accessing housing among migrants.   
 
Methodologically, this chapter draws on qualitative data from semi-structured interviews 
with documented and undocumented migrants, and builds on the preceding analysis and data 
to draw its analytical conclusions.  The qualitative data is cumulative and iterative in that the 
findings presented are deduced from new information as well as continuous triangulation 
with data gathered from housing providers and intermediaries.  
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6.1 Similarities 
 
This research focuses on understanding how legal status differentiates Ghanaian migrants in 
the housing market.  But it is first important to understand economic similarities that 
documented and undocumented Ghanaians share as tenants.  This is the focus of Part 6.1.   
 
This research finds two key similarities between migrants irrespective of legal status.  First, 
all migrants surveyed in this study report sending remittances to their families in Ghana 
because this is a non-negotiable, socially obligatory expense.  Second, Ghanaian migrants – 
much like the larger West African community of which they are a part – are deeply 
apprehensive towards accepting public assistance benefits despite the fact most (of the 
documented) would qualify for assistance based on their incomes.  
 
The following two subsections explain why migrants send remittances despite the hardships 
it poses and why, broadly, legally eligible migrants refrain from seeking benefits.  The 
findings presented in Part 6.1 aim to show the economic and social challenges that both 
documented and undocumented Ghanaian migrants share and give a basis for understanding 
the constraints under which they operate.  
 
6.1.1 Remittances 
 
Remittances constitute a complex expense for migrants.  This expenditure is both voluntary 
and involuntary:  migrants elect to make this payment, but do so out of a sense of duty, 
obligation, pride, and socialisation.  This study finds that factors such as ‘self-worth’ and 
‘social pressure’ motivate migrants to send remittances despite the economic hardship this 
causes.  But these factors are also shaped by a myth that migrants themselves perpetuate: that 
living in America is a sufficient condition for economic success.   
 
This subsection describes the key reasons that compel migrants to pay remittances and further 
expounds upon how these reasons are linked to myth-making and future aspirations in the 
Ghanaian community.  The objective of this subsection is to illustrate how documented and 
undocumented migrants are similarly encumbered with remittance obligations.  
 
1. Self-Worth  
 
“Even if you are suffering you have to send money [to family in Ghana] because 
that’s what is expected of you…  We are in America and this is the land of 
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opportunities, right?  So how can you not share with your family—what they gonna 
think of you?  We Africans can manage pain for ourselves, but we cannot make 
relatives back home suffer…that brings shame…  [S]o I send between $100 to $150 
every month even though I only make $7 an hour…it’s hard, but I have too, [because] 
that’s why I am here” (D7). 
 
The central message conveyed in the response above is that bearing the burden of remittances 
is necessary, for opting not to would incur an even greater social price.  While migration 
from Ghana puts physical distance between migrants and their homelands, this literal space 
does not attenuate the ties bonding them to their friends and families in Ghana.  Maintaining 
good relations with these relatives is critical because migrants do not want to be branded as 
disrespectful and selfish.  This is because their sense of self-worth is strongly derived from 
how they are viewed by their communities in Ghana.  Indeed, Ghanaian migrants are clear 
that they immigrated to America to earn money on behalf of their families and, in many 
cases, received financial support from their relatives to complete their journey, and they must 
repay these debts.  So, failure to send remittances would constitute reneging on their 
responsibilities and would be cause for shame.  But the challenge arises from the fact that 
meeting the monthly remittance demands is financially straining.  Migrants surveyed for this 
study report sending remittances of $100-$175 per month (the variation is attributed to 
unexpected emergencies and various celebrations).  However, these migrants earn average 
monthly incomes between $1,200-$1,600.  This means that remittances comprise 6-14 
percent of their disposable income, which is a substantial voluntarily income transfer for 
individuals who themselves are living on the economic margins of society.  
 
2. Social Pressure  
 
“[I]t really depends on the relationship of the beggar [to determine who receives 
money each month] … [L]ike my mother is must, but I send to others, maybe, every 
couple months and depending on the situation…if there’s an emergency or 
something… But everyone keeps calling and calling…that’s why I turn my phone off, 
for peace.   But back home they think, ‘oh, in America you can just pick money up 
from the streets’… but it’s not easy like that… They put a lot pressure… that’s why 
everyone has to get something…” (U1) 
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The response above is characteristic of what most migrants have described in their interviews 
regarding remittances: that they are constantly barraged with requests for money from 
relatives and friends.  These individuals feel entitled to ask, as migrants explain, because they 
view living in America as a sufficient condition for wealth.  Migrants for their part do not 
feel they can indefinitely reject these requests as it would damage their reputations in their 
communities; they would appear ‘cheap’ or selfish.  In addition, many migrants report having 
had to borrow from their familial networks in order to undertake their journey to the United 
States.  As such, some of their remittances are debt payments, which include surplus sums 
that function as a form of interest.   
 
Nevertheless, migrants try to prioritise their monthly remittances, avoiding non-essential 
requests for as long as possible before sending some sum at non-regular intervals.  Based on 
migrants’ self-reported contributions, nearly a quarter of remittances are sent to individuals 
other than migrants’ spouses (and their children) or mothers, which are the two relative 
groups that migrants regard as legitimate dependents who receive a fixed amount monthly.  
This additional contribution, beyond what is deemed essential, is what is driven by the social 
pressure.    
 
3. Myth-Making  
 
A deeper examination of the issues of ‘self-worth’ and ‘social pressure’ begs the question – 
why do migrants not tell their families and relatives the truth of their economic situation:  In 
America, they are poor, and it is a struggle to maintain their own basic necessities because 
the relative cost of living in New York is much higher than in Ghana. 
 
Migrants, both documented and undocumented, explain that they largely refrain from 
conveying this reality because they do not want to appear as failures.  This, again, is tied to 
self-worth—not wanting to admit that they have been unsuccessful at obtaining the promise 
of America where wealth is believed to be abundant and easily attainable.  But given the 
collective economic hardships endured by the migrant community, why is this information 
not conveyed en mass to their relatives in Ghana?  This is partly due to the fact that migrants 
in the US perpetuate the myth themselves by their actions. As one documented individual 
explains, when migrants return to visit Ghana from the US,  
 
“[They] spend big money and act like a big man.  You need wear fancy clothes, have 
a nice [used] car, and get everyone gifts…” (D2).   
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This ostentatious display of (relative) wealth shapes how their relatives and friends remaining 
in Ghana view migrants: as individuals who have money to spare.  Hence, the irony is that 
migrants project this profligate image because they feel they have to in order to save face:   
 
“[Y]ou have to spend a lot when you go back so you don’t look cheap, and people 
don’t think you’re lazy and that’s why you don’t have any money” (D19).  
 
But in so doing, migrants aid and abet the myth of readily obtainable wealth in America to 
which they become victim by way of the remittance demands placed on them.   
 
4. Retirement Planning  
 
Another factor embedded in remittance payments is that migrants also view this expense as a 
retirement plan of sorts.  Many explain that they one day aspire to return to Ghana and live 
with their families on the land that their remittances have financed: 
 
“[M]y family bought land with my money and they are building a house on it… that’s 
in my name.  When I’m done here, I can go back home and have something that’s 
mine…” (U12).   
 
But whether this plan will materialise in reality is an open question.  For instance, older 
migrants shed light on the obstacles that prevent them from moving back; they explain that 
reliable (and affordable) healthcare is not always available in Ghana.  This makes it difficult 
for them to permanently relocate to Ghana.  Older migrants further explain that full-time 
retirement remains a luxury that they cannot afford:  
 
“I still need to work... [because] I support a lot of people here [in the US] and back 
home [in Ghana]” (D4).   
Nevertheless, irrespective of whether migrants are able return to Ghana in the future, for 
some, remittances paid in the present day are viewed partially as if they are investments that 
will directly benefit them in the future.    
 
5. Summary  
 
This exposition on remittances aimed to provide foundational knowledge for understanding 
the social and economic dynamics that shape migrant choices and decision making.  First, it 
is clear that the migrants are responsible for an expense that is unique to immigrants; native 
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citizens would not have this type of socially obligatory remittance.  Second, it is important to 
appreciate that remittances place migrants, irrespective of their legal status, on comparable 
economic grounds; both documented and undocumented migrants bear this expense.  Third, 
remittances reveal the importance of transnational network ties.  Ghanaian migrants have 
moved to the US as individuals, but their choices have ramifications beyond themselves.  
Their families and communities in Ghana look to these migrants as an important source of 
revenue.  Migrants, for their part, have benefited from these familial ties and draw a large 
measure of their social worth from their transnational relationships.  It matters to them how 
they are perceived “back home.”  They also view income transfers to Ghana, at least partly, 
as investments in their future.  Later sections in this chapter will delve into the importance of 
social network ties in terms of facilitating housing access and how that differs between 
documented and undocumented migrants.  
 
6.1.2 Benefits  
 
This research finds three interrelated factors that shape migrants’ viewpoint of public 
assistance benefits.  The first is normative, the second is a matter of institutional 
unfamiliarity, and the final reason follows from a collective misunderstanding of immigration 
law.  Each of these views is captured in the remarks provided below.   
 
Reason 1:  Accepting Benefits is Equal to Personal Failure 
 
“What I know is Christians have to work.  That’s what the Bible teaches…[you] have 
to work with your own hands, earn your own living.  [G]od created man and wanted 
him to be hardworking.  This is why we Africans come to America.  If someone says I 
don’t want to do any hard work, [and you respond] I will feed you, I will clothe you, 
it’s not helping…  I didn’t come here to beg.  That is [why] some of us look down on 
the Black Americans and the Spanish people…they don’t work.  But we Africans are 
very serious people” (D9). 
 
The documented migrant’s statement above conveys a sentiment that accepting public 
benefits is tantamount to personal failure.  Ghanaians believe that they should be able to 
succeed in the United States on their own without government support.  Indeed, the primary 
motivating factor for most migrants to leave their homeland was economic – the idea that, 
through hard work and access to the abundant employment opportunities in the US, they 
would be able to improve their economic position substantially.  The economic prospect that 
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life in America presented to migrants while they lived abroad is invariably described as the 
most significant pulling force that drove these individuals to make the journey.  This 
understanding, therefore, shapes the normative view among Ghanaian migrants that failure to 
economically succeed in the US is solely a result of their inability to capture or realise the 
promise of America.   
 
This view retains purchase across transnational boundaries.  Migrants are strongly 
apprehensive toward benefits, as it would be embarrassing to them if their families in Ghana 
learned that they had accepted public assistance.  This impression is reflected in the response 
below from a documented Muslim woman who describes the deep-rooted attitude in her 
community. 
 
“[I]f you’re pregnant and you have issues, the hospital sends a social worker who tells 
[the couple] to take benefits for the child.  If the man accepts this and people find out 
back home [in Ghana], they will think you don’t take care of your wife.  It’s a 
disgrace and people will shun you, so they feel they shouldn’t go for any benefits.  
[Because] it’s degrading themselves.  Especially… Muslim men, they think it’s 
degrading themselves. ‘Why would I go for benefits when I’m working and 
capable…” (D14).  
 
The pressure against seeking out public assistance is arguably as strong as the need for it.  
This includes not only housing benefits but other forms of government support such as food 
assistance, or services for pregnant women and children.  This pressure leads to forgone 
opportunities as well as a need for migrants who receive benefits to lie.  These migrants apply 
for assistance programs that can be obtained relatively discretely as the response below 
illustrates.    
 
“Where we come from, we’re taught to stand on our own and not beg for anything.  
When one is in pain, that person will prefer to go to her sister or brother than go to the 
authorities.  But sometimes you need the help and it is not available [from your 
family], so you get some Food Stamps or something like that.  Nothing too big - you 
just get a little card and use it.  But if you want housing and cash every month, that’s 
too much. People gonna find out and you will feel shame” (D17).  
 
Applying for public assistance requires much correspondence from government agencies, and 
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this can be problematic for those living in shared settings wherein there remains a stigma 
against seeking such support.  This is why there is a community-wide emphasis on seeking 
support internally, but where this assistance is available, some migrants (commonly women) 
will apply for programs that are quickly dispersed, as is the case with food assistance 
benefits.   
 
Reason 2: Complexity of the Process 
 
“Any time you go…to apply for something, they know what’s going on, what you 
make, your social security, everything.  You bring all these forms and then they say 
we want this and that on top of it.  If I am here for help, help me…don’t tell me to go 
somewhere else to get another piece of paper.  [It] doesn’t make sense and I don’t 
think there is any point in trying…” (D12). 
 
The process to obtain any type of public assistance is complex and can be demoralising, as 
the comments from one documented migrant who attempted to obtain housing benefits show.  
First, an individual must visit the government office that administers a benefit program.  For 
example, one must visit the Human Resource Administration’s (HRA) Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Centres for food assistance or the Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) approved housing counselling agencies to apply for housing benefits, 
and there is an entirely separate procedure to join the waitlist for public housing.  Second, 
each program has its own application that requires a variety of supporting documents, 
including proof of legal status and current income.  As shown in the Housing Actors chapter, 
even documented migrants report difficulty in producing certain paperwork, particularly if 
their income is generated through work in the informal economy where they are paid in cash 
without a pay stub.  Third, for housing-related public assistance, proof of present housing 
status is required if the applicant is not homeless.  This can prove challenging for those 
residing in shared housing without a contract for their arrangement.  Thus Ghanaians, unable 
to readily substantiate their circumstances with documentation, express a wariness towards 
engaging bureaucratic institutions when they are uncertain of the process and the outcome it 
will yield.  
 
Reason 3:  A Misunderstanding of Immigration Law  
 
The third and most commonly cited reason why these migrants do not seek public assistance 
is out of fear of compromising their legal status or hindering future opportunities to sponsor 
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relatives to join them in the US through the Family Reunification program.  This program 
allows citizens to sponsor noncitizen relatives living abroad and requires that noncitizen 
relatives submit applications to their local US embassy, at which point they are placed on a 
waiting list (USCIS 2017).  Depending on their relationship to the sponsoring relative and 
their region, their visa may take up to ten years to process (ibid).  Despite the complex and 
protracted nature of this process, documented migrants fear that if they obtain public 
assistance of any kind they will forfeit their sponsorship rights.  The two responses below 
from married documented women capture how this incorrect understanding of the law 
manifests, as well as how it bears real consequences.   
 
Response 1:  “If you want to bring your husband or your children from Africa you 
can’t do that if you’re on public assistance, that’s what I’ve heard. When I went to 
take the food stamps for my children, for example, they [other Ghanaians] said ‘no 
don’t take the food stamps [because] I may want to bring somebody someday, but if 
the government sees I needed benefits, they will tell me no I can’t’” (D15). 
 
Response 2:  “My husband is a respectable person and he believes that if you go to 
welfare or get food stamps or get any assistance you can’t help anyone come to 
America.  But we don’t have money for a two-bedroom apartment and that’s what we 
really need, but he says we can’t ask the government for help” (D11). 
 
These remarks reflect a pervasive misunderstanding of the Family Reunification program; the 
law that migrants mistakenly think says that seeking public assistance will hinder their ability 
to invite their relatives to join them in America.  First, while the program stipulates that 
sponsored immigrants – those who arrive by invitation – should not become a “public 
charge” (meaning dependent on the government assistance for survival), this does not apply 
to the sponsoring citizen relative (USCIS 2013).  Second, the “public charge” designation 
exclusively applies to cash assistance programs (ibid).  This means the following benefits are 
exempt from this classification: Medicaid (low-income health insurance), SNAP (food 
assistance), beneficiaries of the Women, Infant and Children (WIC) program, child care, 
energy assistance, housing assistance, foster care or adoption assistance, and school meals 
(ibid).  Hence, this study finds Ghanaian migrants completely misunderstand the regulation at 
issue: first, they conflate a rule that applies to visa recipients as applying to them and, second, 
they incorrectly think that all public benefits impede sponsorship rights.  
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These similarities strongly suggest that Ghanaian migrants, irrespective of their legal status, 
seek housing under comparable financial constraints.  In addition to their basic living 
expenses of food and housing, migrants must also portion some of their low disposable 
income toward remittances on a monthly basis.  The disinclination toward public assistances 
further reduces the purchasing power of documented migrants, rendering them economically 
comparable to their undocumented counterparts who cannot legally avail themselves of 
benefits.   
 
Documented and undocumented are alike: both face the economic challenges brought by 
remittance obligations and rejection of public benefits.  These challenges distinguish 
Ghanaian migrants from their native counterparts in the Bronx:  27 percent of all tenants – or 
four-fifths of all qualifying low-income households – in the borough receive some form of 
public assistance (HVS 2014).  It is also unlikely that natives are burdened with an expense 
such as remittances.  Hence, it is important to consider the similarities within the Ghanaian 
migrant community to appreciate the degree to which all members of this group are 
economically constrained as they navigate the housing market.  
 
6.2 Dissimilarities 
 
Part 6.2 is comprised of four subsections of findings on how migrants are different from one 
another as tenants and how this corresponds to their legal status.  Subsections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 
describe the advantages available to documented migrants and why these migrants 
nevertheless struggle in accessing housing.  Then subsection 6.2.3 enumerates the strategies 
that documented migrants use to access housing.  Subsection 6.2.4 focuses on how 
undocumented migrants benefit from their co-ethnic social network in terms of housing 
access strategies. 
 
6.2.1 Documented Migrants 
 
Legal status allows migrants access to the documentation required in most formal housing 
applications.  Without it, migrants cannot legally obtain employment, tax records, 
identification cards, or a social security number, which is needed to generate a credit report.  
As detailed in Chapter 5: Housing Actors, these documents are not legally necessary to obtain 
housing on the private market.  Most private providers, however, ask for these materials to 
conduct their financial due diligence of prospective tenants.  For their part, public and non-
profit providers cannot, by law, accept tenants without legal status.  Therefore, those migrants 
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with legal status are conferred greater housing opportunities relative to their undocumented 
peers.   
 
However, the fact that documented migrants are theoretically able obtain housing on the 
formal market does not always materialise in practice.  As explained in Part 6.1, documented 
migrants do not pursue public assistance, including housing benefits; thus, this group has 
diminished options because they have less disposable income available for housing, which 
makes them appear financially riskier to prospective landlords.  For example, non-profit 
providers who must balance dual mandates of serving low-income households and ensuring 
their own fiscal sustainability may find that income qualified applicants who do not receive 
subsidies pose an unacceptable default risk.  In addition, although documented migrants may 
apply for public housing where rents are set to be no more than one-third of the tenant’s 
income, these units are scarcely available (HVS 2014).  This is because the vacancy rate for 
public housing is extremely low, standing at 2.20 percent based on the most recent available 
data (ibid).  
Figure 6.1. below depicts a new model for observing the various housing pathways available 
to low-income document migrants.  
 
Figure 6.1   Documented Migrants’ Housing Pathways 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
 
This diagram illustrates the available housing pathways for documented migrants as well as 
the likelihood that a potential pathway will be used.  First, the diagram shows that while 
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documented migrants have access to the full formal market, they are less likely to capitalise 
on this theoretical access.  This is because these migrants have insufficient resources and also 
are generally unfamiliar with formal procedures.  Second, migrants who are unable to use the 
formal market can use the informal market.  But documented migrants are often relegated to 
the ‘inferior’ informal market because they tend to lack the social capital required to access 
housing on the ‘superior’ segment of this market.  What distinguishes the inferior market is 
its lower quality of housing and weaker tenure security relative to the superior informal 
market.  Further discussion on the differences between these two markets and why 
documented migrants are relegated to the inferior segment are described in subsequent 
subsections. 
 
6.2.2 Social Network Endowment  
 
Executing strategies to overcome the obstacles described above or otherwise navigate the 
impediments of poverty requires alternative support resources, such as those afforded by a 
migrant’s co-ethnic community.  Yet, counter-intuitively, what this research has uncovered is 
that the strength of a migrant’s access to the Ghanaian social network correlates inversely 
with legal status.   
 
Low-income documented migrants in the Bronx tend to have weaker social ties in the US 
relative to their undocumented counterparts.  This is because most of these documented 
Ghanaian migrants enter the US via randomly issued lottery Diversity Visas (DV).  The 
recipients of these visas report that they typically applied to join the DV waiting list many 
years in advance of their notification.  If selected, they have no more than 6 months’ grace 
period to act on their visa, otherwise they forfeit the opportunity.  The response below from 
one DV winner displays the type of rapid arrangements that migrants must make and some of 
the transitional challenges this imposes.  
 
“I applied with the embassy because it was easy, you just put your name on a list 
basically… I thought maybe someday something will happen.  And then boom, years 
later, it did.  I was in my last year of my studies, but I didn’t have time to even finish 
that, I had to pack everything and go.  If I didn’t I would lose my place and would 
have to apply again.  I wasn't going to take that chance.  But man, it was hard coming, 
I didn’t know anyone or anything, and it still is.  I have to find everything on my own, 
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like even now I am trying to go back to school, but I don’t know how to transfer 
credits or how I can pay for it” (D8).  
 
The randomness of the DV entry pathway contrasts with the conscious, planned migration 
journey that undocumented migrants report.  The undocumented group undertakes their 
migration to the US after extensive consultations with family members or friends who 
presently reside in the US.  They understand that they will arrive on a Visiting Visa with the 
purposeful intent of overstaying and thereby becoming undocumented aliens.  Indeed, US 
embassies abroad that issue these Visiting Visas are particularly conscious that persons from 
certain regions of the world pose a greater risk of overstaying, and therefore set stringent 
requirements before such visas are issued, such as proof of illiquid assets, extensive 
employment history, and enduring familial ties, including children (State Dept. 2017).  
Nevertheless, those migrants who are intent on reneging on the terms of their Visiting Visa 
make appropriate arrangements: assets are liquidated by relatives over time, employment is 
abandoned, and their extended family is prepared to take on the responsibility of raising any 
children left behind.  Hence, undocumented migrants execute their journey with robust social 
support on both sides of the Atlantic, which greatly facilities in their migration.  As one 
undocumented migrant who left his professional position explains, his journey was a 
deliberately executed plan. 
 
 “I didn’t want to stay in Ghana anymore.  There’s no opportunity…everything is 
corrupt.  So I talked to my family there and friends here, and then I got a visa to go to 
some conference in Texas.  As soon as I landed, I took the bus to New York and came 
to the Bronx.  My friends met me, gave me bed and got me this job at the gas station.  
So now I work in Jersey all day then go home to the Bronx.  I stink every day, smell 
like gas, but I make enough to send home and I like my [Muslim] brothers here.  It is 
very, very hard, but I think it’s better, I can make plans for the future” (U11).     
 
Migrating to the US is a very difficult journey, but as the response above articulates, the 
crossing is made much easier with the support of a network on each side.  How this network 
is operationalised for the purposes of obtaining housing is detailed later in this chapter.  But 
here the main observation is that undocumented migrants tend to have greater endowment 
advantages relative to their documented counterparts.  This is because Diversity Visas 
provide immediate legal status and a pathway to citizenship, but do not come with a social 
network of relatives or friends who already live in America and can help with settling.  
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Migrants who lack strong social network ties are on their own when they arrive—and 
continue to have relatively limited social capital, placing them at a disadvantage with regards 
to accessing housing.   
 
Transnational familial relationships shape the social network hierarchy among Ghanaian 
migrants in the Bronx and act as a foundation for social capital within this community.  
Those who arrive without an established familial connection tend to lack social capital and, 
therefore, also lack access to the most coveted amenities provided by co-ethnic membership 
(comfortable, secure housing, settlement assistance, guidance), as these intensive benefits are 
conferred to those regarded as family.  An initial dearth in social network endowment also 
proves cumulative, for it remains difficult for documented migrants to break into existing 
networks of tight communal familial bonds within their co-ethnic community.  This is not to 
suggest that these documented migrants live apart; they do live among their Ghanaian 
community (and alongside other West African nationalities), but they live differently.   
 
This study finds that documented migrants without strong ties to their social network are 
ultimately relegated to lower-tier (inferior) housing pathways based on an analysis of their 
self-reported experiences on both the formal and informal housing markets.  This is because 
their weak social network ties limit their housing options and strategies.  The next subsection 
details these findings in describing the strategies that documented migrants pursue to obtain 
housing. 
 
6.2.3 Documented Migrant Strategies  
 
Strategy 1:  Housing Applications 
 
The first step that documented migrants can take to find housing is simply to apply where 
there are vacancies.  The most common type of formal market units that documented 
migrants may pursue are those offered by private and non-profit providers.  While most units 
in the Bronx are governed by Rent Stabilisation regulations, which assure that rents do not 
exceed certain thresholds, documented migrants report challenges in accessing this housing.  
These obstacles include: a failure to establish creditworthiness and difficulty with fulfilling 
administrative protocols.  
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Creditworthiness 
 
According to the most recent available US Census data, a documented Ghanaian migrant’s 
average income in New York stands at $30,348 (Census 2014).  This officially reported 
figure is more than 30 percent greater than the average that is self-reported by the 
documented migrants surveyed in this research.  Even with this average income, if 
unsupported by subsidies, the rent burden would be nearly 44 percent based on the Bronx’ 
average contract rent of $1,100 (HVS 2014).  Given this picture, providers are likely wary of 
renting to applicants with a poor credit history along with a low-income.   
 
For migrants, this issue of poor credit is a common problem. This is captured in the remarks 
below from a principal at an intermediary that provides housing assistance services.  
 
“West African immigrants generally do not understand credit.  They’ve never had a 
credit card before and when they get one, they think it’s free money, not realising that 
if you don’t pay what you’ve spent back, there are consequences on your [credit] 
report – and this can really get you into a jam when you’re trying to find a place [to 
live].  This is why bad credit is so common in this community; I seriously see it all the 
time” (I7). 
 
The concept of an ongoing and continuous loan, which is how credit cards function, is 
unfamiliar to many of these migrants.  The requirement of regular monthly payments and 
strict credit limits are the governing rules of credits cards that migrants fail to abide by – as a 
result, their credit reports show poor marks.  Moreover, the steps required for an individual to 
repair her or his credit report, which entail making back payments and writing to the credit 
reporting agencies to remove delinquent accounts after a sufficient period has elapsed, are 
also foreign to Ghanaian migrants.  
 
Documented migrants with poor credit tend to acknowledge that their past profligacy has 
created significant problems for them, but nevertheless commonly rationalise their 
predicament as such, 
 
“Credit cards are no good man…[you ] think it’s good because it gives you money, 
but then you can’t pay and it messes your record and everything.  Now you can’t get a 
place when you want to live on your own because all those landlords check and see 
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you didn’t pay before.  It’s just stupid man, why they give you those things?  It’s all a 
big game to rob you…”  (D7). 
 
This type of response is characteristic of the documented migrants who find themselves in 
this situation.  It reflects an appreciation of the fact that their choices have rendered a 
significant access barrier, but this realisation is tempered with the reasoning that these 
circumstances are an unavoidable product of their poverty.  The effect of this is bitterness, a 
feeling that the odds are stacked against them and that their credit-default was a function of 
institutional design.   
 
Administrative Struggles  
 
Obtaining housing via the formal market, particularly from affordable providers, requires 
persistence and a measure of institutional savviness that Ghanaians migrants struggle with 
executing.  This entails follow-up phone calls to property managers, ensuring that the 
required documents have been received and recorded, and otherwise keeping track of where 
their application stands in the queue.  Migrants tend not to have these soft skills. 
 
“Landlords want all this paperwork: IDs, bank accounts, job proof, social security, 
credit check.  But even after you give them everything, they still make excuses for 
more, and then they deny you.  It’s too much and for what?  They know I will pay my 
rent.  We Ghanaians pay our rent.  Here, it’s a headache and everyone thinks you’re 
gonna cheat them” (D4). 
 
The response above is characteristic of what most documented migrants report about the 
experience of trying to find housing via formal channels.  The difficulty arises from 
unfamiliarity with rules-based procedures coupled with the reality that migrants do not have 
personal ties to those administering access.  Hence, migrants do not feel comfortable finding 
housing using this impersonal and highly procedural process.  But more pointedly, the 
remarks above illustrate the degree to which most documented migrants struggle to access 
housing via the formal channels. 
 
Those documented migrants who have successfully accessed housing on the formal market, 
including subsidised units, describe the process as arduous but ultimately worth the effort. 
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“I applied to a lot of buildings before I got this place…always something wrong with 
the application.  They wanted this proof or that proof… lotta bullshit.  But now I got 
my two bedroom – it’s $1,400 a month but I got three flat mates.  They take the other 
bedroom and the living room so for me it’s manageable” (D13).   
 
By subletting unused space—rooms or beds—in their units on the informal market, these 
migrants, in effect, have monetised their housing opportunity.  This strategy is employed to 
reduce their personal rent liability as well as to potentially generate an additional income 
stream.  The broader implication of this manoeuvre is that it adds to the informal stock, 
thereby providing housing for those unable to secure a housing unit through the formal 
pathway.  
 
Strategy 2: Brokers 
 
A last resort strategy for those migrants unable to obtain housing directly by application to a 
provider, is to rely on a housing broker.  Brokers are intermediaries that have a portfolio of 
hundreds of apartment vacancies and work to link those vacancies to prospective tenants.  
They offer the service of finding a “qualified” tenant, conducting a preliminary screening and 
then introducing the prospective tenant to the provider or property management agency.  In 
the Bronx, and New York City more broadly, these brokers do not charge housing providers 
for their services.  Instead they charge tenants the equivalent of one month’s rent as their fee.  
That they charge tenants and not providers illustrates the power dynamic in the market: 
providers hold the more privileged position.   
 
Brokers are used to facilitate access for migrants unfamiliar with the market who have been 
unsuccessful in applying for housing on their own.  But because they charge a sizable fee that 
migrants often struggle to afford, this strategy is used purely out of necessity.  
 
“I paid this man $1,500 just to find me a place, then I pay the landlord another $3,000 
for the rent and deposit.  But I have no choice because I needed a two-bedroom 
because I am here with my wife and my kids, and we just came on the lottery visa… 
and I couldn’t find nothing.  Everywhere I apply they don’t call me.  I pay this man 
and he finds me this in less than a week.  I had to take a loan for from my job [taxi 
medallion] to pay all these people.  But it’s crazy… I can’t afford nothing even 
though I work all the time.  Now my wife is trying to do day-care here so we can 
make some more, but then the city won’t let us” (D9).  
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As the response above exemplifies, documented migrants that use brokers are begrudgingly 
placed in situations where they must pay a service fee on top of market rate rental prices.  
Brokers, as observed, are ultimately interested in serving the clients who pay them and do not 
conduct extensive due diligence as providers typically do.  For their part, private providers 
acknowledge that brokers are an inferior source of prospective tenants.  They view brokers as 
biased applicant suppliers who will doctor application materials because they are motivated 
by their fee and bear no liability in the event of default.  Nevertheless, because of their 
substantial housing portfolios, brokers can often aptly link prospective tenants to providers 
who are either comfortable taking on risky tenants or are inclined to trust a broker’s 
recommendation.  Many providers that rely on brokers are management firms that want to 
minimise the time and administrative costs associated with finding a tenant directly.  
 
Strategy 3:  African Markets 
 
Housing found on the informal market most often entails subletting parts of a shared 
apartment unit.  These range from a single bedroom to a single bed in a shared room.  In this 
segment of the housing market risk is assessed differently than in the formal process.  The 
informal submarket relies not on documentation, but instead on co-ethic connection.  The 
degree of connection between tenant and informal provider varies, but the ‘provider’ here is 
invariably another West African whose shares the aim of minimising their own rent burden 
through division: the greater the number of occupants, the less rent each person must pay.  
Informal providers rent only to co-ethnics as their vacancies are advertised exclusively within 
West African circles, particularly in ‘African Markets.’  These markets are ethnic grocery 
stores that display notice boards where individuals place advertisements for rooms that are 
available for rent. 
 
Migrants who rely on the African Market strategy frequently describe living in unfavourable 
conditions that are significantly overcrowded with limited heat or hot water and housing units 
that are in general disrepair.  Moreover, they describe a relationship with the lead tenant (the 
informal provider) that is highly asymmetrical in its power dynamic.  For example, consider 
the following account from a documented migrant living in housing found via the African 
Market. 
 
“I share the living room in one-bedroom.  It still costs $400, but I don’t have a choice.  
I found the apartment from the market…and the guy who rented it to me is no good.  
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He took a deposit for no reason, plus he never cleans or pays for any of light bill, we 
have to do everything.  He doesn’t care about anything.  It is a very hard place to live, 
but no choice brother…  If you don’t like it they kick you out, then where you gonna 
go?” (D12). 
 
Again, those migrants who access housing using this pathway do so because they cannot find 
alternative housing through a relative or friend, which is a situation in which many 
documented migrants find themselves.   
 
In this type of inferior housing, migrant tenants are unable to complain for fear of summary 
eviction.  This is distinct from housing arrangements that are mediated in the context of a 
mutually respected religious institution, as was described in the Housing Actors chapter, 
which can arbitrate disagreements and provide alternate housing options if a resolution is not 
possible.  But when a migrant relies on the African Market as an access pathway there is a far 
greater risk in terms of the amiability of the informal provider.   
 
6.2.4 Undocumented Migrant Strategies  
 
The undocumented migrant experience stands in stark contrast to their documented 
counterparts.  These migrants arrive in the US with deep social network ties to prior cohorts 
of migrants with whom they share familial and religious connections.  Through these 
relationships, they access numerous tangible benefits that facilitate their transition: airport 
pickups, employment assistance, and both short and long-term housing. 
 
The following findings detail the multiple strategic options to access housing available to 
these migrants that are afforded by way of their membership a tight social network: 
 
Strategies 1 and 2: Guest Grace Period and In-Network Room-mating   
 
The undocumented migrants’ housing experience is a continuous flow from their point of 
arrival to the US.  Once a migrant immigrates, they are readily embedded into the social 
network of their community.  This type of integration enables migrants to firstly have a place 
of residence for an extended period – often several months – free of charge, a ‘grace period.’  
What is more, this initial housing opportunity itself comes with further introductions to other 
critical resources, including: access to employment, placement within a spiritual community 
– either a mosque or a church – and a readily available network of co-ethnic friends.  While 
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all poor migrants struggle with the challenges involved in settling into a new country, these 
social support resources ease the difficulties and pay continual dividends. 
 
Room-mating with another migrant to obtain accommodation is another iteration of this 
strategy.  Specifically, once undocumented migrants transition from their ‘grace period’ to 
seeking out their own accommodations, they often turn to their network of family and friends 
to learn of available rooms or beds.  In doing so, they are readily and quickly able to find 
space which they can rent from another Ghanaian in their community at cost, or at a 
discounted rate depending on their financial situation.   
 
“Just like when I first came here, the only people that help you are your brothers.  So 
if today I need something, like a room or a job, I text my [Muslim] brothers and the 
next day I have it.  Nobody else going to help you like that, so that’s why I stick with 
my people (U7). 
 
As the remarks above illustrate, these types of transactions are quite often frictionless. Trust 
is assured because of strong bonded ties that the prospective tenant shares with their informal 
provider.  While these migrants may rent from someone who they do not know directly, they 
nevertheless have confidence in their provider because this person is, in effect, accredited 
through their ethnic group membership.  This follows for the informal providers as well; they 
can trust the quality of their tenants because they have been referred from within the 
community.   
 
Strategy 3: Informal Channel to Formal Housing  
 
The circumstances described in Strategy 2 typically apply to those seeking accommodation 
space for one.  There are situations where migrants wish to obtain an entire apartment unit 
either because they are expecting a spouse or because they wish to live with a close family 
member or friend.  Whatever the circumstance, executing this sort of transaction is consistent 
with the findings shown in the Housing Actors chapter.  Again, these migrants turn to their 
community to learn of formal providers who have vacancies that they can access via an 
informal selection process.  For financial risk screening, this selection process relies less on 
formal documentation, but rather draws on the provider’s positive experiences with other 
members of this ethnic community.  In practice, the process works as described by the 
undocumented migrant below. 
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“I got this apartment because my pastor knew the landlord and he told them I needed 
a place.  He lives in the landlord’s other building.  I had to pay the rent and deposit, 
but that’s it.  $1,500 a month is still a lot for me, but we manage… [The] apartment is 
okay, they need to paint it and change sink and toilet, but the building is safe and 
there are a lot of Africans in the area, so I like it” (U6). 
 
From the perspective of the would-be tenant, this situation is one where their integration into 
a social network overcomes the obstacle that their legal status poses for obtaining formal 
housing.  Indeed, use of this strategy gives an undocumented migrant access to such housing 
with all of its formalities – including a contract lease.  Moreover, these trust-based 
introductions to willing housing providers ultimately prove mutually advantageous for 
provider and tenant alike: the landlord obtains a reliable tenant without incurring the 
transaction costs associated with a lengthy housing application process, and the 
undocumented tenant obtains an entire apartment unit that they can further sublet as they 
choose.   
 
Strategy 4: Document Sharing  
 
It is not always the case that undocumented migrants can find an apartment through a 
provider who will perform an informal due diligence examination and rely on the word of an 
existing tenant.  In these circumstances, undocumented migrants will turn to members of their 
social network to obtain the necessary documentation required to obtain housing via the 
formal market.  They will borrow someone’s identification card, tax and employment 
records, and any other required materials needed to succeed during a housing application 
process.  
 
“It was the Imam who helped me… [he] introduced me to this other brother at the 
mosque who had got his papers recently though marriage.  He had everything – his 
green card, a job, the taxes.  I used it to apply to apply for apartments, and I got lucky 
and got one in this new building… That’s what we Africans do, help each other…this 
is from Allah that we have to.  Now when other brothers come from Ghana, I have 
space for them to stay…” (U9). 
 
The response above shows that undocumented migrants are exceedingly versatile in the 
pathways they can follow to obtain the type of housing that is most appropriate for them.  In 
many ways, their success in this area demonstrates not only the superiority of options 
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available to them, relative to their documented counterparts, but further shows how they are 
able to overcome even the obstacles that plague many of the documented migrants, such as 
poor credit. This is because, in relying on community-based referrals, they are directed only 
to persons who can pass financial due diligence, most likely because they themselves have 
secured their own apartment. 
 
Strategy 5: Sublet Entire Unit 
 
Undocumented migrants “sublet” units from someone in their community who has decided to 
move from their apartment either temporarily or permanently.  Most often, the situation 
described is that a migrant wishes to return to Ghana for an extended period, such a year or 
more, but does not want to lose their apartment.  As such, they will find a willing partner to 
assume the responsibilities of their lease without formally taking ownership.  This individual 
in turn finds additional roommates who can help divide the cost of rent.  
 
“This apartment it’s not in my name, but it’s mine.  The guy who had it went back to 
Ghana to get married and he gave it to me… Yeah, I don’t know if the landlord 
knows or cares, we just pay the rent every month.  He doesn’t have to come to fix 
anything.  Like when the faucet broke, we just changed it ourselves” (U3).   
 
It is important to note that Strategy 5 is connected to Strategies 1 and 2 in that it is part of the 
same circle of housing units added to the informal market stock.  These migrants are 
continually relying on one another to find and fill housing space; the objective is to never 
relinquish a unit once it has entered circulation within their community.  
 
Indeed, it is this growing stock of units that facilitates the generosity that new migrants often 
experience in terms of always having a space to stay when they arrive or should they fall on 
hard times.  The community has in effect built an infrastructure capable of serving its 
members, particularly those with strong transnational familial ties to their relatives living in 
New York.  This is not to suggest that documented migrants are always excluded, but that the 
degree of access and integration is greater for the undocumented because so many of these 
ties are built and woven through relationships that were formed over transnational boundaries 
over an extended period.  As described previously, because documented migrants arrive on 
randomly issued Diversity Visas, they often do not have any connections to other Ghanaians 
living in New York.   
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Contrary to what was hypothesised, this research finds that undocumented tenants, because 
they arrive in the US with established ties to the existing Ghanaian community, are actually 
in a more privileged situation relative to their documented counterparts, who invariably do 
not have such connections.  The benefits of this social network are such that undocumented 
migrants invariably speak in terms that suggest complete immersion or reliance on their 
friends and relatives for housing:  ‘I just text my brother.’  There is logic to this process of 
course, as these social network-based strategies are effective and convenient.  Thus, while 
undocumented status is a literal barrier to regular employment, accessing identification 
documents, health insurance, and numerous other amenities available to legal residents, in the 
context of the housing market this barrier has been overcome.   
 
Figure 6.2 adds to the previous iteration of the model to illustrate deeper, added complexity 
of the housing market for both migrant groups.   
 
Figure 6.2 Undocumented and Documented Migrants’ Housing Pathways 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
 
In particular, Figure 6.2 above shows that undocumented migrants can access the formal 
market using strategies.  On the formal market, undocumented migrants are more likely to 
find housing from a private provider relative to a non-profit provider, and not likely to obtain 
public housing for lack of legal status.  On the informal market, undocumented migrants 
receive amenities such as grace period housing and, thereafter, transition to the superior 
informal market, because access to this market is facilitated by their social network.  This 
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diagram further shows how the undocumented migrant housing pathways differ from their 
documented counterparts’ who, despite having greater housing access potential, are more 
likely to be relegated to the inferior informal housing market.    
 
6.3  Gender  
 
The strategies described in Part 6.2 apply to male migrants, who comprise most of the 
Ghanaian migrant community and the sample of those interviewed for this study.  Hence, the 
focus of this Part is to detail findings on how documented and undocumented female 
migrants access housing, and explain the unique gendered nature of their access pathways. 
 
The subsections below detail the different housing arrangements that female migrants 
occupy.  What these data illustrate is that the dynamics that distinguish male migrants based 
on their legal status generally do not apply to female migrants.  For these women, accessing 
affordable housing is not a significant obstacle.  Instead, the challenge they face is the 
constraints accompanying their housing.  Although female migrants pay far less in rent, their 
choices in terms of where and how they wish to live are considerably limited, as these 
findings illustrate.  
 
This study finds that there is a striking discrepancy between the average rents of male and 
female migrants, as shown in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 6.1  Average Monthly Rental Contribution in Shared Housing 
  Documented Undocumented 
Male $550 $420 
Female $140 $100 
Source:  Qualitative Migrant Interviews 
 
This substantial difference between female and male migrant rents is due to the absence of 
expectation that women will pay rent.  This is so for two reasons.  First, female contributions 
come in the form of household services.  Second, there is an observed cultural norm that the 
rent burden is a male responsibility. 
 
How this manifests in the housing pathway process is illustrated in Figure 3 below.  This 
diagram shows how female migrants are separate from their male counterparts in terms of 
how they access housing.   
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The subsection below details the ways in which different categories of female migrants 
obtain housing, and at what cost.  The critical unifying finding for these women is that legal 
status is not the inverse arbiter in terms of ease of access to housing; it is marital status.   
 
6.3.1 Categories of Female Migrants 
 
1. Sponsored and Married  
 
Female migrants sponsored by their documented spouses will live with their spouses and are 
not asked to contribute to rent.  Indeed, these women indicate that they are broadly unaware 
of the finances of their households.  
 
 “My husband move to America long before me…once he had papers, he brought me 
and my children…  [H]e handles everything with the housing and the papers… [I] 
don’t have to worry about none of that.  I have to take care of the house and the 
children… so that’s what I do…” (D21) 
 
As male spouses have been in the US for an extended period, they have often secured stable 
housing by the time their wives are granted a sponsored visa.  And because these female 
migrants are disconnected from household financial decisions, they are not expected to 
contribute to their rental costs.  Their most significant obligations include childcare and 
household chores.  This is not to suggest that these women do not earn an income; they often 
monetise their homes by providing informal day-care services to other families, or working 
as a healthcare aid.  These earnings are used to manage their household, as well as to pay 
their own remittance obligations. 
 
Married Ghanaian households are housing mainstays for single female migrants who are not 
sponsored or who arrive alone on a Diversity Visa.  As will be explained in greater detail 
below, these married households prefer additional female tenants because they provide 
essential free labour in exchange for free, or very low-cost housing. 
 
2. Sponsored and Arriving Alone 
 
The category of sponsored female migrants who are not married is mostly comprised of 
daughters who are sponsored by their fathers.  These female migrants are adults, but they do 
not live on their own when they arrive.  They may live with their fathers, or with other 
relatives or family friends.  In any case, they are not expected to contribute to rent. 
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 “My dad has been living in the US for a while and he brought me over last year.  
[H]e didn’t have space in his house and he works a lot so he asked my aunt to take 
care of me…  But she is away a lot too doing home healthcare, so I help out in the 
house… [L]ike I make food, clean, and we also do day-care in the apartment so I 
watch the children…  I don’t really mind it… I’ll probably be here until I get 
married…” (D18). 
 
These adult female migrants are allocated to the household in their familial network where 
they can best serve and their presence will not prove problematic.  In the case of the woman 
quoted above, her father lives in shared housing with other male migrants; it would, 
therefore, be inappropriate for his daughter to live with him.  In addition, her father works in 
12-hour shifts operating a taxi that he shares with his cousin, with whom he cohabitates.  
When his unmarried daughter, the migrant quoted above, finally received her sponsored visa, 
the only option for her was to live with another Ghanaian household who could watch her 
and where she could be helpful.  Although she was 25 at the time of her arrival, at no point 
did she consider the possibility of living on her own, nor was it an option offered to her by 
her father or other relatives.  She is welcomed by her aunt, as she can provide household 
services – including watching children for the day-care service that operates out of her aunt 
and uncle’s apartment – which allows her aunt to work additional hours as an overnight 
health assistant for the elderly (home healthcare aid).   
 
Young, single female migrants are clearly advantageous to the economic well-being of the 
Ghanaians with whom they live.  They offer heavily discounted labour services.  Moreover, 
they are often described as ‘agreeable’ in that they do not vocalise any issues with their 
housing arrangements.  This applies in cases where the female migrant is not related to any 
member of the household where she is staying, but was placed there because it was deemed 
mutually advantageous.    
 
 “[A]frian girls are good you see… they will help out in the house and just mix in.  
It’s like I have another daughter here… [I] can keep an eye and make sure the girl 
doesn’t go messing around with boys and goes to church with us… [S]he can live and 
eat here and not have to worry too about paying…  She helps me in the house with the 
cleaning, preparing food, just normal things that African women have to do…  [And 
no], you can’t have an African man here helping like that, that’s crazy, I got little girls 
here… plus my husband wouldn’t accept that…”  (D5). 
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Live-in female migrants are valued because of the household services they provide.  
Moreover, this arrangement is only possible because they are women; this fact makes them 
less threatening to all members of the household, as the response above captures.  This is 
because the live-in female migrant is not viewed as potential threat to the male head of 
household, or as a potential sexual predator to the other women in the home. 
 
3. Female Diversity Visa Winners 
 
The housing pathway for female migrants who arrive on a Diversity Visa also relates to their 
marital status.  The key difference here though is whether the female migrant arrives with her 
spouse.  If so, strategies detailed in Part 6.2 for documented migrants apply.  The qualitative 
response from the migrant D9 listed in that section shows how these married households 
typically must find entire apartment units and use brokers to do so, because of their 
unfamiliarity with the rental market. 
 
Married female DV winners who arrive alone – most often because their spouse has 
previously migrated to Europe for employment – and single DV winners follow housing 
pathways similar to sponsored women in their situation: they are housed in households in 
their community that are in need of assistance with household tasks, including childcare.  
These women are viewed as a resource, and similar access advantages that apply to 
sponsored women are afforded to female DV winners, as the response below shows.        
 
“[I] got the lottery visa… I didn’t know people in America, but I heard there are a lot 
of Ghanaians in New York…  [P]lus, my husband [who lives in Germany] helped me 
with the plane tickets and found a [Ghanaian] family in the Bronx that said I could 
live with them; they met me at the airport and that’s where I’ve been staying since I 
got here about 18 months ago” (D3).   
 
That documented women who are unaccompanied can readily find housing is remarkable as 
compared to their male counterparts.  As is illustrated in Part 6.2, these male migrants 
struggle in finding housing, and often are resigned to using costly brokers to find 
accommodations.  However, documented female migrants do not face the same struggles in 
terms of access.  In the case of the female migrant D3, her husband found a Ghanaian pastor 
on Facebook who then found a family in his congregation that offered to house his wife.  
This exchange resembles the experience of sponsored women, with the key difference being 
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that outreach efforts need to be made in advance.  Still, this study found no examples of male 
Diversity Visa winners having similar success arranging free housing prior to arriving in the 
US.  It is clear, therefore, that female migrants are not viewed as burdens, but as potential 
assets in the Ghanaian community.  This accounts for the relative ease with which these 
women are given housing.   
 
4. Undocumented Female Migrants 
 
This study found few examples of undocumented female migrants.  This is likely due to the 
fact that female migrants report being strongly discouraged from making the journey to the 
US alone on visiting visas, if their intention is to overstay, for there are community-based 
norms against women permanently migrating alone.  But undocumented women often cite 
their ties to other migrants living in the US as critical for helping them make the journey.  In 
this sense, they resemble the broader undocumented population described in Part 6.2.  These 
women display a strong will, as it requires a significant force of will to disregard the advice 
of their community and make the journey alone even though they have extended families in 
the US.    
 
In terms of housing, undocumented women follow a pathway not unlike their documented 
female counterparts.  They, too, find themselves living in Ghanaian households where they 
are required to pay little if anything toward rent, but are expected to contribute with their 
labour.  
 
“I came from Ghana only seven months ago…  I am trying to find work but I’m lucky 
because I am staying with my auntie and her husband… they help me a lot since I 
came.  [My aunt] does child care in the house so I help with that…[I do] some of the 
cleaning and cooking and stuff like that…but I don’t have to pay for anything so it’s 
nice.  Right now my plan is maybe go to school and then to try and bring my husband 
over from Germany; he’s working there now” (U8). 
 
Newly arrived female migrants view household responsibilities as a relatively easy task to 
complete in exchange for housing.  Indeed, they do not view the childcare and domestic 
services they provide as work.  This is because these tasks are similar to their household 
responsibilities in Ghana.   
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Figure 6.3 is a complete model of all housing pathways for Ghanaian migrants by legal status 
and gender. 
 
Figure 6.3   Ghanaian Migrants’ Housing Pathways 
 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
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Figure 6.3 adds the options available to female migrants to the previous housing pathway 
diagrams.  If a female migrant arrives alone, no matter her legal status, she is most likely to 
find housing on the superior informal market.  However, if she arrives to join her spouse, she 
will follow the housing trajectory of her male documented spouse.  Critically, this diagram 
illustrates that for female migrants the decisive issue for determining the housing pathway is 
marital—not legal—status.   
 
6.3.2 Perceptions  
 
One observation that can be drawn from these more recent arrivals is that they have not 
become disillusioned by the real challenges they face in living in an unfamiliar country with 
minimal resources at their disposal.  They are generally happy and optimistic about their 
future prospects in the US.  They may not have fully appreciated the challenges they face as 
an undocumented person, as in the case of the respondent above. 
 
In contrast, older female migrants are unhappy with the restrictive situation in which they 
find themselves. 
 
[L]ife for an African woman is too hard… You suffer for your family, for your 
husband, but then in the end you don’t have anything.  Look at me, I am alone… my 
husband is away and I can do nothing but just struggle every day.  And for what?  At 
least back in Ghana I had peace, I was with my friends and family, we all living 
together…  Here, you just have to work, work, work because everyone wants to use 
you… (U5)  
 
For these women, their time in the US has been a long and arduous journey, which is often 
filled with deep loneliness and isolation from their spouse and other members of their family.  
These women express unhappiness because they are living as a house servant.  Their feeling 
is that the journey they undertook was based on different expectations, many of which did not 
materialise.  As such, the fact that housing is affordable, if not free, does not register as an 
appreciable amenity relative to the personal cost that they feel they must incur.  
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6.3.3 Marriage Pressure  
 
Marriage is an additional complicating variable for Ghanaian women.  Documented migrant 
women who are not yet married are coveted by undocumented suitors because they can 
provide immediate legal status.  As one documented female migrant explained,  
 
“[I] feel like I need to get married soon because that’s what everyone keeps asking 
me.  There a lot of guys here who want papers and that’s what my family back home 
is pushing me to do, but I don’t really want to do that right now…but sometimes it 
feels like I don’t have a choice, like it’s my obligation to do it” (D10). 
 
Documented women therefore must balance the strong pressure they feel from their families 
in Ghana to marry quickly, which is intensified by the courting efforts from undocumented 
male migrants, with their own desires.  The extent of this problem has even led to the creation 
of a support program, offered by the Sauti Yetu Center for African Women, a Bronx-based 
non-profit, that guides young women on how to advocate for themselves in order to resist 
unwanted marriage requests.  In this sense, unmarried documented female migrants are often 
placed in a situation where their personal autonomy is deemed secondary to their documented 
status and the utility this can provide.    
 
This calculus is somewhat reversed for undocumented women, as their long-term strategic 
plan is to marry a documented Ghanaian man.  For example, one undocumented woman 
detailed her goals, “[R]ight now I don’t have papers…so I need to get married to someone to 
fix that….  No, I don’t think that will be too hard because there are lot of Ghanaians here, and 
they want an African wife because we understand each other” (U4).  These remarks illustrate 
the degree to which the undocumented female migrant’s situation contrasts with that of her 
documented counterpart.  The undocumented are eager to legalise themselves and, as such, 
women in this situation who can do so by marriage are inclined to accept this bargain.   
 
6.3.4 Results 
 
This research finds that female migrants are situated in a circumstance where their autonomy 
is notably constrained.  These women readily accept the free to low cost housing they are 
offered through their families or by other Ghanaian households, but this deal is not without 
cost – these women work, effectively, as indentured servants.  The dynamic in these homes is 
never described as untoward or exploitative by any of the female migrants surveyed, but over 
133 
 
time, as is revealed through remarks offered by older female migrants, the women become 
less satisfied with their condition.  This reflects the fact that their role is that of mostly 
uncompensated service providers.  This is true whether the female migrant is single or 
married, documented or undocumented.   
 
The situation for single female migrants is more complicated, however.  A woman in this 
situation must grapple with pressure to marry for reasons unrelated to her romantic interests.  
If the female migrant is documented, she is viewed as an asset that can help legalise an 
undocumented male migrant.  If she is undocumented, legalisation is only possible through 
marriage—and she is aware that, unlike male migrants, she will encounter widespread 
disapproval if she marries a non-West African.  As such, in either circumstance, female 
migrants confront a situation that is made worse by of their gender.   
 
6.4 Chapter Conclusion 
 
6.4.1 Summary  
 
This research hypothesised that legal status would be a key benefit for migrants that 
possessed it, because it would facilitate access to the formal housing market.  But as the 
findings illustrate, there are several confounding variables that showed how reality proved 
different from what was anticipated.   
 
The first layer of this complexity arises from the fact that Ghanaian migrants – like the larger 
West African community of which they are a part – are socially obligated to allocate a 
portion of their incomes monthly to their families in Ghana.  Failure to meet this commitment 
would constitute a violation of the social covenant that migrants have with their relatives 
wherein they are expected to be economic supporters because they are in the US.  
Unfortunately, they are unable to convey to their foreign relatives that their economic 
situation is not as lucrative as they might envision.  As such, meeting this obligation places 
an additional demand on their personal finances beyond what normally strains all low-income 
tenants.   
 
The second layer follows from the fact that most documented migrants are reluctant to pursue 
public assistance.  As a result, qualifying poor documented migrants are at a disadvantage 
relative to comparably poor native residents; nearly four fifths of Bronx natives who qualify 
for government support accept it in some form whereas the majority of the documented 
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migrants surveyed in this study do not (HVS 2014).  This finding strongly suggests that 
documented migrants have limited bargaining power for formal housing without benefits.  
Their rent-to-income ratio would exceed the thresholds used by most providers, which is no 
more than 40 percent of disposable income.   
 
These two findings reveal the high degree of parity between documented and undocumented 
migrants.  Namely, like their documented counterparts, undocumented migrants are also 
obligated to send some of their income as remittances and do not benefit from public 
assistance.  Hence, the critical distinction between documented and undocumented migrants 
in the housing market – that documented migrants have full access to the formal market – 
does not prove as important as initially hypothesised.   
 
This chapter further demonstrates that there is an overlapping relationship between formal 
and informal markets.  Tenants who have obtained housing on the formal market act as 
providers on the informal market and all other migrant tenants rely on varying informal 
channels to find accommodation.  The migrant experience illustrates that the urban system 
that they occupy is not designed to serve the needs of this demographic.  Hence, migrants 
must form their own market and methods to obtain access.   
 
6.4.2 Discussion 
 
Examining the different strategies of both migrant groups yields significant insights as to the 
nature of these housing markets.  Strategies that documented migrants use to access informal 
housing reveal a hierarchy within the market: documented migrants are more likely to occupy 
the inferior segment of this market because they tend to lack transnational familial ties to 
others in their community and, therefore, have less social capital.  This relegates the 
documented to inferior housing where they find informal housing through impersonal 
postings found in African Markets.  These ads merely connect the prospective tenant to 
another West African migrant; there is no ethnic solidarity or social ties between provider 
and tenant.  The findings from this transactional dynamic are similar to Burgers’ (1998ab) 
findings in Rotterdam: migrants who found housing there without social ties commonly 
reported economic exploitation, fear of summary evictions, and general dissatisfaction in 
their shared accommodations.  Documented migrants in the Bronx’ inferior informal market 
have the same experience.  In this market, informal providers invariably prevail should a 
135 
 
dispute arise, as their migrant tenants are viewed only as a revenue source with no rights or 
protections. 
 
The undocumented migrants’ experience in the informal market contrasts starkly with this 
experience.  First, in many ways this study finds that for these migrants, ‘informal’ housing is 
the norm that begins immediately from the time of their arrival, at which point they are 
afforded free housing and integration into their ethnic community.  Immersion into informal 
housing allocation processes continues through various points in an undocumented migrant’s 
life where they seek housing.  These migrants access the informal market through relatives 
and close friends who share information about various offerings when asked.  The thick, 
often indirect ties they enjoy with their informal provider facilitate trust, thereby reducing the 
probability of rampant exploitation.  It is for such reasons, as the qualitative data strongly 
suggest, that these migrants do not describe their housing experiences as harshly as their 
documented counterparts.  Undocumented migrants blame their housing affordability issues 
on low wages and the high rents charged by the property owners.  These migrants, however, 
are not unhappy living in shared accommodations, nor do they find their informal providers 
to be exploitive.  Such migrants occupy the superior position in the informal market 
hierarchy.     
 
The informal market accessed by undocumented migrants is superior because it offers 
numerous housing opportunities coupled with some informal protections against exploitation.  
For example, if a migrant needs a room or a bed, they can use their social network to find a 
trustworthy fellow Ghanaian with a vacant space who is far less likely to overcharge or 
otherwise exploit their position of power.  Moreover, those with access to this informal 
market are not limited to only spare beds or rooms; migrants can also obtain entire 
apartments provided they have secured the financial resources, or have a sufficient number of 
co-ethnics with whom they will share the rent. 
 
Disparities in access to the social network between documented and undocumented migrants, 
and the implications of this on housing access do not apply to female migrants, however.  
The findings show that gender is in many ways itself a determinative feature of housing 
access, irrespective of legal status.  Female migrants do not struggle with accessing housing, 
nor do they pay much in rent, provided they are unencumbered by a spouse.  However, 
relative ease of access that women enjoy is not without costs in terms to their autonomy.  In 
this sense, women are viewed in their communities as an asset – a household indentured 
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servant – and it is because of this that the process of finding housing itself is not challenging, 
but the price for housing is their autonomy.   
 
This dynamic of limited choice is brought into sharper relief when viewing unmarried female 
migrants.  These women must grapple with the decision to marry based not on their romantic 
interests, but on their obligations to their community (if they are documented) or their own 
need to legalise status (if they are undocumented).  In either case, their choice in this matter is 
notably more constrained relative to their male counterparts.  Ghanaian men with legal status 
describe no pressure to marry an undocumented Ghanaian woman.  Moreover, female 
migrants are socially prohibited from marrying outside of their faith or a non-Ghanaian, but 
such limitations do not apply to documented and undocumented men. 
 
Female migrants operate with very limited autonomy.  Their housing pathway correlates to 
the services they can offer to their informal housing provider.  This can include completing 
household chores or providing childcare as well as eventually marrying another Ghanaian 
migrant in their community.  Women, therefore, are bound into their social networks even 
more intimately than male migrants.  They express comfort with their circumstances, as it is 
familiar and in many ways simpler.  But it is nevertheless a dynamic wherein their choices 
are circumscribed by the will of their community and, eventually, their spouse.    
 
In sum, the strategies Ghanaians use to facilitate access to societal resources, such as housing, 
are vivid examples of bonded and ethnic solidarity in operation (Portes and Wilson 1980; 
Portes 1987).  This is true even of documented migrants, who turn to African Markets, as 
well as female migrants, who obtain heavily discounted housing through their community in 
exchange for their labour and autonomy.  Indeed, looking inward for social support coheres 
with the literature, as shown in Stoller’s (2001) study of West Africans in Harlem.  
 
But the deeper insight this study has uncovered is how this social support is divided; the 
range and power of strategies that are available to Ghanaian migrants reflects the varying 
degrees to which they have established familial ties within their community.  Strategies 
therefore are a calculated response to the constraints that migrants live within, and also show 
the range of resources that they can access.  For impoverished migrants, familial ties are 
useful and important because they can be leveraged to access housing.  Thus, legal status by 
itself does not eliminate access barriers, but strong community ties go a long way in this 
direction.  
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7  
Urban Informality  
 
7.1   Adapted Urban Informality  
 
7.2   Urban Informality in the Bronx 
7.2.1 Criteria  
7.2.2 Self-Regulated Enclave  
 
7.3   Implications 
7.3.1 Policy Implications  
 
7.4  Chapter Conclusion 
7.4.1 Summary 
7.4.2 Discussion 
 
This chapter is the final findings chapter and it answers the research question:  how does 
informality interface with formality in the housing market and in housing allocation?  Using 
the experiences of Ghanaian migrants, this chapter explains how the theory of Adapted Urban 
Informality captures the overlapping and symbiotic relationships between formal and 
informal housing processes in the Bronx.  
 
The previous two findings chapters focused on explaining the role of housing actors and the 
particular strategies that migrants use to access housing.  This chapter explores those findings 
within the larger context of the Bronx by analysing: (a) how urban informality has taken 
shape in the Bronx; (b) where informality relates to the notion of a Ghanaian enclave; and (c) 
how housing allocation functions for migrants based on their connection to, and placement 
within, their enclave.  This chapter further presents the implications that follow from the 
findings uncovered in this study, including policy implications.   
 
7.1  Adapted Urban Informality  
 
Urban informality describes informal settlements in developing world cities as a logical 
product of suspended sovereignty.  These settlements are permitted as part of a mode of 
urbanisation that requires minimal state resources.  Per the theory, it is incorrect to frame the 
informal and formal sectors as separate spaces, for both are interdependent economies with 
shared populations.  This study has sought to show how migrant housing in the Bronx 
illustrates such interdependence through adjoining the concepts of ethnic enclaves, social 
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capital and networks, and survival strategies to urban informality.  These combined concepts 
form the conceptual framework, Adapted Urban Informality.   
 
Figure 7.1 (previously shown in Chapter 2: Literature Review) shows Adapted Urban 
Informality as a model. 
 
Figure 7.1    Adapted Urban Informality 
 
Source:  Researcher’s Model 
 
The adapted model (Figure 7.1) shown above integrates enclave theory with the concepts of 
social capital and survival strategies to capture how the migrant community functions in an 
urban system in the Global North.  As the greyed oval shows, social capital connects 
documented and undocumented migrants within their enclave.  This communal relationship 
was envisioned as important for helping migrants access housing.  Particularly,  
undocumented migrants would benefit as their housing options could improve through their 
ties to documented migrants – who can access the formal market.   
 
However, the findings described in the preceding chapters complicate the social dynamics 
represented in the model.  For instance, documented migrants are disadvantaged in accessing 
housing because they arrive in New York without transnational social ties to other migrants, 
unlike their undocumented counterparts.  Those migrants who have such transnational 
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familial ties to their co-ethnics have the social capital needed to access preferred housing.  
So, while congenial relationships exist within the West African community generally, and the 
Ghanaian community in particular, deep bonds between Ghanaian migrants are not simply a 
function of co-ethnic group membership.  Such bonds – which facilitate sacrifice and service 
for one another – come from sharing an extended network of relatives and friends in Ghana.  
Thus, the social capital thought to connect documented and undocumented migrants did not 
function as was conceptualised.   
 
The confounding dynamics between documented and undocumented migrants adds depth to 
the Adapted Urban Informality model.  The following subsections explore these nuances in 
the Bronx and present a detailed understanding as to how urban informality in this context 
interfaces with the Ghanaian migrant enclave. 
 
7.2  Urban Informality in the Bronx  
 
Ghanaian migrants have created a unique system of informal ‘settlements’ in sub-boroughs 
throughout the Bronx.  These settlements are comprised of apartment units.  Such units are 
not the constructed ‘self-help’ type housing that would be observed in the developing world 
(UN Habitat 2003).  Rather, they are legally obtained formal apartment units that migrants 
sublet on an informal market that is only available to West Africans.  By their actions, 
migrants literally occupy both formal and informal sectors simultaneously, which exemplifies 
the overlapping relationship between the two spaces posited in urban informality.  
 
The process by which these migrants came to repurpose housing stock from the formal 
market and then sublet it on their informal market further reveals urban informality in action.  
Migrants identified a void in the formal housing market, namely, highly affordable sleeping 
space for low-paid workers living without families.  The product that migrants need is single 
beds or rooms.  Affordable housing initiatives in New York City are not designed to 
encourage developers to provide this type of housing, for, among other reasons, it would lead 
to crowding.  This is a health and safety concern that local authorities are responsible for 
preventing (Community Service Society 2007, 2013; HVS 2013).  Nevertheless, Ghanaian 
migrants have been able to create a robust market comprised of exactly these type of crowded 
units – without institutional resistance and aided by a complicit network of housing providers 
– thereby filling the void.   
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That the Ghanaian migrant community has been able to fill this niche is evidence of the 
controlled withdrawal of sovereignty posited in urban informality.  The broader market 
economy of New York City benefits from this supply of low-paid labour, and governing 
authorities do not provide the type of affordable housing needed by these labourers.  As such, 
what migrants do to obtain housing is ignored; it appears to work, has not raised any alarms 
in terms of public concern, and the involved parties – the migrants, the providers, and 
relevant intermediaries – are ostensibly content.     
 
This inaction by the state in New York City can be described as administrative 
discretion.  Public authorities have finite resources and not every law-breaking activity can be 
pursued.  However, it is precisely this ‘discretion’ in the Global North that constitutes a 
withdrawal of sovereignty.  This resembles the South Texas authorities that ignored 
unregulated settlements (colonias) built by Mexican labourers and their families (Larson 
2002).  In New York, authorities observe the pervasive existence of illegal or unsafe housing 
arrangements in immigrant communities but seldom prosecute such abuses.  This constitutes 
their strategic exercise of discretionary authority.  As a result, hidden homes remain hidden 
because authorities have no reason to disturb this situation. 
 
7.2.1  Criteria  
 
The Ghanaian migrants surveyed in this research consistently describe the Bronx as an ideal 
location in the context of New York City.  The borough is connected to the city’s expansive 
and affordable public transportation system.  This makes reaching employment throughout 
the five boroughs and larger metropolitan area possible.  In addition, migrants appreciate that 
the Bronx has a large West African population, as this provides familiar comforts such as 
African churches, mosques, and grocery stores.  Even for a migrant not strongly connected to 
the Ghanaian ethnic network, the Bronx does not feel completely foreign in terms of culture.  
Finally, the Bronx has the lowest cost of living of any of the five boroughs; prices for 
groceries, utilities, and other necessities in the Bronx average 40 percent cheaper relative to 
other boroughs (Numbeo 2017). 
 
The attributes that Ghanaian migrants find attractive in the Bronx suggest a set of criteria for 
the emergence of an urban informal market in a developed world city.  These criteria are 
detailed in Table 7.1 below.  
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Table 7.1     Informal Housing Criteria  
1 Relatively cheap housing that is proximal to wealthier areas with strong demand for 
low-paid labour.  
2 Public authorities are mostly indifferent and interfere in the housing market unless 
explicitly called to do so. 
3 Sizable number of complicit, profit-seeking actors (e.g. housing providers). 
4 Sufficient influx of migrants of the same ethnic community who reside in the same 
geographic space. 
 
As shown in Table 7.1, this research identifies four key components that work together to 
allow for overlapping formal and informal housing markets, namely: relative cheapness of 
housing and other living costs; clear access to a vibrant labour market; a sizeable number of 
complicit institutional actors including housing providers; and a critical mass of inflowing 
migrants.  
 
The importance of cheap housing and a low cost of living is rather obvious.  The Bronx is the 
most economically feasible area for a low-income migrant in New York City to live.  If 
resources did not present a barrier for migrants, they would likely choose to live in a more 
desirable borough that would be closer to employment, echoing the main tenant of the Spatial 
Mismatch Hypothesis (Kain 1994; Kain 1968).  As this is not the case, the Bronx provides 
the next best opportunity.  While housing is not affordable for most of the Ghanaian migrant 
community surveyed in this research, it can be made so through various innovative measures; 
in this sense, the cheapness of housing in the Bronx relative to other boroughs makes it easier 
to facilitate housing affordability there.  
 
In addition to its relative cheapness, the Bronx provides excellent public transportation that 
migrants can use to reach employment opportunities anywhere in New York City.  Most of 
the migrants surveyed tend to work outside the Bronx, in Manhattan or other boroughs.  In 
most cases, they can reach these locations in under an hour with an unlimited monthly 
transportation pass that costs $121 (MTA 2017).  This kind of transportation, in the parlance 
of urban informality, is critical to the flourishing formation of the informal space for it allows 
easy access to the formal economy. 
 
This is reflected in how the Bronx functions for its migrant inhabitants.  It provides the 
physical space where members of this community can live, via its informal housing markets.  
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From there, migrants can readily access the surrounding labour markets where they are in 
demand.  This situation constitutes a prime illustration of the relationship between formal and 
informal spaces in the urban system: the Bronx resembles the informal settlement in that it 
provides a home to low-wage migrant labourers who work in the formal economy found in 
the surrounding boroughs.   Hence, there is an overlapping, mutually advantageous 
relationship between both spaces.  
 
In the Bronx, authorities responsible for regulating housing crowding or exploitation are 
rarely known to crack down.  This follows from the narrative accounts of Ghanaian migrants:  
their housing arrangements, however crowded, have never been interrupted, either by 
landlord or government agency.  Nor do these migrants feel compelled to reach out to public 
authorities at all.  As explained in Chapter 5: Strategies, migrants seldom avail themselves of 
public benefits or the housing court for they are untrusting of these institutions.  Housing 
providers, for their part, cater to the migrant market niche by allowing migrants to bypass 
formal leasing procedures or otherwise turning a blind eye to how migrants occupy their 
properties.  Indeed, the drive for stable profits shapes how providers select tenants, for as 
long as their tenants pay consistently and do not demand repairs, there is little reason to 
disrupt the arrangement that migrants have made amongst themselves.   
 
The institutional environment therefore allows for an accumulation of advantages to staying 
within the migrant network.  This creates a self-perpetuating dynamic: Ghanaians make a 
reputation for themselves as an idealised tenant group and providers in turn welcome these 
tenants.  Hence, urban informality in the Bronx flourishes.  These factors explain the near 
total detachment between migrants and formal institutional actors.  The status quo persists 
because it functions well from the perspective of all interested parties; these are symbiotic 
dynamics.  
 
The Bronx can be viewed as a critical node in the urbanisation process in that it provides the 
geographic space for an informal housing market to develop.  It is important to the 
surrounding areas that the Bronx plays this role, as the city’s economy relies on West African 
migrant labour, particularly in sectors such as tourism, home health care, taxi services and a 
variety of other low-paid occupations.  In order to work in these positions, labourers need to 
live in relative proximity to where are employed (Kain 1994; Kain 1968).  For migrants, the 
Bronx provides a base for them to strive toward their American dream, earning enough 
resources to provide a comfortable life for their families back in Ghana as well as situating 
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these migrants on an upwardly mobile trajectory in the United States.  While the Ghanaian 
American dream is rarely realized, the Bronx nevertheless plays a critical role in facilitating 
the attempt.  
 
7.2.2 Self-Regulated Enclave  
 
The methods by which Ghanaian migrants access housing are not just the innovative tactics 
of an impoverished population but they are complex and differentiated:  allocation is based 
on the social and ethnic bonds that tie its members together.   
 
In this connected housing market that migrants have created for themselves, whereby formal 
and informal units are comprised of the same stock, the differentiation takes place within 
informal submarkets. The original concept of urban informality ascribes different degrees of 
legitimacy to different informal settlements. In the Bronx, this manifests in the quality of the 
housing experience that migrants encounter when they are pursuing housing in the informal 
market.  
 
Per adapted urban informality, the hierarchy of housing legitimacy in the Bronx is as follows: 
First, units obtained on the formal market, by whatever channel, have the greatest degree of 
legitimacy.  These units give the occupant a legal right to tenure (a lease) that is recognised 
by the formal system of laws that govern the housing market, and this right extends to the 
informal market.  That is, the occupant of this formally obtained unit may decide how it is to 
be sublet on the informal market.  In effect, these tenants become informal landlords and in 
so doing they make a choice as to how they will market their unit.  It is this choice that 
determines whether their unit will become part of the superior or inferior informal market.   
 
Those who sublet to their co-ethnics because of obligation receive tenants through a shared 
transnational social network, where local churches or mosques act as the connecting nodes.  
These informal providers abide by the standards of the superior informal market in that they 
typically divide the cost of rent and utility expenses equally among all the occupants.  
Further, they are likely to house new migrants for a period at no cost, fulfilling their grace 
period obligations.  These providers also respect their community-based institutions as 
legitimate arbiters that can resolve tenant disputes where they may arise.  Such informal 
providers are not simply concerned with lessening their housing expenses, but also seek to 
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serve their fellow Ghanaians with whom they share familial relationships originating in 
Ghana. 
 
In contrast, units rented by migrant providers who do not have these bonded ties to their 
tenants are guided by the same economic calculus that applies to formal housing providers: 
profitability.  Unlike formal providers, however, these informal providers are not constrained 
by regulations that govern the housing market.  In addition, these migrants do not abide by 
social covenants that are present in the superior informal market.  They charge their tenants 
rents that completely cover their housing costs and utility expenses, thus ensuring minimal 
personal housing expenses.  Moreover, these providers do not allow for recourse where there 
is a dispute between themselves and their tenants. In such situations, summary evictions are 
the primary outcome and the informal tenant has no options beyond seeking a new home.  
 
The differences between these housing markets and how each is respectively self-governed 
illustrate the overlapping dynamics between urban informality and ethnic enclaves.  In the 
parlance of urban informality, the informal housing market that migrants have created for 
themselves exists in a suspended space; there are no standardised regulations or formal 
institutions to enforce rules.  This is in part because all the participants of this market agree to 
these terms, but the implication of this unanimous consent is that migrants create their own 
processes to implement order within their markets.  This order, as observed in this study, 
divides the migrant community into two groups:  those who have bonded familial ties to their 
co-ethnic network, and those who do not.  Those migrants who are deeply tied to their social 
networks are those whose ties to the community originated in Ghana and continue into the 
Bronx.  These migrants are embedded in a transnational network of co-ethnics.  The rules that 
govern their transactions with other members of their community are designed to strengthen 
their ties of community and otherwise promote communitarianism over exploitation.  
 
The notion of co-ethnics serving one another is a foundational feature of enclaves as 
described in the Literature Review (Portes 1987; Portes and Jensen 1989; Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes and Shafer 2006; Portes and Zhou 1996).  Co-ethnic community 
members turn inward for social support, theorists explain, in response to mainstream 
society’s economic and social marginalisation.  This process is self-perpetuating, as the 
benefits of co-ethnic membership—including access to housing—strengthen solidarity 
between migrants and increase their reliance on one another in lieu of mainstream 
institutions.  Hence, although the informal market emerges in an institutional vacuum where 
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formal authority is suspended, the superior market is not governed through anarchy; this 
market models the social norms of the Ghanaian enclave. However, this research has 
uncovered nuance as regards those social norms.  Namely, it is not the case that all Ghanaians 
within the enclave are in solidarity with one another purely because of their shared heritage 
and geography.  Such conditions are necessary, but they are not sufficient.  There must also 
be a basis for the relationship between migrants, as this study’s findings demonstrate; and 
that basis invariably comes from shared familial ties that can be traced to Ghana.  
 
Where co-ethnic migrants are not connected through these shared transnational relationships, 
the housing market dynamics between migrants is less communitarian.  This is the condition 
of the inferior informal market.  Here, migrants use the structures of their ethnic economy but 
are not afforded its protections.  They access the inferior market through local businesses, 
also known as African Markets, that offer a venue for the migrant provider to find migrant 
tenants.  There is no connection between provider and tenant here except for their West 
African heritage.  There are no transnational ties that would create social consequences for 
the informal provider if they were to exploit or abuse their tenant.  As such, inferior informal 
market providers observe free market rules in their transactions; tenants are sources of 
revenue and the provider’s responsibilities include offering the bare minimum of housing.  
 
The critical insight uncovered in this research is that the enclave’s rules supersede the rights 
and protections afforded by legal status if the tenant has obtained housing on the informal 
market.  It does not matter in the informal market whether one is documented or 
undocumented.  Legal status gives one access to all segments of the formal housing market, 
but if the tenant fails to find housing through this formal channel, they are without recourse.  
For many migrants who find housing on the superior informal market, being unable to access 
housing directly on the formal market is an unimportant consequence.  They prefer living 
with other Ghanaians whom they regard as family; they share language, culture, religion and 
a community.  For them, the informal market offers quick and socially rich housing options.  
On the other hand, migrants who find housing on the inferior informal market have a 
noticeably worse experience, as their legal status is of little value in this particular context.  
Many lack the resources needed to bypass this situation and find their housing directly and 
are hesitant to act upon the housing benefits that are available to them.  Therefore, inferior 
housing remains their only option.  
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These findings confound the research hypothesis on the importance of legal status in 
accessing housing.  The nature of urban informality in the Bronx is such that what matters are 
transnational ties that continue from West Africa into the Bronx.  For those living on the 
margins in the context of an ethnic community, it is these connections that afford the greatest 
degree of protections, privileges, and rights. 
 
Nevertheless, there are clearly adverse consequences to overdependence upon one’s 
enclave’s resources.  Even in the scope of accessing housing, migrants deeply enmeshed in 
the informal market as their main avenue for obtaining access find it difficult to extricate 
themselves from that market.  Such dependency reflects an inability to integrate into the 
institutions of mainstream society.  This arguably complicates the assimilation component of 
ethnic enclave theory (Portes 1987; Massey 1985; Alba, and Nee 1997).  Residing within an 
ethnic community is a temporary state that migrants use to afford the cost associated with 
living in a new country where they are at the bottom of the economic ladder.  Over time, 
however, assimilation should take place, whereby the migrants are integrated into mainstream 
society and its civic institutions.  This is not necessarily the case among Ghanaians or their 
larger West African cohort.  For example, this research has observed the ineffective nature of 
the only political institution for Africans in New York:  The African Advisory Council.  
Migrants remain broadly unaware of this public-private organisation and affirm that there is 
no need for them to reach outside of their community to access assistance.  Thus, migrants 
remain strongly network dependent.  
 
This can have adverse consequences.  For instance, religious institutions are also bastions of 
misinformation despite the important spiritual as well as networking resources they provide. 
Leaders at these institutions often disseminate inaccurate facts about immigration rules in the 
United States and strongly discourage their low-income congregation from taking advantage 
of public resources that would ameliorate their economic circumstances.  However, 
consistent with enclave theory, the positive resources created by the ethnic enclave perpetuate 
the enclave’s endurance and the dependencies it creates among its Ghanaian members.  In 
this sense, the ethnic enclave, and the notion of bounded solidarity therein, appear to function 
in some ways as a binding force among these migrants, which is consistent with the critiques 
of ethnic communities made by Mahler (1995) and Burgers (1998ab).   
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7.3 Implications  
 
By adapting urban informality, this research uncovered the underlying allocation mechanisms 
that apply to migrant communities in how they access and navigate the rental sector.  At the 
first level, housing allocation processes are differentiated based on ethnic community ties.  
As shown in the Strategies chapter, individuals with the most robust ties to their ethnic 
community’s social network ultimately have the greatest variety of strategic options available 
to them to access housing.  These individuals have numerous potential allocation options 
available.  They can gain housing directly through a provider who is willing to use informal 
screening.  Alternatively, they can use other members of their social network who will either 
sublet a room or will transfer the entire unit because this would prove mutually advantageous.  
Each of these pathways illustrates that the informal market is organised distinctly from the 
larger formal system in which it exists.  The rules therein are based on network-ties; different 
rules apply depending on whether one is a member of the in-group. 
 
The structures of this realm also reflect certain values of the ethnic community. This is 
apparent in how female migrants are placed in the housing market.  For Ghanaian women, the 
pathway to access housing does not depend on whether there are strong ties to their ethnic 
community per se, but rather, whether the woman in question is single or married. This 
illustrates a structural patriarchy in housing allocation.  Women who arrive alone or without a 
spouse encounter minimal difficulty in finding accommodations.  In fact, these women will 
often pay little to nothing for their housing, but they will become trapped in a type of 
indentured servitude that constrains their autonomy. Over time female migrants find it 
difficult to exercise personal choice and live on their own.  Indeed, their only escape from 
these housing circumstances is marriage.  If they arrive with their spouse or meet their spouse 
who is already living in the Bronx, they do not confront the housing market directly at all.  
Their pathways follow that of their spouse.  If they are unmarried and find themselves living 
cost-free in the indentured servitude circumstances previously described, they can only leave 
and create their own household through marriage. 
 
The Ghanaian community has therefore devised a largely self-governed housing market, 
which mixes informality within formality and integrates values that are most important for 
members of this community, namely,  familial ties to other Ghanaians.  The religious 
institution serves as their informal regulatory agency.  It connects Ghanaians to one another 
and also mediates disputes, for it serves as a forum that informal provider and tenant 
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mutually recognise and respect.  A deeper insight is that the Ghanaians' informal housing 
market mirrors the formal housing market in certain aspects.  This is partly due to the fact 
that informal units are actually formal units that have been repurposed by their occupants.  
Those living in these units must continue to pay utilities and otherwise abide by laws and 
rules of decorum that apply.  Yet migrants also engage with one another on terms that follow 
practices in the formal system, for example, some charge security deposits, others mediate 
disputes via a third-party.  Hence, there is clearly some convergence between the formal and 
informal systems. 
 
7.3.1 Policy Implications  
 
The policy prescriptions that follow are derived from the qualitative findings and analysis 
shown in this study.  These proposals have a two-fold aim:  first, to build on the advantages 
of the systems that migrants have constructed, which are often innovative and responsive to 
the practical needs of their community; second, to minimise practices that have a clear 
deleterious effect and allow for exploitation. 
 
Execute a Targeted and Sustained ‘Know Your Rights’ Information Campaign:  There 
is an epidemic of misinformation within the West African community regarding the rights 
one has as an immigrant.  This study has found countless examples of migrants refraining 
from seeking public assistance because they falsely believed that doing so would compromise 
their ability to invite family members to the United States through the Family Reunification 
program.  There is also a general fear among migrants of communicating with public 
authorities regarding unsafe housing conditions, financial exploitation, and many other 
legitimate concerns.  This fear arises from a nebulous belief that reaching out to official 
institutions will result in personal scrutiny that may have adverse consequences on the 
individual raising the complaint.  Fundamental to the misinformed concerns that migrants 
hold is a broad lack of awareness of the rights of individuals in the United States.   
 
As such, a highly useful policy would entail a program to educate members of the West 
African public using their preferred avenues of communication (e.g., local religious 
institutions, community radio stations, newspapers, etc.) on their rights as well as signposting 
where they can reach out for help from the government depending on their issue.   
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In order for this information campaign to be useful and effective, it must emulate the 
protocols used during the Ebola Outbreak in 2014-2015.  In this period, city officials worked 
in concert to ensure that accurate information penetrated into the community by using 
multiple platforms, including both media and local community liaisons who were given 
training, scripts and fact sheets. 
 
Local Leaders Training Program:  Implementing the ‘Know Your Rights’ Information 
Campaign should be complemented by a training program for community leaders, 
particularly clergy members in the West African community.  Again, such a program would, 
in many ways, be a more formalised version of the type of recruiting and training that took 
place during the Ebola Outbreak.  However, whereas the aim of that effort was to grapple 
with an immediate emergency, the Local Leaders Training Program would be a sustained, 
continuing education program that is aimed at targeting the sources of misinformation rather 
than only raising awareness.   
 
Specifically, as has been documented in this study, the clergy plays an important role in the 
Ghanaian community.  Among other things, they disseminate information and foster 
connections between Ghanaians.  Yet acting in this capacity, many of these religious leaders 
spread harmful myths – such as the aforementioned misinformation regarding the Family 
Reunification program.  Hence, the proposal to educate these clergy members (alongside 
other community leaders) is intended to: (a) correct misconceptions and provide transferable 
information that would be shared to their congregations; and (b) create a standardised set of 
information that can function as a fact-check against those who continue to spread myths.  
Furthermore, the attendees of this training program can claim a symbolic credential from 
their participation, which is important in that it increases their own credibility and thus gives 
them an incentive to participate.   
 
West African Cultural Competency Training at the 311 Call Centre:  New York City 
pioneered the first-in-the-nation 311 hotline, which allows local residents to easily reach a 
call centre staffed by trained city personnel who can assist with non-emergent issues.  This 
assistance ranges from reporting noise complaints and potholes to anonymously requesting 
emergency inspections from the Building Department.  While this resource is extremely 
useful for New Yorkers generally, it is not commonly used by Ghanaians or their larger West 
African cohort.  This may in part be due to the fact that there is a dearth of cultural 
competency training in dealing with West African populations.  Many of the intermediaries 
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interviewed in this study have recognised the wariness among West Africans of sharing 
information with official entities.  A few of these intermediary organizations have executed 
programs to re-train their intake personnel to be mindful, respectful, and accommodating of 
the cultural sensitivities of West Africans.  A similar program of West African Cultural 
Competency Training should be implemented at the 311 Call Centre.   
 
Tax Abatement and Incentive Financing for Hostel-Housing Pilot Program:  New York 
City provides developers with financial incentives to build affordable housing, including low 
interest financing for construction and property tax abatements.  Conventionally, the 
developer agrees to rent regulations in exchange for these economic incentives. However, the 
way in which these units are constructed is not generally a subject of this negotiation between 
the developer and the city.  The proposed pilot program envisions the providing of financial 
incentives to developers who build hostel-housing complexes, where the tenants would rent 
single rooms with shared access to kitchens and bathroom facilities.  Units in these 
complexes may be similarly designed as apartments with shared living space, but each 
individual tenant would pay the provider directly for their room and the shared facilities.  
Moreover, these rents would also be governed by the Rent Guidelines Board. 
 
This pilot program aims to emulate the physical design and pricing of informal housing units 
while allowing for better defined regulatory oversight from public authorities.  This program 
is also a learning opportunity for the local government to design new housing and related 
regulations to more aptly respond to all segments of the local housing market.   
 
Legally Recognizing Roommate Housing Arrangements:  The Housing Court in New 
York City recognizes legal contracts between landlords (housing providers) and tenants, but 
it does not have a mechanism for adjudicating disputes between two or more tenants of the 
same household.  Where such disputes arise, only the leaseholder(s) will prevail because they 
are the only individual with a legal right to reside in the unit.  As such, complementing the 
Hostel-Housing Pilot Program, new procedures must be devised to regulate the sub-letting of 
single rooms within housing units to allow for impartial arbitration.  These procedures may 
resemble settlement conferencing, a type of legal proceeding that takes place outside of the 
courtroom but under the administration of a judicial officer.  The objective here is to devise a 
functional, low-cost, and relevant legal structure to govern housing arrangements that are 
commonplace in low-income communities, particularly among migrants, that presently fall in 
an institutional void.  
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Increase Enforcement Against Housing Benefit Discrimination:  The private providers 
interviewed in this study widely acknowledge that they discriminate against tenants who 
receive housing benefits, for many believe that those who receive benefits are less profitable 
as tenants because they demand more repairs.  Many of these providers also distrust the 
reliability of the benefits, fearing that the programs themselves might be discontinued.  While 
it is presently illegal to discriminate on the basis of payment method, it is clear from speaking 
with providers that enforcement of this regulation could be improved.  Renewed enforcement 
efforts should also be coupled with efforts to educate providers on the reliability of the 
various benefit programs that tenants may use, for some concerns about the financial 
sustainability of these benefits are unfounded.     
 
Simplification and Standardisation of the Housing Application Process:  While there is 
broad convergence across most providers in the types of supporting documentation required 
on their housing applications, applying to numerous properties remains an onerous 
experience.  This is because providers require a large volume of documentation and vary in 
how they want these materials submitted (e.g., notarized).  Moreover, there is no centralised 
portal through which prospective tenants can compile the required documentation; each 
property must be applied to individually.  
 
The housing application process should be simplified and standardised by: (a) devising a set 
list of materials that can be requested by all providers; and (b) by creating a centralised online 
portal where that information could be submitted.  This simplification should help 
prospective tenants and providers alike in that it would reduce the time and cost required to 
process applications.  For instance, providers could more easily keep track of submitted 
documents and prospective tenants would only need to pay for a credit check once per 
application period rather than for each application.   
 
If the formal housing application process itself was made easier to complete, it would be 
more inviting to populations that avoid seeking housing this way, at least in part because it is 
currently too complex and onerous a task.  There is also precedent for this proposal found in 
public housing in New York City: public housing has one standardised application that must 
be submitted online.  
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7.4 Chapter Conclusion 
 
7.4.1 Summary  
 
This study reveals that informality exists within formality.  Housing informality takes shape 
where formal units are co-opted and rented on the informal market.  Equally, formal market 
customs (e.g., security deposits) may be emulated on the informal market.   
 
The fact that Ghanaians have created a complex informal market in the Bronx that resembles 
elements of settlements in the Global South does not explain the processes by which housing 
is allocated in the Bronx, however.  Such processes have been discerned only? through 
examining the housing experiences of Ghanaian migrants.  This examination reveals why the 
Bronx forms the ideal space for first-world urban informality, namely:  its relative cheapness 
of housing; proximity to employment opportunities; complicit housing providers; the 
indifference of institutional actors to illegal and irregular housing arrangements; and, of 
course, the steady influx of low-wage migrants. 
 
The Bronx further shows an overlapping dynamic between formal and informal markets, as 
seen through the ways in which migrants obtain housing and make it available to members of 
their enclave community.  For instance, some migrants must first legally obtain housing 
through formal channels before subletting it on the informal market.  Yet, in so doing, they 
are free to devise their own unique allocation processes.  These processes reflect the values 
and institutions that are important to Ghanaians and illustrate hierarchies within their enclave:  
social connections to other Ghanaian migrants are critical to obtaining affordable housing 
that comes with community-based protections against eviction.  Migrants who do not have 
strong bonded ties to their community must, invariably, seek housing on a separate, inferior 
informal market available to West Africans but without the amenities and protections.   
 
7.4.2 Discussion 
  
This research fills an important gap in explaining how hidden informal housing markets 
function in a/the developing world context.  In answering the first research question 
regarding how legal status shapes access to housing, these findings establish that legal status 
is not the organising framework for the housing market for Ghanaian migrants.  This 
confounded the first hypothesis.  This chapter added nuance by further explaining how this 
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housing market is organised, and how informality emerges from within the formal housing 
market.  
 
The findings show that both informal and formal systems are interdependent.  For instance, 
housing providers prefer migrant tenants for profit-seeking reasons.  Therefore, they create an 
alternate screening process for migrants unable to complete their formal applications.  Public 
authorities for their part do not regulate the means that migrants use to facilitate affordability: 
illegal sub-divisions and overcrowding.  Instead, these authorities only react to issues where 
either the tenant or provider raises a concern.  Neither of these parties has much incentive to 
involve regulatory authorities.  Hence, a combination of self-interest and/or indifference 
engender complicity from housing actors in the formal system, which in turn allows the 
informal housing market to form and flourish.   
 
It is important to recognise that the informal market emerges to fill a clear need:  housing for 
poor migrants who (mostly) only require and can afford single beds or rooms.  Urban 
informality anticipates this outcome.  However, the structure of the markets that migrants 
have created shows a deeper complexity that could only be understood through examining 
inter-community dynamics and the critical role of social ties among Ghanaians.  These ties 
allow for segmentation in the informal housing market and shape the allocation processes that 
exist in each market.   
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8 
Summary and Discussion 
 
8.1   Summary 
8.1.1 Hypotheses Revisited 
8.1.2 Confounding Findings  
 
8.2  Discussion  
 
8.3  Contribution to Knowledge  
8.3.1  Limitations 
8.3.2   Further Work 
 
This chapter presents the dissertation conclusion.  It is comprised of three parts.  Part 8.1 
explains the original hypotheses in relation to the research findings.  Part 8.2 reflects on the 
conceptual approach and implications of the findings.  Part 8.3 explains how this study has 
meaningfully contributed to knowledge, as well as the limitations of this work and where 
further study would be helpful.  
 
8.1  Summary 
 
8.1.1  Hypotheses Revisited 
 
The research findings confound and complicate the two initial hypotheses: 
 
1. Undocumented Ghanaian migrants are meaningfully disadvantaged relative to their 
documented counterparts in accessing housing because they lack legal status.   
 
The first hypothesis held that because legal status is a requisite condition for obtaining all 
manner of resources, including employment and financial documentation in the United 
States, those without such status would face significant access barriers, including limited 
housing choice, higher cost and greater dissatisfaction.   This is because, unlike low-income 
documented migrants, the undocumented would be precluded from the formal housing 
market because they would not be able to satisfy the application requirements.   In addition, 
undocumented migrants are not eligible for benefits, including rental subsidies, giving them 
fewer resources.  This study therefore expected that undocumented migrants would be 
relegated to making (inferior) informal housing arrangements.   
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2. On both formal and informal housing markets, allocation is influenced by non-market 
actors, intermediaries, who can act as gatekeepers.   
 
The second hypothesis anticipated that non-market intermediaries would play a key role in 
housing allocation in the Bronx.  These intermediaries could help their constituencies of low-
income persons to find housing on the formal market.  This hypothesis further held that social 
service agencies and ethnic group networks would also assist migrants in finding informal 
housing where formal alternatives did not materialise.  
 
8.1.2  Confounding Findings 
 
1. First Hypothesis  
 
The findings establish that lack of legal status does not appear to restrain Ghanaian migrants 
from accessing housing, confounding the first hypothesis.  
 
Undocumented migrants have developed a means for bypassing the constraints of their legal 
status.  First, migrants have cultivated a network of housing providers who waive application 
requirements.  Second, and more commonly, migrants rely on their community to find 
housing.  This latter housing pathway is where co-ethnic group membership determines 
access.   Migrants have therefore constructed an informal housing market for themselves that 
has two tiers:  superior and inferior.  
 
The superior informal market is the primary housing pathway for undocumented 
migrants.  These migrants gain housing via this pathway by activating their strong 
transnational ties upon migrating from Ghana to the United States.  In this scenario, the 
inbound migrant will contact a cousin, uncle, distant relative, or friend prior to commencing 
their journey.  Those receiving new undocumented migrants offer multiple forms of 
settlement assistance, including housing and employment.  Hence, undocumented migrants 
can overcome many of the barriers arising from their lack of legal status because their strong 
ties to other Ghanaians provide critical social support. 
 
The inferior informal market is the domain of migrants unable to afford formal housing and 
who lack the social ties needed to access the superior informal market.  The inferior market 
does not provide the social network-based amenities and protections that are offered on the 
superior market.  Namely, those living in this type of inferior informal housing had 
exploitative roommate-landlords who charged higher rents for overcrowded spaces and could 
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summarily evict their ‘tenants’ with no recourse.   Such experiences accounted for the broad 
dissatisfaction among those migrants who found themselves resigned to the inferior market.  
 
Documented migrants lacked critical transnational social ties because they invariably arrived 
in America through a randomised visa lottery, the Diversity Visa program.  These migrants 
received legal status by chance and had only months to make travel arrangements, otherwise 
they would forfeit their visa.  Most of these migrants did not have familial ties to Ghanaians 
already living in New York.   And without such ties, new arriving migrants suffered from a 
dearth of social capital, placing them at a disadvantage in accessing housing.  Moreover, this 
disadvantage proves difficult to overcome even with time, as those outside of the existing 
communal networks cannot easily join these relationships – much in the same way one 
cannot simply join a family in moving to a new place, despite being culturally and ethnically 
similar to those already living there.  
 
The documented migrant experience stands in stark contrast with the way that undocumented 
migrants arrived: undocumented migrants came on visiting visas on which they planned to 
overstay; their travel to the US was planned in advance and at the advice of their relatives in 
New York who would provide important assistance when they arrived.  In short, most of the 
documented migrants surveyed in this study could not avail themselves of the advantages of 
Ghanaian ethnic membership because they simply did not have familial relationships to other 
migrants within their community and could not break into these established networks.   Such 
transnational familial relationships are the backbone of social capital within the Ghanaian 
community. 
 
The hypothesis expected that documented migrants would encounter far fewer obstacles in 
the housing market.  They could use their legal status to obtain legal employment that 
provides payment records and tax receipts and hence have the paperwork needed to obtain an 
apartment unit.  They could also legally apply for public support for food assistance, free 
healthcare, and housing benefits if their income proved sufficiently low.  This study did not 
anticipate that documented migrants would have a deep apprehension toward pursuing public 
benefits.  As a result, these migrants proved more similar to their undocumented counterparts 
than expected:  they did not receive benefits.  They also had sizable remittance obligations to 
their families in Ghana.  This obligation—a type of familial tax—placed both documented 
and undocumented migrants on comparable economic footing.  
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The polarised experiences between documented and undocumented migrants illustrated that 
legal status was not an all-important issue in the housing market among extremely poor 
migrants.  In fact, the notion of legal status, from a day-to-day experience, proved to be a 
remote, amorphous, seldom exercised privilege – unless one sought public benefits.  Yet, 
because migrants broadly opted against pursuing benefits, what mattered most was the ethnic 
enclave, which facilitated access to social network-based resources to help with overcoming 
barriers in accessing housing.   
 
These findings, however, should not be construed to mean that legal status is unimportant to 
undocumented migrants.  Indeed, these migrants recognize that ‘becoming legal’ provides 
enormous security for themselves and their families.  This is why so many undocumented 
migrants aspire to obtain it by pursuing marriage with a documented individual as a strategy 
to obtain legal status.  Thus, the best way to interpret the implications of legal status in terms 
of access to housing is to situate these findings in context:  in the extremely poor segment of 
the housing market where migrants predominate, social capital plays a vastly more crucial 
role than legal status.  However, having legal status is not itself a burden of any kind.  
 
2. Second Hypothesis  
 
The findings also showed that housing allocation primarily functioned according to the will 
of providers and that intermediaries acted in a mostly peripheral capacity.   
 
This result confounded the second hypothesis:  that intermediaries played an important role in 
housing allocation, ensuring that low-income tenants could access affordable housing.  The 
hypothesis was based on the successful history that housing advocacy non-profits have in 
New York broadly, and in the Bronx specifically, with assisting low-income tenants.     
 
This research found that housing advocacy non-profits operate on the margins in the housing 
market.  They connect those at immediate risk of eviction with social service agencies that 
may be able to provide emergency financial support.  They also organise tenants to form 
associations to advocate for repairs where the owner or management has a history of 
neglect.  But these non-profits are not capable of assisting someone to find housing, for they 
do not have influence with providers.  Even within the scope of the services that they do 
offer, non-profits acknowledge their outreach efforts do not interest West African 
tenants.  Thus, for migrants, non-profits are particularly irrelevant as intermediary actors.  
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Other intermediary actors, such as public authorities and the housing court, are disconnected 
from Ghanaian migrants by design.  These authorities are reactive administrators, only 
becoming involved in housing matters at the request of either tenant or landlord.  However, 
this research found that Ghanaian migrants remain very apprehensive toward reaching out to 
public authorities, resembling their behaviour with public benefits.   Hence, these actors are 
also mostly unimportant intermediaries for migrants.  
 
Religious institutions play a more important role for migrants, relative to other 
intermediaries. They act as facilitators, connecting migrants who need housing to those who 
have rooms available.  They also serve to mediate disputes between migrants within their 
congregation.  In short, religious institutions obtain their limited power by virtue of the fact 
that Ghanaian migrants trust, respect and abide by the advice of their leaders.  
 
Ultimately, though, providers are the principal gatekeepers in the housing market.  This 
group includes landlords, property management organisations, as well as tenants who operate 
as informal providers because they sublet portions of their housing units.  All these providers 
function in the same capacity:  they decide who rents their property and can employ whatever 
selection criteria they wish.   
 
This research found that providers set both explicit and implicit rules for housing allocation. 
The formal process embodies the explicit rules:  it includes financial due diligence whereby 
the provider collects information from the prospective tenant to decide whether the applicant 
poses a default risk.  This process requires written forms and is publicised.  The informal 
process has the same purpose as the formal process, to select only financially viable tenants, 
but it is governed by implicit rules.  In this process, the landlord uses reputational equity, the 
word of an existing tenant who advocates on behalf of a prospective tenant.  The provider 
implicitly trusts the existing (migrant) tenant not to vouch for a risky applicant.  Providers 
further understand that the existing tenant would step in in the event of default to preserve 
their own credibility, but also because they know migrants to support each other.  
 
What both formal and informal allocation processes illustrate is that the providers are 
complicit in the formation of the informal housing market.  They select tenants on the basis 
of their ethnic group, thereby increasing ethnic concentration in a neighbourhood or 
building.  Once the migrant tenant comes to occupy the unit, landlords remain broadly 
indifferent to who lives in their apartment and how that unit might be transferred within the 
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migrant community.  Indeed, the providers’ interests invariably begin and end at the point of 
rent collection; as long as that remains uninterrupted and there are no reports of damage or 
repairs required, they leave migrant tenants alone.   
 
8.2  Discussion 
 
Ghanaian migrants in the Bronx have created a tiered informal housing market within the 
confines of a formal market.  These migrants did not construct physical settlements to form 
their informal housing.  Their informality instead emerges in processes:  co-opting housing 
units, bypassing housing applications, illegal subletting.  The hidden informal market that 
migrants have devised embodies urban informality; it has emerged and flourished through a 
permitted institutional vacuum.  
 
Migrants are able to create their tiered informal housing market because providers are 
complicit and government authorities are indifferent.  The findings revealed that some 
providers offer alternate pathways for undocumented migrants to access their units.  Instead 
of conducting due diligence using financial records that such migrants lack, providers use 
referrals from existing migrant tenants.  Providers do not use the formal application process 
with their preferred migrant groups.  This enables the undocumented to avoid an otherwise 
significant access barrier.  Migrants, for their part, sublet their homes to others in their 
community, including to newly arriving Ghanaians.  This cycle of converting formal housing 
units into stock on the informal market is allowed by complicit providers.  Providers are 
content to allow migrants to overcrowd in their buildings because it does not adversely 
impact them financially.  To the contrary, migrants pay on time, seldom make repair requests, 
and are long term tenants – even if the original tenant leaves, he usually unofficially transfers 
the unit to a co-ethnic.   
 
While public authorities have clear enforcement powers as well as a responsibility to crack 
down on hazardous overcrowding and provider exploitation, this remains uncommon. 
Enforcement against neglectful providers only occurs where housing advocacy non-profits 
organised the complaining tenants, invariably native residents.  Providers tend to view native 
residents as entitled, ‘needy,’ and costly.  Frustration with native citizen tenants, therefore, 
creates opportunities for migrants, as providers prefer tenants who are unlikely to complain 
and/or become organised into tenant associations.  Thus, the combination of institutional 
indifference and profit-seeking of providers allows for the particular form of urban 
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informality that takes shape in the Bronx:  formal housing units are repurposed on an 
informal migrant-only housing market. 
 
The informal housing market in the Bronx is regulated through trust-based ethnic ties because 
of the inherent institutional vacuum of urban informality.  The suspended sovereignty allows 
informality to emerge, but regulation of this ungoverned realm is left to its occupants. The 
regulatory structure that migrants have devised is grounded in ethnic kinship:  all Ghanaian 
migrants are members of their enclave, but those with the strongest ties to other migrants – 
such as familial bonds – fare better under the informal housing regime.   
 
In-group members of the enclave, those who have transnational familial ties to other 
Ghanaian migrants in their community, benefit enormously from their social ties to other 
migrants.  For example, migrants who can access the superior informal market receive a rent-
free grace period, pay an equally divided monthly rent, and are broadly satisfied with their 
roommates, who are other Ghanaian migrants of the same religious background.  Shared 
religious institutions intensify bonds between migrants, so that there is an unspoken notion of 
obligation that all members of this community have toward one another.  Existing migrants 
therefore pay it forward to newly arriving migrants.  In contrast, those outside of the 
enclave’s circle of trust, through no fault of their own, must vie for housing with resource 
limitations and social obligations to their families in Ghana, but without the full network of 
amenities of the migrant enclave.  
 
Social capital and survival strategies are also intimately linked to the ethnic enclave.  In the 
enclave, social capital is traded as a resource.  Those with high levels of social capital, strong 
ties to other migrants within their enclave, can exercise a broader range of survival 
strategies.  For instance, migrants with high social capital can find providers who will rent 
them an apartment unit by referral, even if they would not ordinarily qualify based on their 
income or legal status.  Migrants with low social capital still live in the enclave, but their 
strategic options are limited.  For example, such a migrant can find a bed or room for rent in a 
fellow West African’s apartment through an African Market.  Here, access is possible 
because of shared ethnicity, but social bonds are notably weaker.  This makes this segment of 
the informal market inferior:  it does not have the same protections given to those who have 
stronger ties to their informal housing provider.   
 
161 
 
The exploitative practices of informal providers reveal a prototypical ungoverned 
market.  Rent, tenure security and rights for any tenant living in informal housing is set by the 
leaseholder, the migrant who acts as the informal provider.  These informal providers are 
other West Africans who are subletting space for profit or to eliminate their personal housing 
expenses.  Though they are part of the larger West African community, these providers have 
little connection to the Ghanaian migrant tenant beyond a common African heritage.  This 
lack of social connection permits economic exploitation that is characteristic of the inferior 
informal market; social norms, reputational consequences and the authority of religious 
institutions do not apply here.  Nor will regulatory institutions step in, as the migrant tenant 
has no recognised claim to their informal unit, and the tenants are unlikely to seek out such 
government support anyway.  
 
Per urban informality, the informal housing market that migrants have created emerges 
because the state has strategically suspended its authority to allow for urbanisation.  To what 
degree can we attribute intentionality to the state in this process?  This research did not 
uncover direct evidence of officials in the Bronx stating a wilful disregard for regulating 
certain segments of the housing market.  However, it was revealed that institutional priorities 
are focused on those constituencies that demand their attention.  So, affordable housing 
projects are built for poor native citizens and enforcement is taken against housing providers 
whose malfeasance is brought to the attention of regulatory agencies.  The research assumes 
state authorities are acting rationally in where and how they expend resources.  With this 
assumption, it follows that the informal housing processes and tiered market that migrants 
have devised will remain uninterrupted, as there is no political will to alter arrangements that 
have clear positive externalities for the local economy and conserve public resources.  Yet, as 
is shown in the literature, authorities can always reassert control over unregulated space 
should the will arise.  In a Global North context such as New York City, which has strong, 
well-functioning governing institutions, the state has more than sufficient capabilities to do 
so.       
 
8.3  Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This study has sought to answer fundamental questions as to how legal status shapes access 
to housing in a Global North market.  Pursuing this line of inquiry has yielded important 
contributions to knowledge that pertain to methodology, theory and migrants as subject 
matter.   
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Methodology:  Conventionally, research into housing focuses on large datasets that describe 
the formal market.  However, poor migrants are not often participants in the surveys that 
make up those datasets, so little is known about how they navigate the housing market.   
 
This study devised a mixed methods approach that used quantitative datasets as a building 
block for understanding existing knowledge.  This information then shaped how and what 
qualitative data would be pursued to fill in the missing gaps.  For instance, New York City’s 
estimates of populations living in informal arrangements (hidden homes) inform targeted 
migrant sampling.  
 
Housing research can broadly benefit from adopting techniques that gather qualitative data 
where standard quantitative methods leave gaps.  The ethnographic techniques used in this 
study, which build on the work of Rex and Moore (1967), focus extensively on interviewing 
hidden populations who would not otherwise respond to census surveying.  This mixed 
methods approach enabled the uncovering of new, interesting and confounding 
findings.  Hence, methodology is the most generalizable feature of this study.   
 
Conceptual Framework:  Hart (1973) famously argued that wherever formal institutions are 
weak and unreliable, people will participate in both formal and informal economies alike to 
survive.  The argument made in this study is that broad-scale informality emerges even where 
governing institutions are strong and active.  The adapted urban informality theory developed 
in this research presents a language and set of tools for observing, investigating and 
understanding relationships between formality and informality outside of the Global 
South.  The theory situates the institutional logic that permits informal systems to emerge and 
flourish in highly formalised environs.  It also provides a framework for examining 
individual and community behaviour among those who create and operate these informal 
systems.  Applications for this conceptual approach include housing studies as well as urban 
economics.   
 
For housing studies, the conceptual framework situates understudied, hidden housing as part 
of the larger housing market.  This allows for a deeper and more nuanced appreciation of all 
available housing options and why it is that certain populations choose a particular housing 
market over another.  In addition, this approach further helps with observing the ties that exist 
between formal structures and the informal practices that emerge where such structures are 
either absent or not observed, as is the case in informal markets.   
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For urban economics, the conceptual framework suggests that informality plays a greater role 
in cities in the Global North than is conventionally appreciated.   While the focus of this 
study is on housing, a key premise of the conceptual framework is that both formal and 
informal economies are inter-dependent.  This is seen in the housing market where formal 
units are relisted on the informal market.  Measuring the impact of this practice, as well as of 
other activities that bridge informal and formal (e.g., the sharing of work authorisation 
documents between legal and illegal migrants), would be important for a more totalised study 
of an urban economy.  Here, the crucial conceptual insight is to absorb more data into an 
economic model than merely the activity taking place within the formal domain.  
 
Migrants:  Migrants are an oft-discussed category of persons.  As a group, they are at times 
described in media and research in exulting terms because they undertake large risks in 
moving to a new country with the hopes of building a better life for themselves and their 
families.  At other times, however, migrants are demonised as a disruptive group that is 
reluctant to assimilate and drains resources from native citizens.  Either categorisation 
invariably treats migrants as a monolith.  This research has injected a measure of nuance and 
empiricism into the migrant discussion. With respect to the Ghanaian migrants observed in 
this study, there are sub-groups within this community who are separated by their degree of 
social connection to other migrants.  There are further distinctions between males and 
females that also illustrate that gender dynamics play an important role in how migrants 
settle.  This research has demonstrated how differences between migrants can matter.  Such 
differences further illustrate how migrants can be completely divorced from many of the 
institutions of their new homeland.  The findings presented in this study have special import 
for academics and policymakers alike in thinking through how it is that regulations and 
public services will be received by different migrant constituencies.  
 
8.3.1 Limitations 
 
There are important limitations in this study that correspond to where further research would 
be well suited.  
 
Female Migrants:  This study was organised around exploring the role of legal status in 
accessing housing.  The axis of analysis focused on undocumented and documented 
migrants.  But it did not anticipate the role of gender in housing allocation.  As the findings 
show, female migrants face an entirely different set of issues in the housing market:  they are 
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treated as household labourers rather than as prospective tenants and they face social pressure 
to marry.  Gender, thus, cuts across the legal status divide.  But the fact that this issue was an 
un-hypothesised aspect of the research illustrates a key limitation:  the research questions 
were not designed to take into account the role that gender plays within the housing market.  
 
Context and Housing Stock:  The Bronx is comprised of large apartment complexes that are 
mostly rent regulated.  This is a unique housing market even within New York City.  As 
such, the findings uncovered in this study may be isolated.  A housing market comprised of a 
different type of stock that follows a different regulatory regime may make for an entirely 
dissimilar experience for migrants than was found in this study.   The key limitation here is 
that the particular conditions that allow for urban informality in the Bronx may not exist in 
another context where the physical and institutional structure of housing differs significantly.  
 
Case Study Design:  The time constraints of fieldwork meant that this study interviewed its 
migrant subjects at a particular point in their lives and not continuously over a number of 
years.  There was no scope for a longitudinal study.  Such a study could capture changes in 
housing circumstances as they happen for migrants, which may produce further refined 
findings.  
 
8.3.2 Further Work 
 
There are a number of important topics that follow from this study that could further refine 
the conceptual model as well as broaden the generalisability of the findings.    
 
Gender:  As described in the limitations discussion, the role of gender in housing allocation 
was an unexpected issue that emerged in this study.  Investigating how differences between 
male and female migrants shape long-term housing outcomes would be an important line of 
inquiry.  The parameters of such research could explore how female migrants manage the 
constraints and obligations that their community imposes on them and whether this varies 
across different nationality groups. 
 
Housing Stock:  This study focused on the Bronx, which has a unique housing stock that is 
heavily rent-regulated.  Further research could test the viability of the conceptual model 
developed in this research by pursuing a case study in an entirely different city in the Global 
North.  This could help discern how much influence context has in shaping the emergence of 
urban informality.  
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Longitudinal Study:  Equally, further research could follow a population of migrants over 
an extended period of time.  This would allow for a more consistent examination as to how a 
particular group of migrants navigates the housing market.   
 
Labour Markets:  The conceptual framework of this study focuses on informal 
housing.  However, there is also a clear relationship between housing and economic 
activity.  Migrants choose to live in the Bronx because it is proximal to where they decide to 
work.  Many of these migrants participate in both the formal and informal economies.  Their 
economic activity, as such, says much about relationships between different segments of the 
labour market.  This would be an opportune area for further study, as it would explain why 
migrants choose to pursue certain types of occupations, and whether or not they are simply 
resigned to those professions indefinitely or if such occupations are stepping stones to other 
higher-paying work.  For instance, this research uncovered that a significant portion of 
female migrants work in the healthcare industry as live-in aides for the elderly.  Given the 
growing population of elderly persons in New York, as well as throughout the United States, 
the fact that much of the healthcare services provided to this population are provided by 
African migrants is potentially an important area for further study.  
 
Further work focused on migrant communities will serve to expand and deepen the concepts 
and findings presented in this study.  Yet, it will also no doubt uncover, as this research has, 
that migrants are an incredibly resilient, capable, and driven community.  Scores of the 
Ghanaian migrants interviewed in this study explained that they came to the United States to 
pursue their ‘American Dream.’  While they encounter significant difficulties in this 
endeavour, their journeys are nonetheless revealing and inspiring.  This project aspires to 
share the knowledge gained from their experiences to further societal improvement, keeping 
with the migrant tradition of striving toward betterment. 
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Appendix  
 
Appendix 9.1   Sample Private Provider Application
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Appendix 9.2   Sample Non-profit Provider Application 
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Appendix 9.3    Sample Public Provider Application 
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Appendix 9.4   Sample Intermediary Support Document 
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Appendix 9.5 Sample Intermediary Support Document 
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Appendix 9.6  Migrant Interview Schedule 
 
 
1. Where are you originally from? 
2. When did arrive in the U.S.? 
3. Who came with you? 
4. How did you end up living in the Bronx? 
5. Do you have papers?  Since when? 
6. How long have you lived at your current residence? 
7. How big is this place? 
8. How many people live here with you? 
9. Is everyone related? 
10. Where did you live before? 
11. How long do you expect to live here? 
12. Do you have lease? 
13. How much is your rent? 
14. How do you/your family afford your rent?   
15. Does everyone living here contribute? 
16. How did you find your home? 
17. Did consider many other options?  If so, where?   
18. Why did you choose it? 
19. What difficulties did you encounter in finding it? 
20. Are there any difficulties involved with keep it?  If so, what are they? 
21. Does anyone or any organisation help you with your rent? 
22. Are you member of a church, mosque, or community organisation?  If so, which one?   
23. Did they help you in anyway?  
24. Who is your landlord? 
25. Can you describe your relationship with her/him? 
26. Does s/he ever ask you about who lives with you?   
27. How frequently do you interact with this person? 
28. Do you know if your house is regulated (i.e., rent controlled, Section 8, etc.)? 
29. Do you receive public assistance of any kind? If so, how did you qualify? 
30. Did anyone help you find this assistance?  If so, who and how? 
31. Are you happy or unhappy with where you live?  Why or why not? 
32. Do you like your community?   
33. Do you know your neighbours?  Do they help you in anyway? 
34. Did this community influence your decision to move here in anyway? 
35. Where do you want to live next year or the year after that?  And why? 
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Appendix 9.7  Provider Interview Schedule 
 
 
1. How many properties do own or manage?  
2. Are any of them rent regulated?  
3. If so, under what program(s)?  
4. How frequently do visit your properties?  
5. How do you collect rents?  
6. How do your tenants usually pay? (e.g. cash, check, e-payment, etc.?)  
7. How many tenants live in your properties?  
8. What is the range of rents?  
9. How do you find your tenants?  
10. How do they find you? 
11. How do you decide whom to rent to?  
12. Do you always use housing applications? 
13. Do referrals matter? 
14. Do your tenants pay using rental assistance subsides? If so, how many?  
15. Do you always accept such tenants?  
16. Does it matter to you how they pay? Why or why not?  
17. In your view is public assistance rent comparable to the market rates?  
18. If not, why do you accept it?  
19. What are your tenant preferences?  
20. Do you know the immigration status of your tenants?  
21. Does that matter to you in anyway? If so, why?  
22. Do you provide all your tenants with leases?  
23. Do you subdivide your units or allow your tenants to do so on their own? 
24. If you uncover this behaviour what, if anything, do you do? 
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Appendix 9.8  Intermediaries Interview Schedule 
 
 
1. How long has this organisation worked in this community? 
2. How is this organisation funded? 
3. How does the funding affect the type of services provided? 
4. Does your funding source place any restrictions on who may be served? 
5. Who do you serve? 
6. How do you decide who receives your services? 
7. Are undocumented persons among your clientele? 
8. Does this status matter to your organisations work in anyway? 
9. What are the needs of this community? 
10. How do you assist them on housing matters? 
11. What are the types of obstacles they encounter? 
12. How these difficulties resolved?  If they can’t be resolved, what is done? 
13. Do you have clients from West Africa? 
14. Are the housing issues encountered by members of these groups the same or 
different from your experience?  If so, how? 
15. In your view, which undocumented groups fair the worse in the housing market? 
16. What accounts any differences housing access among different undocumented 
communities? 
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